Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-2FVV-QXRQ-7JQ6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-18 18:55 – Updated: 2022-08-18 18:55

Summary

apollo-server-core vulnerable to URL-based XSS attack affecting IE11 on default landing page

Details

Impact

The default landing page contained HTML to display a sample curl command which is made visible if the full landing page bundle could not be fetched from Apollo's CDN. The server's URL is directly interpolated into this command inside the browser from window.location.href. On some older browsers such as IE11, this value is not URI-encoded. On such browsers, opening a malicious URL pointing at an Apollo Router could cause execution of attacker-controlled JavaScript.

This only affects Apollo Server with the default landing page enabled. Old browsers visiting your server may be affected if ANY of these apply: - You do not pass any landing page plugin to the plugins option of new ApolloServer. - You pass ApolloServerPluginLandingPageLocalDefault() or ApolloServerPluginLandingPageProductionDefault() to the plugins option of new ApolloServer.

Browsers visiting your server are NOT affected if ANY of these apply: - You pass ApolloServerPluginLandingPageDisabled() to the plugins option of new ApolloServer. - You pass ApolloServerPluginLandingPageGraphQLPlayground() to the plugins option of new ApolloServer. - You pass a custom plugin implementing the renderLandingPage hook to the plugins option of new ApolloServer.

This issue was introduced in v3.0.0 when the landing page feature was added.

Patches

To avoid this, the sample curl command has been removed in release 3.10.1.

Workarounds

Disabling the landing page removes the possibility of exploit:

import { ApolloServerPluginLandingPageDisabled } from 'apollo-server-core';

new ApolloServer({
  plugins: [ApolloServerPluginLandingPageDisabled()],
  // ...
});

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in the Apollo Server repository * Email us at security@apollographql.com

Credits

This issue was discovered by Adrian Denkiewicz of Doyensec.

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "apollo-server-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.10.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-08-18T18:55:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nThe default landing page contained HTML to display a sample `curl` command which is made visible if the full landing page bundle could not be fetched from Apollo\u0027s CDN. The server\u0027s URL is directly interpolated into this command inside the browser from `window.location.href`. On some older browsers such as IE11, this value is not URI-encoded. On such browsers, opening a malicious URL pointing at an Apollo Router could cause execution of attacker-controlled JavaScript.\n\nThis only affects Apollo Server with the [default landing page](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/apollo-server/api/plugin/landing-pages/) enabled. Old browsers visiting your server may be affected if ANY of these apply:\n- You do not pass any landing page plugin to the `plugins` option of `new ApolloServer`.\n- You pass `ApolloServerPluginLandingPageLocalDefault()` or `ApolloServerPluginLandingPageProductionDefault()` to the `plugins` option of `new ApolloServer`.\n\nBrowsers visiting your server are NOT affected if ANY of these apply:\n- You pass `ApolloServerPluginLandingPageDisabled()` to the `plugins` option of `new ApolloServer`.\n- You pass `ApolloServerPluginLandingPageGraphQLPlayground()` to the `plugins` option of `new ApolloServer`.\n- You pass a custom plugin implementing the `renderLandingPage` hook to the `plugins` option of `new ApolloServer`.\n\nThis issue was introduced in v3.0.0 when the landing page feature was added.\n\n### Patches\nTo avoid this, the sample `curl` command has been removed in release 3.10.1.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDisabling the landing page removes the possibility of exploit:\n\n```ts\nimport { ApolloServerPluginLandingPageDisabled } from \u0027apollo-server-core\u0027;\n\nnew ApolloServer({\n  plugins: [ApolloServerPluginLandingPageDisabled()],\n  // ...\n});\n```\n\n### See also\nA similar issue exists in the landing page of Apollo Router. See the corresponding [Apollo Router security advisory](https://github.com/apollographql/router/security/advisories/GHSA-p5q6-hhww-f999).\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [the Apollo Server repository](https://github.com/apollographql/apollo-server/)\n* Email us at [security@apollographql.com](mailto:security@apollographql.com)\n\n### Credits\n\nThis issue was discovered by Adrian Denkiewicz of [Doyensec](https://doyensec.com/research.html).",
  "id": "GHSA-2fvv-qxrq-7jq6",
  "modified": "2022-08-18T18:55:01Z",
  "published": "2022-08-18T18:55:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apollographql/apollo-server/security/advisories/GHSA-2fvv-qxrq-7jq6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/apollographql/apollo-server/commit/68a439b6e3af9edc8a2480092f2d49f058be1e64"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apollographql/apollo-server"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "apollo-server-core vulnerable to URL-based XSS attack affecting IE11 on default landing page"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

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