GHSA-2M6G-CRV8-P3C6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-16 21:17 – Updated: 2022-09-21 19:21
VLAI?
Summary
Parse Server vulnerable to brute force guessing of user sensitive data via search patterns
Details
Impact
Internal fields (keys used internally by Parse Server, prefixed by _) and protected fields (user defined) can be used as query constraints. Internal and protected fields are removed by Parse Server from query results and are only returned to the client using a valid master key. However, using query constraints, these fields can be guessed by enumerating until Parse Server returns a response object.
Patches
The patch requires the master key to use internal and protected fields as query constraints.
Workarounds
Implement a Parse Cloud Trigger beforeFind and manually remove the query constraints, such as:
Parse.Cloud.beforeFind('TestObject', ({ query }) => {
for (const key in query._where || []) {
// Repeat logic for protected fields
if (key.charAt(0) === '_') {
delete query._where[key];
}
}
});
References
- https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-2m6g-crv8-p3c6
Severity ?
8.6 (High)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "parse-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.10.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "parse-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.2.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-36079"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-09-16T21:17:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-09-07T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nInternal fields (keys used internally by Parse Server, prefixed by `_`) and protected fields (user defined) can be used as query constraints. Internal and protected fields are removed by Parse Server from query results and are only returned to the client using a valid master key. However, using query constraints, these fields can be guessed by enumerating until Parse Server returns a response object.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe patch requires the master key to use internal and protected fields as query constraints.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nImplement a Parse Cloud Trigger `beforeFind` and manually remove the query constraints, such as:\n\n```js\nParse.Cloud.beforeFind(\u0027TestObject\u0027, ({ query }) =\u003e {\n for (const key in query._where || []) {\n // Repeat logic for protected fields\n if (key.charAt(0) === \u0027_\u0027) {\n delete query._where[key];\n }\n }\n});\n```\n\n### References\n\n- https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-2m6g-crv8-p3c6",
"id": "GHSA-2m6g-crv8-p3c6",
"modified": "2022-09-21T19:21:12Z",
"published": "2022-09-16T21:17:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-2m6g-crv8-p3c6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36079"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/8143"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/issues/8144"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/634c44acd18f6ee6ec60fac89a2b602d92799bec"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/e39d51bd329cd978589983bd659db46e1d45aad4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/4.10.14"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/releases/tag/5.2.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Parse Server vulnerable to brute force guessing of user sensitive data via search patterns"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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