GHSA-36HH-X5P5-JGC8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-27 00:37 – Updated: 2026-05-27 00:37
VLAI
Summary
@hapi/content header parser has a parameter smuggling issue that allows upload-filter bypass via duplicate parameters
Details

Impact

The two parsers resolved duplicates inconsistently and silently: - Content.disposition() retained the last occurrence of each parameter. - Content.type() retained the first occurrence of charset and boundary.

Either behavior creates a parameter-smuggling primitive when another component in the request-processing chain (a WAF, reverse proxy, security filter, or alternate parser) resolves duplicates the opposite way. The primary attack vector is upload filename allowlist bypass:

Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="safe.txt"; filename="shell.php"

Patches

The issue has been patched in 6.0.2.

Workarounds

Pre or post validate headers looking for duplicates.

Resources

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@hapi/content"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.0.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44974"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-436"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-27T00:37:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThe two parsers resolved duplicates inconsistently and silently:\n- `Content.disposition()` retained the last occurrence of each parameter.\n- `Content.type()` retained the first occurrence of charset and boundary.\n\nEither behavior creates a parameter-smuggling primitive when another component in the request-processing chain (a WAF, reverse proxy, security filter, or alternate parser) resolves duplicates the opposite way. The primary attack vector is upload filename allowlist bypass:\n\n`Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"file\"; filename=\"safe.txt\"; filename=\"shell.php\"`\n\n### Patches\nThe issue has been patched in 6.0.2.\n\n### Workarounds\nPre or post validate headers looking for duplicates.\n\n### Resources\n- [RFC 6266 \u00a74.1 \u2014 Content-Disposition syntax](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6266#section-4.1)\n- [RFC 7231 \u00a73.1.1.1 \u2014 Content-Type syntax](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7231#section-3.1.1.1)\n- [RFC 7230 \u00a73.2.6 \u2014 token character set](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7230#section-3.2.6)",
  "id": "GHSA-36hh-x5p5-jgc8",
  "modified": "2026-05-27T00:37:20Z",
  "published": "2026-05-27T00:37:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hapijs/content/security/advisories/GHSA-36hh-x5p5-jgc8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hapijs/content/commit/3850079550c191d25e3643dc82a6d61144db8c2f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/hapijs/content"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@hapi/content header parser has a parameter smuggling issue that allows upload-filter bypass via duplicate parameters"
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

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Nomenclature

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