GHSA-2PVJ-P485-CP3M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-30 04:33 – Updated: 2022-09-30 04:33
VLAI?
Summary
matrix-android-sdk2 vulnerable to impersonation via forwarded Megolm sessions
Details

Impact

An attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver can construct messages appearing to have come from another person. Such messages will be marked with a grey shield on some platforms, but this may be missing in others.

This attack is possible due to the matrix-android-sdk2 implementing a too permissive key forwarding strategy on the receiving end.

Key forwarding is a mechanism allowing clients to recover from “unable to decrypt” messages when they missed the initial key distribution, at the time the message was originally sent. Examples include accessing message history before they joined the room but also when some network/federation errors have occurred.

Patches

The default policy for accepting key forwards has been made more strict in the matrix-android-sdk2. The matrix-android-sdk2 will now only accept forwarded keys in response to previously issued requests and only from own, verified devices.

A unique exception to this rule is with the experimental MSC3061, that is forwarding room keys for past messages when invited in a room configured with the proper history visibility setting. Such key forwards are parked upon receipt and are only accepted if the SDK receives an invitation for that room from the inviter in a limited time window.

The SDK now sets a trusted flag on the decrypted message upon decryption, based on whether the key used to decrypt the message was received from a trusted source. Clients need to ensure that messages decrypted with a key with trusted = false are decorated appropriately (for example, by showing a warning for such messages).

Workarounds

Current users of the SDK can disable key forwarding in their forks using CryptoService#enableKeyGossiping(enable: Boolean).

References

Blog post: https://matrix.org/blog/2022/09/28/upgrade-now-to-address-encryption-vulns-in-matrix-sdks-and-clients

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, e-mail us at security@matrix.org.

Severity ?
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.4.36"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.matrix.android:matrix-android-sdk2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-39246"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-322"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-09-30T04:33:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-09-28T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nAn attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver can construct messages appearing to have come from another person. Such messages will be marked with a grey shield on some platforms, but this may be missing in others.\n\nThis attack is possible due to the matrix-android-sdk2 implementing a too permissive [key forwarding](https://spec.matrix.org/v1.3/client-server-api/#key-requests) strategy on the receiving end.\n\nKey forwarding is a mechanism allowing clients to recover from \u201cunable to decrypt\u201d messages when they missed the initial key distribution, at the time the message was originally sent. Examples include accessing message history before they joined the room but also when some network/federation errors have occurred.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe default policy for accepting key forwards has been made more strict in the matrix-android-sdk2. The matrix-android-sdk2 will now only accept forwarded keys in response to previously issued requests and only from own, verified devices.\n\nA unique exception to this rule is with the experimental [MSC3061](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/3061), that is forwarding room keys for past messages when invited in a room configured with the proper history visibility setting. Such key forwards are parked upon receipt and are only accepted if the SDK receives an invitation for that room from the inviter in a limited time window. \n\nThe SDK now sets a `trusted` flag on the decrypted message upon decryption, based on whether the key used to decrypt the message was received from a trusted source. Clients need to ensure that messages decrypted with a key with `trusted = false` are decorated appropriately (for example, by showing a warning for such messages).\n\n### Workarounds\nCurrent users of the SDK can disable key forwarding in their forks using `CryptoService#enableKeyGossiping(enable: Boolean)`.\n\n### References\nBlog post: https://matrix.org/blog/2022/09/28/upgrade-now-to-address-encryption-vulns-in-matrix-sdks-and-clients\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, e-mail us at [security@matrix.org](mailto:security@matrix.org).\n",
  "id": "GHSA-2pvj-p485-cp3m",
  "modified": "2022-09-30T04:33:00Z",
  "published": "2022-09-30T04:33:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/security/advisories/GHSA-2pvj-p485-cp3m"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39246"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/3061"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/commit/77df720a238d17308deab83ecaa37f7a4740a17e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-android-sdk2/releases/tag/v1.5.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "matrix-android-sdk2 vulnerable to impersonation via forwarded Megolm sessions"
}


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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.