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GHSA-2X4H-J98J-X2MW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-18 15:30 – Updated: 2025-03-21 18:31
VLAI
Details

On IROAD X5 devices, a Bypass of Device Pairing can occur via MAC Address Spoofing. The dashcam's pairing mechanism relies solely on MAC address verification, allowing an attacker to bypass authentication by spoofing an already-paired MAC address that can be captured via an ARP scan.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-30110"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-290"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-18T15:16:02Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "On IROAD X5 devices, a Bypass of Device Pairing can occur via MAC Address Spoofing. The dashcam\u0027s pairing mechanism relies solely on MAC address verification, allowing an attacker to bypass authentication by spoofing an already-paired MAC address that can be captured via an ARP scan.",
  "id": "GHSA-2x4h-j98j-x2mw",
  "modified": "2025-03-21T18:31:35Z",
  "published": "2025-03-18T15:30:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-30110"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/geo-chen/IROAD-V"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://iroad-dashcam.nl/iroad/iroad-x5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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