GHSA-2JX3-FF3V-J7JJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 19:09 – Updated: 2026-09-24 19:09
VLAI
Summary
yara-x: Unvalidated deserialization in safe `Rules::deserialize` allows memory corruption and UB
Details

[!NOTE] This finding was identified during an agentic unsafe Rust code review performed by Gemini AI, followed by human review and verification.

The Issue

The crate exports a public safe API Rules::deserialize accepting any generic byte sequence B: AsRef<[u8]>. It restores compiled rule structures directly from raw bytes using bincode::serde::decode_from_slice.

This decoded Rules struct contains internal lookup tables, including sub_patterns: Vec<(PatternId, SubPattern)>, atoms: Vec<SubPatternAtom>, and lit_pool: BStringPool. Subsequent safe operations assume these internal tables satisfy strict structural invariants:

  • Rules::get_sub_pattern executes unsafe { self.sub_patterns.get_unchecked(sub_pattern_id.0 as usize) }. If untrusted serialized bytes contain an atom referencing an out-of-bounds SubPatternId, calling get_sub_pattern during scanning triggers an out-of-bounds memory read (Undefined Behavior).

https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara-x/blob/5bd1f35db783679c90a3ea1a66bd15fe4e55bef1/lib/src/compiler/rules.rs#L355-L360

  • Metadata::next() extracts string metadata via unsafe { s.to_str_unchecked() }. If serialized bytes corrupt lit_pool indices or structural data, to_str_unchecked constructs a &str pointing to invalid UTF-8 bytes (Undefined Behavior).

https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara-x/blob/5bd1f35db783679c90a3ea1a66bd15fe4e55bef1/lib/src/models.rs#L204-L210

Because passing malformed or untrusted data to Rules::deserialize induces Undefined Behavior in subsequent safe calls (Scanner::new, Scanner::scan) without any unsafe blocks in caller code, this API is unsound.

Minimal Reproduction (Miri / Native Crash) Zip file with crashing_payload: [crashing_payload.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29173221/crashing_payload.zip) We have a payload crashing_payload.bin where only a single byte in the structural metadata tail is mutated (changing a `SubPatternId` from `1` to `248` while keeping the WebAssembly bytecode completely untouched and valid). Below is the self-contained verification script which compiles and runs against the official **unmodified** `yara-x v1.17.0` crate:
use yara_x::{Rules, Scanner};

fn main() {
    // Embed the crashing payload generated by the fuzzer at compile time.
    let serialized = include_bytes!("crashing_payload.bin");
    println!("Loaded embedded crashing payload, length: {}", serialized.len());

    // Deserialize. On unmodified library, this succeeds because the WASM and headers
    // are pristine and structural corruption isn't validated.
    if let Ok(deserialized) = Rules::deserialize(serialized) {
        println!("Deserialization succeeded! Running scanner...");
        let mut scanner = Scanner::new(&deserialized);

        // Run the standard scan, which will execute the WASM and trigger the out-of-bounds read!
        let _ = scanner.scan(b"lorem ipsum dolor sit amet");
        println!("Scanner finished.");
    } else {
        println!("Deserialization failed!");
    }
}
### 1. Miri Trace NOTE: This needs to be run with 1.17.0. I haven't tested this against other versions. Unfortunately I was able to get a miri trace, but I'm not able to reproduce it right now because of lockfile changes. If you're trying this out be sure to use `MIRIFLAGS="-Zmiri-disable-stacked-borrows"` ### 2. Segfault / panics When run natively (without Miri or any sanitizers) on a standard Linux platform, the process immediately segfaults:
$ cargo run --bin verify
Loaded embedded crashing payload, length: 11777
Deserialization succeeded! Running scanner...
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
And with a newer compiler (which appears to have debug assertions in `get_unchecked)`
Deserialization succeeded! Running scanner...

thread 'main' (997442) panicked at lib/src/compiler/rules.rs:404:36:
unsafe precondition(s) violated: slice::get_unchecked requires that the index is within the slice

