GHSA-2G2G-8P8H-FGWM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 21:46 – Updated: 2026-06-05 21:47
VLAI
Summary
Twig: XSS in profiler HtmlDumper via unescaped template and profile names
Details

Description

Twig\Profiler\Dumper\HtmlDumper writes Profile::getTemplate() and Profile::getName() straight into its HTML output without escaping:

protected function formatTemplate(Profile $profile, $prefix): string
{
    return \sprintf('%s└ <span style="background-color: %s">%s</span>', $prefix, self::$colors['template'], $profile->getTemplate());
}

The template name comes from the loader (the array key for ArrayLoader, a row id for a database-backed loader, etc.). When that name is attacker-controlled, the profiler dump emits arbitrary HTML, and any browser that renders it executes the injected markup. This is an output-encoding bug in profiler/debug tooling, not a sandbox escape.

Resolution

HtmlDumper now runs both Profile::getTemplate() and Profile::getName() through htmlspecialchars() before inserting them into the HTML output.

Credits

Twig would like to thank El Kharoubi Iosif for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for fixing it.

Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "twig/twig"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47730"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-05T21:46:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Description\n\n`Twig\\Profiler\\Dumper\\HtmlDumper` writes `Profile::getTemplate()` and `Profile::getName()` straight into its HTML output without escaping:\n\n```php\nprotected function formatTemplate(Profile $profile, $prefix): string\n{\n    return \\sprintf(\u0027%s\u2514 \u003cspan style=\"background-color: %s\"\u003e%s\u003c/span\u003e\u0027, $prefix, self::$colors[\u0027template\u0027], $profile-\u003egetTemplate());\n}\n```\n\nThe template name comes from the loader (the array key for `ArrayLoader`, a row id for a database-backed loader, etc.). When that name is attacker-controlled, the profiler dump emits arbitrary HTML, and any browser that renders it executes the injected markup. This is an output-encoding bug in profiler/debug tooling, not a sandbox escape.\n\n### Resolution\n\n`HtmlDumper` now runs both `Profile::getTemplate()` and `Profile::getName()` through `htmlspecialchars()` before inserting them into the HTML output.\n\n### Credits\n\nTwig would like to thank El Kharoubi Iosif for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for fixing it.",
  "id": "GHSA-2g2g-8p8h-fgwm",
  "modified": "2026-06-05T21:47:33Z",
  "published": "2026-06-05T21:46:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/twigphp/Twig/security/advisories/GHSA-2g2g-8p8h-fgwm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/twig/twig/CVE-2026-47730.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/twigphp/Twig"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/twigphp/Twig/releases/tag/v3.26.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://symfony.com/cve-2026-47730"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Twig: XSS in profiler HtmlDumper via unescaped template and profile names"
}



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