GHSA-2JX3-FF3V-J7JJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 19:09 – Updated: 2026-09-24 19:09[!NOTE] This finding was identified during an agentic unsafe Rust code review performed by Gemini AI, followed by human review and verification.
The Issue
The crate exports a public safe API Rules::deserialize accepting any generic byte sequence B: AsRef<[u8]>. It restores compiled rule structures directly from raw bytes using bincode::serde::decode_from_slice.
This decoded Rules struct contains internal lookup tables, including sub_patterns: Vec<(PatternId, SubPattern)>, atoms: Vec<SubPatternAtom>, and lit_pool: BStringPool. Subsequent safe operations assume these internal tables satisfy strict structural invariants:
Rules::get_sub_patternexecutesunsafe { self.sub_patterns.get_unchecked(sub_pattern_id.0 as usize) }. If untrusted serialized bytes contain an atom referencing an out-of-boundsSubPatternId, callingget_sub_patternduring scanning triggers an out-of-bounds memory read (Undefined Behavior).
https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara-x/blob/5bd1f35db783679c90a3ea1a66bd15fe4e55bef1/lib/src/compiler/rules.rs#L355-L360
Metadata::next()extracts string metadata viaunsafe { s.to_str_unchecked() }. If serialized bytes corruptlit_poolindices or structural data,to_str_uncheckedconstructs a&strpointing to invalid UTF-8 bytes (Undefined Behavior).
https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara-x/blob/5bd1f35db783679c90a3ea1a66bd15fe4e55bef1/lib/src/models.rs#L204-L210
Because passing malformed or untrusted data to Rules::deserialize induces Undefined Behavior in subsequent safe calls (Scanner::new, Scanner::scan) without any unsafe blocks in caller code, this API is unsound.
use yara_x::{Rules, Scanner};
fn main() {
// Embed the crashing payload generated by the fuzzer at compile time.
let serialized = include_bytes!("crashing_payload.bin");
println!("Loaded embedded crashing payload, length: {}", serialized.len());
// Deserialize. On unmodified library, this succeeds because the WASM and headers
// are pristine and structural corruption isn't validated.
if let Ok(deserialized) = Rules::deserialize(serialized) {
println!("Deserialization succeeded! Running scanner...");
let mut scanner = Scanner::new(&deserialized);
// Run the standard scan, which will execute the WASM and trigger the out-of-bounds read!
let _ = scanner.scan(b"lorem ipsum dolor sit amet");
println!("Scanner finished.");
} else {
println!("Deserialization failed!");
}
}
### 1. Miri Trace
NOTE: This needs to be run with 1.17.0. I haven't tested this against other versions.
Unfortunately I was able to get a miri trace, but I'm not able to reproduce it right now because of lockfile changes. If you're trying this out be sure to use `MIRIFLAGS="-Zmiri-disable-stacked-borrows"`
### 2. Segfault / panics
When run natively (without Miri or any sanitizers) on a standard Linux platform, the process immediately segfaults:
$ cargo run --bin verify
Loaded embedded crashing payload, length: 11777
Deserialization succeeded! Running scanner...
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
And with a newer compiler (which appears to have debug assertions in `get_unchecked)`
Deserialization succeeded! Running scanner...
thread 'main' (997442) panicked at lib/src/compiler/rules.rs:404:36:
unsafe precondition(s) violated: slice::get_unchecked requires that the index is within the slice
This indicates a bug in the program. This Undefined Behavior check is optional, and cannot be relied on for safety.
note: run with `RUST_BACKTRACE=1` environment variable to display a backtrace
Suggested Fix
To uphold Rust soundness guarantees, either mark `Rules::deserialize` as `pub unsafe fn deserialize` with a formal `/// # Safety` contract documenting that callers are responsible for verifying the authenticity and structural integrity of the input bytes (e.g. via cryptographic signatures), or replace all internal `get_unchecked` and `to_str_unchecked` calls on deserialized data structures with safe bounds checks (`.get()`) and UTF-8 validation (`std::str::from_utf8`).
