GHSA-2J2J-FMXQ-39XM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-13 18:31 – Updated: 2026-03-25 21:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
shmem: fix recovery on rename failures
maple_tree insertions can fail if we are seriously short on memory; simple_offset_rename() does not recover well if it runs into that. The same goes for simple_offset_rename_exchange().
Moreover, shmem_whiteout() expects that if it succeeds, the caller will progress to d_move(), i.e. that shmem_rename2() won't fail past the successful call of shmem_whiteout().
Not hard to fix, fortunately - mtree_store() can't fail if the index we are trying to store into is already present in the tree as a singleton.
For simple_offset_rename_exchange() that's enough - we just need to be careful about the order of operations.
For simple_offset_rename() solution is to preinsert the target into the tree for new_dir; the rest can be done without any potentially failing operations.
That preinsertion has to be done in shmem_rename2() rather than in simple_offset_rename() itself - otherwise we'd need to deal with the possibility of failure after successful shmem_whiteout().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-71072"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-13T16:16:06Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nshmem: fix recovery on rename failures\n\nmaple_tree insertions can fail if we are seriously short on memory;\nsimple_offset_rename() does not recover well if it runs into that.\nThe same goes for simple_offset_rename_exchange().\n\nMoreover, shmem_whiteout() expects that if it succeeds, the caller will\nprogress to d_move(), i.e. that shmem_rename2() won\u0027t fail past the\nsuccessful call of shmem_whiteout().\n\nNot hard to fix, fortunately - mtree_store() can\u0027t fail if the index we\nare trying to store into is already present in the tree as a singleton.\n\nFor simple_offset_rename_exchange() that\u0027s enough - we just need to be\ncareful about the order of operations.\n\nFor simple_offset_rename() solution is to preinsert the target into the\ntree for new_dir; the rest can be done without any potentially failing\noperations.\n\nThat preinsertion has to be done in shmem_rename2() rather than in\nsimple_offset_rename() itself - otherwise we\u0027d need to deal with the\npossibility of failure after successful shmem_whiteout().",
"id": "GHSA-2j2j-fmxq-39xm",
"modified": "2026-03-25T21:30:20Z",
"published": "2026-01-13T18:31:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71072"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4642686699a46718d7f2fb5acd1e9d866a9d9cca"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4b0fe71fb3965d0db83cdfc2f4fe0b3227d70113"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e1b4c6a58304fd490124cc2b454d80edc786665c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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