GHSA-27WG-99G8-2V4V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-03 21:48 – Updated: 2024-01-03 21:48Impact
In rust-evm, a feature called record_external_operation was introduced, allowing library users to record custom gas changes. This feature can have some bogus interactions with the call stack.
In particular, during finalization of a CREATE or CREATE2, in the case that the substack execution happens successfully, rust-evm will first commit the substate, and then call record_external_operation(Write(out_code.len())). If record_external_operation later fails, this error is returned to the parent call stack, instead of Succeeded. Yet, the substate commitment already happened. This causes smart contracts able to commit state changes, when the parent caller contract receives zero address (which usually indicates that the execution has failed).
This issue only impacts library users with custom record_external_operation that returns errors.
Patches
The issue is patched in release 0.41.1. The commit can be seem here.
Workarounds
None.
References
Patch PR #264.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.41.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "evm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.41.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-21629"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-703"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-01-03T21:48:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-02T22:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nIn `rust-evm`, a feature called `record_external_operation` was introduced, allowing library users to record custom gas changes. This feature can have some bogus interactions with the call stack.\n\nIn particular, during finalization of a `CREATE` or `CREATE2`, in the case that [the substack execution happens successfully](https://github.com/rust-ethereum/evm/blob/release-v041/src/executor/stack/executor.rs#L1012C25-L1012C69), `rust-evm` will first commit the substate, and then call `record_external_operation(Write(out_code.len()))`. If `record_external_operation` later fails, this error is returned to the parent call stack, instead of `Succeeded`. Yet, the substate commitment already happened. This causes smart contracts able to commit state changes, when the parent caller contract receives zero address (which usually indicates that the execution has failed).\n\nThis issue only impacts library users with custom `record_external_operation` that returns errors.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue is patched in release 0.41.1. The commit can be seem [here](https://github.com/rust-ethereum/evm/commit/d8991ec727ad0fb64fe9957a3cd307387a6701e4).\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNone.\n\n### References\n\nPatch PR [#264](https://github.com/rust-ethereum/evm/pull/264).\n",
"id": "GHSA-27wg-99g8-2v4v",
"modified": "2024-01-03T21:48:34Z",
"published": "2024-01-03T21:48:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rust-ethereum/evm/security/advisories/GHSA-27wg-99g8-2v4v"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-21629"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rust-ethereum/evm/pull/264"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rust-ethereum/evm/commit/d8991ec727ad0fb64fe9957a3cd307387a6701e4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rust-ethereum/evm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rust-ethereum/evm/blob/release-v041/src/executor/stack/executor.rs#L1012C25-L1012C69"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Rust EVM erroneousle handles `record_external_operation` error return"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.