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.18.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "yara-x"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.19.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-24T19:09:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "\u003e [!NOTE]\n\u003e This finding was identified during an agentic unsafe Rust code review performed by Gemini AI, followed by human review and verification.\n\n\n## The Issue\n\nThe crate exports a public safe API [`Rules::deserialize`](https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara-x/blob/5bd1f35db783679c90a3ea1a66bd15fe4e55bef1/lib/src/compiler/rules.rs#L187-L254) accepting any generic byte sequence `B: AsRef\u003c[u8]\u003e`. It restores compiled rule structures directly from raw bytes using `bincode::serde::decode_from_slice`.\n\nThis decoded `Rules` struct contains internal lookup tables, including `sub_patterns: Vec\u003c(PatternId, SubPattern)\u003e`, `atoms: Vec\u003cSubPatternAtom\u003e`, and `lit_pool: BStringPool`. Subsequent safe operations assume these internal tables satisfy strict structural invariants:\n\n- `Rules::get_sub_pattern` executes `unsafe { self.sub_patterns.get_unchecked(sub_pattern_id.0 as usize) }`. If untrusted serialized bytes contain an atom referencing an out-of-bounds `SubPatternId`, calling `get_sub_pattern` during scanning triggers an out-of-bounds memory read (Undefined Behavior).\n\nhttps://github.com/VirusTotal/yara-x/blob/5bd1f35db783679c90a3ea1a66bd15fe4e55bef1/lib/src/compiler/rules.rs#L355-L360\n\n\n- `Metadata::next()` extracts string metadata via `unsafe { s.to_str_unchecked() }`. If serialized bytes corrupt `lit_pool` indices or structural data, `to_str_unchecked` constructs a `\u0026str` pointing to invalid UTF-8 bytes (Undefined Behavior).\n\nhttps://github.com/VirusTotal/yara-x/blob/5bd1f35db783679c90a3ea1a66bd15fe4e55bef1/lib/src/models.rs#L204-L210\n\nBecause passing malformed or untrusted data to `Rules::deserialize` induces Undefined Behavior in subsequent safe calls (`Scanner::new`, `Scanner::scan`) without any `unsafe` blocks in caller code, this API is unsound.\n\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\u003csummary\u003eMinimal Reproduction (Miri / Native Crash)\u003c/summary\u003e\n\nZip file with crashing_payload: \n[crashing_payload.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29173221/crashing_payload.zip)\n\nWe have a payload crashing_payload.bin where only a single byte in the structural metadata tail is mutated (changing a `SubPatternId` from `1` to `248` while keeping the WebAssembly bytecode completely untouched and valid).\n\nBelow is the self-contained verification script which compiles and runs against the official **unmodified** `yara-x v1.17.0` crate:\n\n```rust\nuse yara_x::{Rules, Scanner};\n\nfn main() {\n // Embed the crashing payload generated by the fuzzer at compile time.\n let serialized = include_bytes!(\"crashing_payload.bin\");\n println!(\"Loaded embedded crashing payload, length: {}\", serialized.len());\n\n // Deserialize. On unmodified library, this succeeds because the WASM and headers\n // are pristine and structural corruption isn\u0027t validated.\n if let Ok(deserialized) = Rules::deserialize(serialized) {\n println!(\"Deserialization succeeded! Running scanner...\");\n let mut scanner = Scanner::new(\u0026deserialized);\n \n // Run the standard scan, which will execute the WASM and trigger the out-of-bounds read!\n let _ = scanner.scan(b\"lorem ipsum dolor sit amet\");\n println!(\"Scanner finished.\");\n } else {\n println!(\"Deserialization failed!\");\n }\n}\n```\n\n### 1. Miri Trace\n\nNOTE: This needs to be run with 1.17.0. I haven\u0027t tested this against other versions.\n\n\nUnfortunately I was able to get a miri trace, but I\u0027m not able to reproduce it right now because of lockfile changes. If you\u0027re trying this out be sure to use `MIRIFLAGS=\"-Zmiri-disable-stacked-borrows\"`\n\n\n### 2. Segfault / panics\n\nWhen run natively (without Miri or any sanitizers) on a standard Linux platform, the process immediately segfaults:\n\n```bash\n$ cargo run --bin verify\nLoaded embedded crashing payload, length: 11777\nDeserialization succeeded! Running scanner...\nSegmentation fault (core dumped)\n```\n\nAnd with a newer compiler (which appears to have debug assertions in `get_unchecked)`\n\n\n```bash\nDeserialization succeeded! Running scanner...\n\nthread \u0027main\u0027 (997442) panicked at lib/src/compiler/rules.rs:404:36:\nunsafe precondition(s) violated: slice::get_unchecked requires that the index is within the slice\n\nThis indicates a bug in the program. This Undefined Behavior check is optional, and cannot be relied on for safety.\nnote: run with `RUST_BACKTRACE=1` environment variable to display a backtrace\n```\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\u003csummary\u003eSuggested Fix\u003c/summary\u003e\n\nTo uphold Rust soundness guarantees, either mark `Rules::deserialize` as `pub unsafe fn deserialize` with a formal `/// # Safety` contract documenting that callers are responsible for verifying the authenticity and structural integrity of the input bytes (e.g. via cryptographic signatures), or replace all internal `get_unchecked` and `to_str_unchecked` calls on deserialized data structures with safe bounds checks (`.get()`) and UTF-8 validation (`std::str::from_utf8`).\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n---",
"id": "GHSA-2jx3-ff3v-j7jj",
"modified": "2026-09-24T19:09:28Z",
"published": "2026-09-24T19:09:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara-x/security/advisories/GHSA-2jx3-ff3v-j7jj"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara-x/commit/25efa375572efcfbe880a263ee3b0932d4b61a24"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara-x"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara-x/releases/tag/v1.19.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "yara-x: Unvalidated deserialization in safe `Rules::deserialize` allows memory corruption and UB"
}
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