This indicates a bug in the program. This Undefined Behavior check is optional, and cannot be relied on for safety.
note: run with `RUST_BACKTRACE=1` environment variable to display a backtrace
Suggested Fix To uphold Rust soundness guarantees, either mark `Rules::deserialize` as `pub unsafe fn deserialize` with a formal `/// # Safety` contract documenting that callers are responsible for verifying the authenticity and structural integrity of the input bytes (e.g. via cryptographic signatures), or replace all internal `get_unchecked` and `to_str_unchecked` calls on deserialized data structures with safe bounds checks (`.get()`) and UTF-8 validation (`std::str::from_utf8`).
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.18.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "yara-x"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.19.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-502"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-24T19:09:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "\u003e [!NOTE]\n\u003e This finding was identified during an agentic unsafe Rust code review performed by Gemini AI, followed by human review and verification.\n\n\n## The Issue\n\nThe crate exports a public safe API [`Rules::deserialize`](https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara-x/blob/5bd1f35db783679c90a3ea1a66bd15fe4e55bef1/lib/src/compiler/rules.rs#L187-L254)  accepting any generic byte sequence `B: AsRef\u003c[u8]\u003e`. It restores compiled rule structures directly from raw bytes using `bincode::serde::decode_from_slice`.\n\nThis decoded `Rules` struct contains internal lookup tables, including `sub_patterns: Vec\u003c(PatternId, SubPattern)\u003e`, `atoms: Vec\u003cSubPatternAtom\u003e`, and `lit_pool: BStringPool`. Subsequent safe operations assume these internal tables satisfy strict structural invariants:\n\n- `Rules::get_sub_pattern` executes `unsafe { self.sub_patterns.get_unchecked(sub_pattern_id.0 as usize) }`. If untrusted serialized bytes contain an atom referencing an out-of-bounds `SubPatternId`, calling `get_sub_pattern` during scanning triggers an out-of-bounds memory read (Undefined Behavior).\n\nhttps://github.com/VirusTotal/yara-x/blob/5bd1f35db783679c90a3ea1a66bd15fe4e55bef1/lib/src/compiler/rules.rs#L355-L360\n\n\n- `Metadata::next()` extracts string metadata via `unsafe { s.to_str_unchecked() }`. If serialized bytes corrupt `lit_pool` indices or structural data, `to_str_unchecked` constructs a `\u0026str` pointing to invalid UTF-8 bytes (Undefined Behavior).\n\nhttps://github.com/VirusTotal/yara-x/blob/5bd1f35db783679c90a3ea1a66bd15fe4e55bef1/lib/src/models.rs#L204-L210\n\nBecause passing malformed or untrusted data to `Rules::deserialize` induces Undefined Behavior in subsequent safe calls (`Scanner::new`, `Scanner::scan`) without any `unsafe` blocks in caller code, this API is unsound.\n\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\u003csummary\u003eMinimal Reproduction (Miri / Native Crash)\u003c/summary\u003e\n\nZip file with crashing_payload: \n[crashing_payload.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29173221/crashing_payload.zip)\n\nWe have a payload crashing_payload.bin where only a single byte in the structural metadata tail is mutated (changing a `SubPatternId` from `1` to `248` while keeping the WebAssembly bytecode completely untouched and valid).\n\nBelow is the self-contained verification script which compiles and runs against the official **unmodified** `yara-x v1.17.0` crate:\n\n```rust\nuse yara_x::{Rules, Scanner};\n\nfn main() {\n    // Embed the crashing payload generated by the fuzzer at compile time.\n    let serialized = include_bytes!(\"crashing_payload.bin\");\n    println!(\"Loaded embedded crashing payload, length: {}\", serialized.len());\n\n    // Deserialize. On unmodified library, this succeeds because the WASM and headers\n    // are pristine and structural corruption isn\u0027t validated.\n    if let Ok(deserialized) = Rules::deserialize(serialized) {\n        println!(\"Deserialization succeeded! Running scanner...\");\n        let mut scanner = Scanner::new(\u0026deserialized);\n        \n        // Run the standard scan, which will execute the WASM and trigger the out-of-bounds read!\n        let _ = scanner.scan(b\"lorem ipsum dolor sit amet\");\n        println!(\"Scanner finished.\");\n    } else {\n        println!(\"Deserialization failed!\");\n    }\n}\n```\n\n### 1. Miri Trace\n\nNOTE: This needs to be run with 1.17.0. I haven\u0027t tested this against other versions.\n\n\nUnfortunately I was able to get a miri trace, but I\u0027m not able to reproduce it right now because of lockfile changes. If you\u0027re trying this out be sure to use `MIRIFLAGS=\"-Zmiri-disable-stacked-borrows\"`\n\n\n### 2. Segfault / panics\n\nWhen run natively (without Miri or any sanitizers) on a standard Linux platform, the process immediately segfaults:\n\n```bash\n$ cargo run --bin verify\nLoaded embedded crashing payload, length: 11777\nDeserialization succeeded! Running scanner...\nSegmentation fault (core dumped)\n```\n\nAnd with a newer compiler (which appears to have debug assertions in `get_unchecked)`\n\n\n```bash\nDeserialization succeeded! Running scanner...\n\nthread \u0027main\u0027 (997442) panicked at lib/src/compiler/rules.rs:404:36:\nunsafe precondition(s) violated: slice::get_unchecked requires that the index is within the slice\n\nThis indicates a bug in the program. This Undefined Behavior check is optional, and cannot be relied on for safety.\nnote: run with `RUST_BACKTRACE=1` environment variable to display a backtrace\n```\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\u003csummary\u003eSuggested Fix\u003c/summary\u003e\n\nTo uphold Rust soundness guarantees, either mark `Rules::deserialize` as `pub unsafe fn deserialize` with a formal `/// # Safety` contract documenting that callers are responsible for verifying the authenticity and structural integrity of the input bytes (e.g. via cryptographic signatures), or replace all internal `get_unchecked` and `to_str_unchecked` calls on deserialized data structures with safe bounds checks (`.get()`) and UTF-8 validation (`std::str::from_utf8`).\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-2jx3-ff3v-j7jj",
  "modified": "2026-09-24T19:09:28Z",
  "published": "2026-09-24T19:09:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara-x/security/advisories/GHSA-2jx3-ff3v-j7jj"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara-x/commit/25efa375572efcfbe880a263ee3b0932d4b61a24"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara-x"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara-x/releases/tag/v1.19.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "yara-x: Unvalidated deserialization in safe `Rules::deserialize` allows memory corruption and UB"
}



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