FKIE_CVE-2026-98312
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-10-06 09:18 - Updated: 2026-10-06 09:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: 6fire: fix OOB write from device-reported iso length
usb6fire_pcm_in_urb_handler() sizes each outgoing isochronous packet as
(actual_length - 4) / (in_n_analog << 2) * (out_n_analog << 2) + 4, where
actual_length is the unsigned length the device reported for the matching
IN packet. A packet completed with status 0 and actual_length < 4 wraps
the subtraction to 0x7fffffec; a zero-length isochronous packet is legal
on the bus, and the preceding loop rejects only non-zero status. The sum
reaches memset() on out_urb->buffer, a 4832-byte object from
kcalloc(PCM_MAX_PACKET_SIZE, PCM_N_PACKETS_PER_URB).
Even without the wrap the result is out of bounds: at 88.2/96 kHz the
4-in/6-out scaling turns a full 420-byte IN packet into 628, so eight
packets span 5024 bytes of that buffer. usb_submit_urb() rejects an
over-long descriptor only after the memset() and the
usb6fire_pcm_playback() copy of user PCM data have run.
Guard the subtraction as the sibling usb6fire_pcm_capture() already does,
and limit the frame count to what fits in rt->out_packet_size, the OUT
endpoint's wMaxPacketSize. This bounds total_length by the buffer size
while keeping each packet length aligned to a whole output frame.
BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in usb6fire_pcm_in_urb_handler (sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:338)
Write of size 18446744073709551456 at addr ffff88802a3d0000 by task vhci_rx/5018
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
kasan_check_range (mm/kasan/generic.c:186 mm/kasan/generic.c:200)
__asan_memset (mm/kasan/shadow.c:84)
usb6fire_pcm_in_urb_handler (sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:338)
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657)
usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1741)
vhci_rx_loop (drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c:107 drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c:242)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
Allocated by task 10:
__kmalloc_cache_noprof (mm/slub.c:5563)
usb6fire_pcm_init (sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:560 sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:595)
usb6fire_chip_probe (sound/usb/6fire/chip.c:133)
usb_probe_interface (drivers/usb/core/driver.c:399)
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802a3d0000
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
4832-byte region [ffff88802a3d0000, ffff88802a3d12e0)
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "61e665fb48e9eee44ec6d610514af383b1802cc1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "c6d43ba816d1cf1d125bfbfc938f2a28a87facf9",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "246de677552fe5dede293a1543b632e9853f31e4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "c6d43ba816d1cf1d125bfbfc938f2a28a87facf9",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "001ba7c1d9677225a5ecbc3e60d4865c08bb21d8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "c6d43ba816d1cf1d125bfbfc938f2a28a87facf9",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ea11ade10583cc45af515d6b24510dbfa0184ca6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "c6d43ba816d1cf1d125bfbfc938f2a28a87facf9",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "cdc31537012bc7a58c95c6750db321b69dd802bb",
"status": "affected",
"version": "c6d43ba816d1cf1d125bfbfc938f2a28a87facf9",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "1589afe2d099d3e817873bc474676968d7080410",
"status": "affected",
"version": "c6d43ba816d1cf1d125bfbfc938f2a28a87facf9",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.39"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.39",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.189",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.158",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.112",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.54",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.8",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc4",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: 6fire: fix OOB write from device-reported iso length\n\nusb6fire_pcm_in_urb_handler() sizes each outgoing isochronous packet as\n(actual_length - 4) / (in_n_analog \u003c\u003c 2) * (out_n_analog \u003c\u003c 2) + 4, where\nactual_length is the unsigned length the device reported for the matching\nIN packet. A packet completed with status 0 and actual_length \u003c 4 wraps\nthe subtraction to 0x7fffffec; a zero-length isochronous packet is legal\non the bus, and the preceding loop rejects only non-zero status. The sum\nreaches memset() on out_urb-\u003ebuffer, a 4832-byte object from\nkcalloc(PCM_MAX_PACKET_SIZE, PCM_N_PACKETS_PER_URB).\n\nEven without the wrap the result is out of bounds: at 88.2/96 kHz the\n4-in/6-out scaling turns a full 420-byte IN packet into 628, so eight\npackets span 5024 bytes of that buffer. usb_submit_urb() rejects an\nover-long descriptor only after the memset() and the\nusb6fire_pcm_playback() copy of user PCM data have run.\n\nGuard the subtraction as the sibling usb6fire_pcm_capture() already does,\nand limit the frame count to what fits in rt-\u003eout_packet_size, the OUT\nendpoint\u0027s wMaxPacketSize. This bounds total_length by the buffer size\nwhile keeping each packet length aligned to a whole output frame.\n\n BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in usb6fire_pcm_in_urb_handler (sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:338)\n Write of size 18446744073709551456 at addr ffff88802a3d0000 by task vhci_rx/5018\n Call Trace:\n dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120)\n print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482)\n kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)\n kasan_check_range (mm/kasan/generic.c:186 mm/kasan/generic.c:200)\n __asan_memset (mm/kasan/shadow.c:84)\n usb6fire_pcm_in_urb_handler (sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:338)\n __usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657)\n usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1741)\n vhci_rx_loop (drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c:107 drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c:242)\n kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)\n ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)\n ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)\n\n Allocated by task 10:\n __kmalloc_cache_noprof (mm/slub.c:5563)\n usb6fire_pcm_init (sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:560 sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:595)\n usb6fire_chip_probe (sound/usb/6fire/chip.c:133)\n usb_probe_interface (drivers/usb/core/driver.c:399)\n\n The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802a3d0000\n which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192\n The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of\n 4832-byte region [ffff88802a3d0000, ffff88802a3d12e0)\n Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-98312",
"lastModified": "2026-10-06T09:18:22.727",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-10-06T09:18:22.727",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/001ba7c1d9677225a5ecbc3e60d4865c08bb21d8"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1589afe2d099d3e817873bc474676968d7080410"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/246de677552fe5dede293a1543b632e9853f31e4"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/61e665fb48e9eee44ec6d610514af383b1802cc1"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cdc31537012bc7a58c95c6750db321b69dd802bb"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ea11ade10583cc45af515d6b24510dbfa0184ca6"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
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