GHSA-3C5V-HP3X-R94Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-22 09:31 – Updated: 2025-01-31 15:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm: fix mempool NULL pointer race when completing IO
dm_io_dec_pending() calls end_io_acct() first and will then dec md in-flight pending count. But if a task is swapping DM table at same time this can result in a crash due to mempool->elements being NULL:
task1 task2 do_resume ->do_suspend ->dm_wait_for_completion bio_endio ->clone_endio ->dm_io_dec_pending ->end_io_acct ->wakeup task1 ->dm_swap_table ->__bind ->__bind_mempools ->bioset_exit ->mempool_exit ->free_io
[ 67.330330] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 ...... [ 67.330494] pstate: 80400085 (Nzcv daIf +PAN -UAO) [ 67.330510] pc : mempool_free+0x70/0xa0 [ 67.330515] lr : mempool_free+0x4c/0xa0 [ 67.330520] sp : ffffff8008013b20 [ 67.330524] x29: ffffff8008013b20 x28: 0000000000000004 [ 67.330530] x27: ffffffa8c2ff40a0 x26: 00000000ffff1cc8 [ 67.330535] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffffffdada34c800 [ 67.330541] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffffffdada34c800 [ 67.330547] x21: 00000000ffff1cc8 x20: ffffffd9a1304d80 [ 67.330552] x19: ffffffdada34c970 x18: 000000b312625d9c [ 67.330558] x17: 00000000002dcfbf x16: 00000000000006dd [ 67.330563] x15: 000000000093b41e x14: 0000000000000010 [ 67.330569] x13: 0000000000007f7a x12: 0000000034155555 [ 67.330574] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000000001 [ 67.330579] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 67.330585] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffff80148b5c1a [ 67.330590] x5 : ffffff8008013ae0 x4 : 0000000000000001 [ 67.330596] x3 : ffffff80080139c8 x2 : ffffff801083bab8 [ 67.330601] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffffdada34c970 [ 67.330609] Call trace: [ 67.330616] mempool_free+0x70/0xa0 [ 67.330627] bio_put+0xf8/0x110 [ 67.330638] dec_pending+0x13c/0x230 [ 67.330644] clone_endio+0x90/0x180 [ 67.330649] bio_endio+0x198/0x1b8 [ 67.330655] dec_pending+0x190/0x230 [ 67.330660] clone_endio+0x90/0x180 [ 67.330665] bio_endio+0x198/0x1b8 [ 67.330673] blk_update_request+0x214/0x428 [ 67.330683] scsi_end_request+0x2c/0x300 [ 67.330688] scsi_io_completion+0xa0/0x710 [ 67.330695] scsi_finish_command+0xd8/0x110 [ 67.330700] scsi_softirq_done+0x114/0x148 [ 67.330708] blk_done_softirq+0x74/0xd0 [ 67.330716] __do_softirq+0x18c/0x374 [ 67.330724] irq_exit+0xb4/0xb8 [ 67.330732] __handle_domain_irq+0x84/0xc0 [ 67.330737] gic_handle_irq+0x148/0x1b0 [ 67.330744] el1_irq+0xe8/0x190 [ 67.330753] lpm_cpuidle_enter+0x4f8/0x538 [ 67.330759] cpuidle_enter_state+0x1fc/0x398 [ 67.330764] cpuidle_enter+0x18/0x20 [ 67.330772] do_idle+0x1b4/0x290 [ 67.330778] cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x28 [ 67.330786] secondary_start_kernel+0x160/0x170
Fix this by: 1) Establishing pointers to 'struct dm_io' members in dm_io_dec_pending() so that they may be passed into end_io_acct() after free_io() is called. 2) Moving end_io_acct() after free_io().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-47435"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-22T07:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndm: fix mempool NULL pointer race when completing IO\n\ndm_io_dec_pending() calls end_io_acct() first and will then dec md\nin-flight pending count. But if a task is swapping DM table at same\ntime this can result in a crash due to mempool-\u003eelements being NULL:\n\ntask1 task2\ndo_resume\n -\u003edo_suspend\n -\u003edm_wait_for_completion\n bio_endio\n\t\t\t\t -\u003eclone_endio\n\t\t\t\t -\u003edm_io_dec_pending\n\t\t\t\t -\u003eend_io_acct\n\t\t\t\t -\u003ewakeup task1\n -\u003edm_swap_table\n -\u003e__bind\n -\u003e__bind_mempools\n -\u003ebioset_exit\n -\u003emempool_exit\n -\u003efree_io\n\n[ 67.330330] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at\nvirtual address 0000000000000000\n......