GHSA-3GQX-RV8X-9M5C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-27 15:31 – Updated: 2025-02-11 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix race in concurrent f2fs_stop_gc_thread
In my test case, concurrent calls to f2fs shutdown report the following stack trace:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xc6cfff63bb5513fc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 678 Comm: f2fs_rep_shutdo Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241029-g6fb2fa9805c5-dirty #85 Call Trace: ? show_regs+0x8b/0xa0 ? __die_body+0x26/0xa0 ? die_addr+0x54/0x90 ? exc_general_protection+0x24b/0x5c0 ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30 ? kthread_stop+0x46/0x390 f2fs_stop_gc_thread+0x6c/0x110 f2fs_do_shutdown+0x309/0x3a0 f2fs_ioc_shutdown+0x150/0x1c0 __f2fs_ioctl+0xffd/0x2ac0 f2fs_ioctl+0x76/0xe0 vfs_ioctl+0x23/0x60 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xce/0xf0 x64_sys_call+0x2b1b/0x4540 do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The root cause is a race condition in f2fs_stop_gc_thread() called from different f2fs shutdown paths:
[CPU0] [CPU1] ---------------------- ----------------------- f2fs_stop_gc_thread f2fs_stop_gc_thread gc_th = sbi->gc_thread gc_th = sbi->gc_thread kfree(gc_th) sbi->gc_thread = NULL < gc_th != NULL > kthread_stop(gc_th->f2fs_gc_task) //UAF
The commit c7f114d864ac ("f2fs: fix to avoid use-after-free in f2fs_stop_gc_thread()") attempted to fix this issue by using a read semaphore to prevent races between shutdown and remount threads, but it fails to prevent all race conditions.
Fix it by converting to write lock of s_umount in f2fs_do_shutdown().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-53218"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-27T14:15:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nf2fs: fix race in concurrent f2fs_stop_gc_thread\n\nIn my test case, concurrent calls to f2fs shutdown report the following\nstack trace:\n\n Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xc6cfff63bb5513fc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI\n CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 678 Comm: f2fs_rep_shutdo Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5-next-20241029-g6fb2fa9805c5-dirty #85\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n ? show_regs+0x8b/0xa0\n ? __die_body+0x26/0xa0\n ? die_addr+0x54/0x90\n ? exc_general_protection+0x24b/0x5c0\n ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x26/0x30\n ? kthread_stop+0x46/0x390\n f2fs_stop_gc_thread+0x6c/0x110\n f2fs_do_shutdown+0x309/0x3a0\n f2fs_ioc_shutdown+0x150/0x1c0\n __f2fs_ioctl+0xffd/0x2ac0\n f2fs_ioctl+0x76/0xe0\n vfs_ioctl+0x23/0x60\n __x64_sys_ioctl+0xce/0xf0\n x64_sys_call+0x2b1b/0x4540\n do_syscall_64+0xa7/0x240\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n\nThe root cause is a race condition in f2fs_stop_gc_thread() called from\ndifferent f2fs shutdown paths:\n\n [CPU0] [CPU1]\n ---------------------- -----------------------\n f2fs_stop_gc_thread f2fs_stop_gc_thread\n gc_th = sbi-\u003egc_thread\n gc_th = sbi-\u003egc_thread\n kfree(gc_th)\n sbi-\u003egc_thread = NULL\n \u003c gc_th != NULL \u003e\n kthread_stop(gc_th-\u003ef2fs_gc_task) //UAF\n\nThe commit c7f114d864ac (\"f2fs: fix to avoid use-after-free in\nf2fs_stop_gc_thread()\") attempted to fix this issue by using a read\nsemaphore to prevent races between shutdown and remount threads, but\nit fails to prevent all race conditions.\n\nFix it by converting to write lock of s_umount in f2fs_do_shutdown().",
"id": "GHSA-3gqx-rv8x-9m5c",
"modified": "2025-02-11T18:31:22Z",
"published": "2024-12-27T15:31:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53218"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/60457ed6c67625c87861f96912b4179dc2293896"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/794fa8792d4eacac191f1cbcc2e81b7369e4662a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b0033dbc48340a1c1c3f12448ba17d6587ca092"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c631207897a9b3d41167ceca58e07f8f94720e42"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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