GHSA-36W4-95HV-5VWG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-08 15:32 – Updated: 2026-06-08 15:33
VLAI
Details

Origin Validation Error vulnerability in ninenines gun (gun_http2 module) allows cross-origin cookie injection via unvalidated HTTP/2 PUSH_PROMISE authority.

In gun_http2:push_promise_frame/7, the :authority pseudo-header from an incoming PUSH_PROMISE frame is stored verbatim into the promised stream record without checking that it matches the connection's origin. When gun_http2:headers_frame/9 later processes the response headers for the promised stream, it calls gun_cookies:set_cookie_header/7 with the unvalidated server-supplied authority before any status branching and before user code can act. This violates RFC 7540 §10.6 / RFC 9113 §8.4, which require receivers to treat as a protocol error any push for a resource the server is not authoritative for.

A malicious or compromised HTTP/2 server can plant cookies scoped to arbitrary third-party domains into the client's shared cookie store. This enables session fixation attacks against those domains and, if the planted cookie overrides a legitimate session token, may result in account takeover. No user interaction beyond making a normal HTTP/2 request to the attacker-controlled server is required.

This issue affects gun: from 2.0.0 before 2.4.0.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-43972"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-08T15:16:46Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Origin Validation Error vulnerability in ninenines gun (gun_http2 module) allows cross-origin cookie injection via unvalidated HTTP/2 PUSH_PROMISE authority.\n\nIn gun_http2:push_promise_frame/7, the :authority pseudo-header from an incoming PUSH_PROMISE frame is stored verbatim into the promised stream record without checking that it matches the connection\u0027s origin. When gun_http2:headers_frame/9 later processes the response headers for the promised stream, it calls gun_cookies:set_cookie_header/7 with the unvalidated server-supplied authority before any status branching and before user code can act. This violates RFC 7540 \u00a710.6 / RFC 9113 \u00a78.4, which require receivers to treat as a protocol error any push for a resource the server is not authoritative for.\n\nA malicious or compromised HTTP/2 server can plant cookies scoped to arbitrary third-party domains into the client\u0027s shared cookie store. This enables session fixation attacks against those domains and, if the planted cookie overrides a legitimate session token, may result in account takeover. No user interaction beyond making a normal HTTP/2 request to the attacker-controlled server is required.\n\nThis issue affects gun: from 2.0.0 before 2.4.0.",
  "id": "GHSA-36w4-95hv-5vwg",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T15:33:00Z",
  "published": "2026-06-08T15:32:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43972"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ninenines/gun/commit/567863ff53802fed21c3b3f25812db7f7ae29676"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-43972.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-43972"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}


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