GHSA-36CQ-F2M4-833W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-04 09:31 – Updated: 2026-08-04 09:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Input: ims-pcu - fix heap-buffer-overflow in ims_pcu_process_data()

The ims_pcu_process_data() processes incoming URB data byte by byte. However, it fails to check if the read_pos index exceeds IMS_PCU_BUF_SIZE.

If a malicious USB device sends a packet larger than IMS_PCU_BUF_SIZE, read_pos will increment indefinitely. Moreover, since read_pos is located immediately after read_buf, the attacker can overwrite read_pos itself to arbitrarily control the index.

This manipulated read_pos is subsequently used in ims_pcu_handle_response() to copy data into cmd_buf, leading to a heap buffer overflow.

Specifically, an attacker can overwrite the cmd_done.wait.head located at offset 136 relative to cmd_buf in the ims_pcu_handle_response(). Consequently, when the driver calls complete(&pcu->cmd_done), it triggers a control flow hijack by using the manipulated pointer.

Fix this by adding a bounds check for read_pos before writing to read_buf. If the packet is too long, discard it, log a warning, and reset the parser state.

[dtor: factor out resetting packet state, reset checksum as well]

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64565"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-04T07:16:31Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nInput: ims-pcu - fix heap-buffer-overflow in ims_pcu_process_data()\n\nThe `ims_pcu_process_data()` processes incoming URB data byte by byte.\nHowever, it fails to check if the `read_pos` index exceeds\nIMS_PCU_BUF_SIZE.\n\nIf a malicious USB device sends a packet larger than IMS_PCU_BUF_SIZE,\n`read_pos` will increment indefinitely. Moreover, since `read_pos` is\nlocated immediately after `read_buf`, the attacker can overwrite\n`read_pos` itself to arbitrarily control the index.\n\nThis manipulated `read_pos` is subsequently used in\n`ims_pcu_handle_response()` to copy data into `cmd_buf`, leading to a\nheap buffer overflow.\n\nSpecifically, an attacker can overwrite the `cmd_done.wait.head` located\nat offset 136 relative to `cmd_buf` in the `ims_pcu_handle_response()`.\nConsequently, when the driver calls `complete(\u0026pcu-\u003ecmd_done)`, it\ntriggers a control flow hijack by using the manipulated pointer.\n\nFix this by adding a bounds check for `read_pos` before writing to\n`read_buf`. If the packet is too long, discard it, log a warning,\nand reset the parser state.\n\n[dtor: factor out resetting packet state, reset checksum as well]",
  "id": "GHSA-36cq-f2m4-833w",
  "modified": "2026-08-04T09:31:35Z",
  "published": "2026-08-04T09:31:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64565"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/40bbbf2e91fd60715525bf0405c67876af817edf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/875115b82c295277b81b6dfee7debc725f44e854"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ca9f8c09845fb8c51b6d447f6428eecd1b8b0a49"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d03a740e087de7dcb2a26dc1123377bd3d1d84ca"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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