GCVE-1-2026-0001
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-01-02 10:20 – Updated: 2026-01-02 13:31
VLAI?
Title
Bundle reference to gpg.fail
Summary
Reference to the gpg.fail
1. Multiple Plaintext Attack on Detached PGP Signatures in GnuPG - https://gpg.fail/detached
2. GnuPG Accepts Path Separators and Path Traversals in Literal Data "Filename" Field - https://gpg.fail/filename
3. Cleartext Signature Plaintext Truncated for Hash Calculation - https://gpg.fail/formfeed
4. Encrypted message malleability checks are incorrectly enforced causing plaintext recovery attacks - https://gpg.fail/malleability
5. Memory Corruption in ASCII-Armor Parsing - https://gpg.fail/memcpy
6. Trusted comment injection (minisign) - https://gpg.fail/minisign
7. Cleartext Signature Forgery in the NotDashEscaped header implementation in GnuPG - https://gpg.fail/notdash
8. OpenPGP Cleartext Signature Framework Susceptible to Format Confusion - https://gpg.fail/notsoclear
9. GnuPG Output Fails To Distinguish Signature Verification Success From Message Content https://gpg.fail/noverify
10. Cleartext Signature Forgery in GnuPG - https://gpg.fail/nullbyte
11. Radix64 Line-Truncation Enabling Polyglot Attacks - https://gpg.fail/polyglot
12. GnuPG may downgrade digest algorithm to SHA1 during key signature checking - https://gpg.fail/sha1
13. GnuPG Trust Packet Parsing Enables Adding Arbitrary Subkeys - https://gpg.fail/trust
14. Trusted comment Injection (minisign) - https://gpg.fail/trustcomment
Severity ?
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
References
| URL | Tags | |
|---|---|---|
Relationships ?
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "gnupg",
"vendor": "gnupg",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected"
}
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}
],
"descriptions": [
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"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
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"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cdiv\u003eReference to the\u0026nbsp;gpg.fail\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e1.\u0026nbsp; Multiple Plaintext Attack on Detached PGP Signatures in GnuPG -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/detached\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/detached\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e2.\u0026nbsp; GnuPG Accepts Path Separators and Path Traversals in Literal Data \"Filename\" Field -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/filename\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/filename\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e3.\u0026nbsp; Cleartext Signature Plaintext Truncated for Hash Calculation -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/formfeed\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/formfeed\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e4.\u0026nbsp; Encrypted message malleability checks are incorrectly enforced causing plaintext recovery attacks -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/malleability\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/malleability\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e5.\u0026nbsp; Memory Corruption in ASCII-Armor Parsing -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/memcpy\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/memcpy\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e6.\u0026nbsp; Trusted comment injection (minisign) -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/minisign\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/minisign\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e7.\u0026nbsp; Cleartext Signature Forgery in the NotDashEscaped header implementation in GnuPG -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/notdash\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/notdash\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e8.\u0026nbsp; OpenPGP Cleartext Signature Framework Susceptible to Format Confusion -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/notsoclear\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/notsoclear\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e9.\u0026nbsp; GnuPG Output Fails To Distinguish Signature Verification Success From Message Content\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/noverify\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/noverify\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e10.\u0026nbsp; Cleartext Signature Forgery in GnuPG -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/nullbyte\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/nullbyte\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e11.\u0026nbsp; Radix64 Line-Truncation Enabling Polyglot Attacks -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/polyglot\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/polyglot\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e12.\u0026nbsp; GnuPG may downgrade digest algorithm to SHA1 during key signature checking -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/sha1\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/sha1\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e13.\u0026nbsp; GnuPG Trust Packet Parsing Enables Adding Arbitrary Subkeys -\u0026nbsp;\u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/trust\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/trust\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e14.\u0026nbsp; Trusted comment Injection (minisign) - \u003ca target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow\" href=\"https://gpg.fail/trustcomment\"\u003ehttps://gpg.fail/trustcomment\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003cdiv\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003c/div\u003e"
}
],
"value": "Reference to the\u00a0gpg.fail\n\n\n\n\n1.\u00a0 Multiple Plaintext Attack on Detached PGP Signatures in GnuPG -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/detached \n2.\u00a0 GnuPG Accepts Path Separators and Path Traversals in Literal Data \"Filename\" Field -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/filename \n3.\u00a0 Cleartext Signature Plaintext Truncated for Hash Calculation -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/formfeed \n4.\u00a0 Encrypted message malleability checks are incorrectly enforced causing plaintext recovery attacks -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/malleability \n5.\u00a0 Memory Corruption in ASCII-Armor Parsing -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/memcpy \n6.\u00a0 Trusted comment injection (minisign) -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/minisign \n7.\u00a0 Cleartext Signature Forgery in the NotDashEscaped header implementation in GnuPG -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/notdash \n8.\u00a0 OpenPGP Cleartext Signature Framework Susceptible to Format Confusion -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/notsoclear \n9.\u00a0 GnuPG Output Fails To Distinguish Signature Verification Success From Message Content\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/noverify \n10.\u00a0 Cleartext Signature Forgery in GnuPG -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/nullbyte \n11.\u00a0 Radix64 Line-Truncation Enabling Polyglot Attacks -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/polyglot \n12.\u00a0 GnuPG may downgrade digest algorithm to SHA1 during key signature checking -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/sha1 \n13.\u00a0 GnuPG Trust Packet Parsing Enables Adding Arbitrary Subkeys -\u00a0 https://gpg.fail/trust \n14.\u00a0 Trusted comment Injection (minisign) - https://gpg.fail/trustcomment"
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"orgId": "00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000"
},
"references": [
{
"url": "https://gpg.fail/"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "UNKNOWN"
},
"title": "Bundle reference to gpg.fail",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory"
}
],
"x_generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 0.2.0"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000",
"datePublished": "2026-01-02T10:20:00.000Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-01-02T13:31:14.359346Z",
"requesterUserId": "00000000-0000-4000-9000-000000000000",
"serial": 1,
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "gcve-1-2026-0001",
"vulnerabilitylookup_history": [
[
"alexandre.dulaunoy@circl.lu",
"2026-01-02T10:20:24.357623Z"
],
[
"alexandre.dulaunoy@circl.lu",
"2026-01-02T10:20:45.873825Z"
],
[
"alexandre.dulaunoy@circl.lu",
"2026-01-02T13:28:12.107109Z"
],
[
"alexandre.dulaunoy@circl.lu",
"2026-01-02T13:31:14.359346Z"
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]
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.1"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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