GHSA-262X-VPC4-RWC6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-01 15:31 – Updated: 2025-11-10 21:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: clear out_curr if all frag chunks of current msg are pruned
A crash was reported by Zhen Chen:
list_del corruption, ffffa035ddf01c18->next is NULL WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 250682 at lib/list_debug.c:49 __list_del_entry_valid+0x59/0xe0 RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x59/0xe0 Call Trace: sctp_sched_dequeue_common+0x17/0x70 [sctp] sctp_sched_fcfs_dequeue+0x37/0x50 [sctp] sctp_outq_flush_data+0x85/0x360 [sctp] sctp_outq_uncork+0x77/0xa0 [sctp] sctp_cmd_interpreter.constprop.0+0x164/0x1450 [sctp] sctp_side_effects+0x37/0xe0 [sctp] sctp_do_sm+0xd0/0x230 [sctp] sctp_primitive_SEND+0x2f/0x40 [sctp] sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0x3fa/0x5c0 [sctp] sctp_sendmsg+0x3d5/0x440 [sctp] sock_sendmsg+0x5b/0x70
and in sctp_sched_fcfs_dequeue() it dequeued a chunk from stream out_curr outq while this outq was empty.
Normally stream->out_curr must be set to NULL once all frag chunks of current msg are dequeued, as we can see in sctp_sched_dequeue_done(). However, in sctp_prsctp_prune_unsent() as it is not a proper dequeue, sctp_sched_dequeue_done() is not called to do this.
This patch is to fix it by simply setting out_curr to NULL when the last frag chunk of current msg is dequeued from out_curr stream in sctp_prsctp_prune_unsent().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-49838"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-01T15:16:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nsctp: clear out_curr if all frag chunks of current msg are pruned\n\nA crash was reported by Zhen Chen:\n\n list_del corruption, ffffa035ddf01c18-\u003enext is NULL\n WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 250682 at lib/list_debug.c:49 __list_del_entry_valid+0x59/0xe0\n RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid+0x59/0xe0\n Call Trace:\n sctp_sched_dequeue_common+0x17/0x70 [sctp]\n sctp_sched_fcfs_dequeue+0x37/0x50 [sctp]\n sctp_outq_flush_data+0x85/0x360 [sctp]\n sctp_outq_uncork+0x77/0xa0 [sctp]\n sctp_cmd_interpreter.constprop.0+0x164/0x1450 [sctp]\n sctp_side_effects+0x37/0xe0 [sctp]\n sctp_do_sm+0xd0/0x230 [sctp]\n sctp_primitive_SEND+0x2f/0x40 [sctp]\n sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0x3fa/0x5c0 [sctp]\n sctp_sendmsg+0x3d5/0x440 [sctp]\n sock_sendmsg+0x5b/0x70\n\nand in sctp_sched_fcfs_dequeue() it dequeued a chunk from stream\nout_curr outq while this outq was empty.\n\nNormally stream-\u003eout_curr must be set to NULL once all frag chunks of\ncurrent msg are dequeued, as we can see in sctp_sched_dequeue_done().\nHowever, in sctp_prsctp_prune_unsent() as it is not a proper dequeue,\nsctp_sched_dequeue_done() is not called to do this.\n\nThis patch is to fix it by simply setting out_curr to NULL when the\nlast frag chunk of current msg is dequeued from out_curr stream in\nsctp_prsctp_prune_unsent().",
"id": "GHSA-262x-vpc4-rwc6",
"modified": "2025-11-10T21:30:28Z",
"published": "2025-05-01T15:31:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-49838"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2ea600b598dd3e061854dd4dd5b4c815397dfcea"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f201ae14ae0f91dbf1cffea7bb1e29e81d4d108"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3eff34e01062ec08fbb45ce2baaaa644550be821"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e27458b18b35caee4b27b37a4a9c503b93cae5cc"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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