\n[ 67.330494] pstate: 80400085 (Nzcv daIf +PAN -UAO)\n[ 67.330510] pc : mempool_free+0x70/0xa0\n[ 67.330515] lr : mempool_free+0x4c/0xa0\n[ 67.330520] sp : ffffff8008013b20\n[ 67.330524] x29: ffffff8008013b20 x28: 0000000000000004\n[ 67.330530] x27: ffffffa8c2ff40a0 x26: 00000000ffff1cc8\n[ 67.330535] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffffffdada34c800\n[ 67.330541] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffffffdada34c800\n[ 67.330547] x21: 00000000ffff1cc8 x20: ffffffd9a1304d80\n[ 67.330552] x19: ffffffdada34c970 x18: 000000b312625d9c\n[ 67.330558] x17: 00000000002dcfbf x16: 00000000000006dd\n[ 67.330563] x15: 000000000093b41e x14: 0000000000000010\n[ 67.330569] x13: 0000000000007f7a x12: 0000000034155555\n[ 67.330574] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000000001\n[ 67.330579] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000\n[ 67.330585] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : ffffff80148b5c1a\n[ 67.330590] x5 : ffffff8008013ae0 x4 : 0000000000000001\n[ 67.330596] x3 : ffffff80080139c8 x2 : ffffff801083bab8\n[ 67.330601] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffffdada34c970\n[ 67.330609] Call trace:\n[ 67.330616] mempool_free+0x70/0xa0\n[ 67.330627] bio_put+0xf8/0x110\n[ 67.330638] dec_pending+0x13c/0x230\n[ 67.330644] clone_endio+0x90/0x180\n[ 67.330649] bio_endio+0x198/0x1b8\n[ 67.330655] dec_pending+0x190/0x230\n[ 67.330660] clone_endio+0x90/0x180\n[ 67.330665] bio_endio+0x198/0x1b8\n[ 67.330673] blk_update_request+0x214/0x428\n[ 67.330683] scsi_end_request+0x2c/0x300\n[ 67.330688] scsi_io_completion+0xa0/0x710\n[ 67.330695] scsi_finish_command+0xd8/0x110\n[ 67.330700] scsi_softirq_done+0x114/0x148\n[ 67.330708] blk_done_softirq+0x74/0xd0\n[ 67.330716] __do_softirq+0x18c/0x374\n[ 67.330724] irq_exit+0xb4/0xb8\n[ 67.330732] __handle_domain_irq+0x84/0xc0\n[ 67.330737] gic_handle_irq+0x148/0x1b0\n[ 67.330744] el1_irq+0xe8/0x190\n[ 67.330753] lpm_cpuidle_enter+0x4f8/0x538\n[ 67.330759] cpuidle_enter_state+0x1fc/0x398\n[ 67.330764] cpuidle_enter+0x18/0x20\n[ 67.330772] do_idle+0x1b4/0x290\n[ 67.330778] cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x28\n[ 67.330786] secondary_start_kernel+0x160/0x170\n\nFix this by:\n1) Establishing pointers to \u0027struct dm_io\u0027 members in\ndm_io_dec_pending() so that they may be passed into end_io_acct()\n_after_ free_io() is called.\n2) Moving end_io_acct() after free_io().",
"id": "GHSA-3c5v-hp3x-r94q",
"modified": "2025-01-31T15:30:42Z",
"published": "2024-05-22T09:31:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-47435"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e506f07c5b561d673dd0b0d8f7f420cc48024fb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e07272cca2ed76f7f6073f4444b1143828c8d87"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9fb7cd5c7fef0f1c982e3cd27745a0dec260eaed"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad1393b92e5059218d055bfec8f4946d85ad04c4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d208b89401e073de986dc891037c5a668f5d5d95"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d29c78d3f9c5d2604548c1065bf1ec212728ea61"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d35aef9c60d310eff3eaddacce301efe877e2b7c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.