GHSA-38F9-M297-6Q9G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-06-03 21:57 – Updated: 2021-01-08 20:15Impact
Medium severity 5.9 https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H
A maliciously crafted record ID can exploit a SQL Injection vulnerability in iOS adapter implementation and cause the app to delete all or selected records from the database, generally causing the app to become unusable.
This may happen in apps that don't validate IDs (valid IDs are /^[a-zA-Z0-9_-.]+$/) and use Watermelon Sync or low-level database.adapter.destroyDeletedRecords method.
The integrity risk is low due to the fact that maliciously deleted records won't synchronize, so logout-login will restore all data, although some local changes may be lost if the malicious deletion causes the sync process to fail to proceed to push stage.
No way to breach confidentiality with this vulnerability is known. Full exploitation of SQL Injection is mitigated, because it's not possible to nest an insert/update query inside a delete query in SQLite, and it's not possible to pass a semicolon-separated second query. There's also no known practicable way to breach confidentiality by selectively deleting records, because those records will not be synchronized.
It's theoretically possible that selective record deletion could cause an app to behave insecurely if lack of a record is used to make security decisions by the app.
Patches
Patched versions include:
- 0.15.1
- 0.16.2
- 0.16.1-fix
- this is actually the same as 0.16.0, but with the patch applied - as 0.16.1 is causing issues for some users
924c7ae2a8dcommit id contains the patch
Workarounds
- Ensure that your backend service sanitizes record IDs sent in the
pull syncendpoint, such that only IDs matching/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-.]+$/are returned. This could also be done in JavaScriptpullChangesfunction passed tosynchronize() - If you use
destroyDeletedRecordsdirectly, validate all IDs passed the same way
For more information
If you have any questions about this advisory, contact @radex.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@nozbe/watermelondb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.15.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@nozbe/watermelondb"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.16.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.16.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-4035"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-03T16:41:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nMedium severity 5.9 https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H\n\nA maliciously crafted record ID can exploit a SQL Injection vulnerability in iOS adapter implementation and cause the app to delete all or selected records from the database, generally causing the app to become unusable.\n\nThis may happen in apps that don\u0027t validate IDs (valid IDs are `/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-.]+$/`) and use Watermelon Sync or low-level `database.adapter.destroyDeletedRecords` method.\n\nThe integrity risk is low due to the fact that maliciously deleted records won\u0027t synchronize, so logout-login will restore all data, although some local changes may be lost if the malicious deletion causes the sync process to fail to proceed to push stage.\n\nNo way to breach confidentiality with this vulnerability is known. Full exploitation of SQL Injection is mitigated, because it\u0027s not possible to nest an insert/update query inside a delete query in SQLite, and it\u0027s not possible to pass a semicolon-separated second query. There\u0027s also no known practicable way to breach confidentiality by selectively deleting records, because those records will not be synchronized.\n\nIt\u0027s theoretically possible that selective record deletion could cause an app to behave insecurely if lack of a record is used to make security decisions by the app. \n\n## Patches\n\nPatched versions include:\n\n- 0.15.1\n- 0.16.2\n- 0.16.1-fix\n\t- this is actually the same as 0.16.0, but with the patch applied - as 0.16.1 is causing issues for some users\n- `924c7ae2a8d` commit id contains the patch\n\n## Workarounds\n\n1. Ensure that your backend service sanitizes record IDs sent in the `pull sync` endpoint, such that only IDs matching `/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-.]+$/` are returned. This could also be done in JavaScript `pullChanges` function passed to `synchronize()`\n2. If you use `destroyDeletedRecords` directly, validate all IDs passed the same way\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions about this advisory, contact @radex.",
"id": "GHSA-38f9-m297-6q9g",
"modified": "2021-01-08T20:15:00Z",
"published": "2020-06-03T21:57:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Nozbe/WatermelonDB/security/advisories/GHSA-38f9-m297-6q9g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-4035"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Nozbe/WatermelonDB/commit/924c7ae2a8d7d6459656751e5b9b1bf91a218025"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "DoS via malicious record IDs in WatermelonDB"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.