GHSA-3H6J-9X8M-RG3G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-31 23:12 – Updated: 2026-03-31 23:12Summary
Graby's cleanupXss() function configures htmLawed with conflicting settings: safe=1 (which removes <iframe>) combined with 'elements' => '*+iframe-meta' (which re-enables <iframe>). htmLawed does not sanitize the srcdoc attribute, allowing injection of arbitrary JavaScript that executes when the content is rendered via |raw in templates.
Root Cause
src/Graby.php lines 1038-1048:
htmLawed($html, [
'safe' => 1, // removes <iframe>
'elements' => '*+iframe-meta', // re-adds <iframe>, overrides safe=1
'deny_attribute' => 'style', // srcdoc is NOT denied
]);
The safe=1 and +iframe combination is a conflict: safe mode is designed to strip dangerous elements, but the elements override re-enables <iframe> without also blocking the dangerous srcdoc attribute.
Proof of Concept
Input to cleanupXss():
<iframe srcdoc="<script>alert(document.domain)</script>"></iframe>
Output (unchanged — htmLawed passes it through):
<iframe srcdoc="<script>alert(document.domain)</script>"></iframe>
When rendered via {{ content|raw }} in a template, srcdoc executes in an about:srcdoc frame with the same origin as the page. Confirmed via Puppeteer/Chromium headless: alert(document.domain) fires.
Validated on Wallabag (which uses Graby) via Docker: entry created via API with iframe-only content body triggers Readability failure → falls through to cleanupXss() path.
Impact
- Stored XSS in any application rendering Graby-sanitized content via
|raw - In Wallabag: affects both authenticated views and public share pages (unauthenticated)
- No CSP headers in default Wallabag config — no secondary mitigation
Suggested Fix
Either remove +iframe from the elements config to keep iframes blocked:
'elements' => '*-iframe-meta',
Or explicitly deny the srcdoc attribute:
'deny_attribute' => 'style srcdoc',
Credit
Discovered by @tikket1, 2026-03-25. Redirected from wallabag/wallabag advisory by @j0k3r.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.5.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "j0k3r/graby"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.5.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-31T23:12:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nGraby\u0027s `cleanupXss()` function configures htmLawed with conflicting settings: `safe=1` (which removes `\u003ciframe\u003e`) combined with `\u0027elements\u0027 =\u003e \u0027*+iframe-meta\u0027` (which re-enables `\u003ciframe\u003e`). htmLawed does not sanitize the `srcdoc` attribute, allowing injection of arbitrary JavaScript that executes when the content is rendered via `|raw` in templates.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n**`src/Graby.php` lines 1038-1048:**\n```php\nhtmLawed($html, [\n \u0027safe\u0027 =\u003e 1, // removes \u003ciframe\u003e\n \u0027elements\u0027 =\u003e \u0027*+iframe-meta\u0027, // re-adds \u003ciframe\u003e, overrides safe=1\n \u0027deny_attribute\u0027 =\u003e \u0027style\u0027, // srcdoc is NOT denied\n]);\n```\n\nThe `safe=1` and `+iframe` combination is a conflict: `safe` mode is designed to strip dangerous elements, but the elements override re-enables `\u003ciframe\u003e` without also blocking the dangerous `srcdoc` attribute.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nInput to `cleanupXss()`:\n```html\n\u003ciframe srcdoc=\"\u0026lt;script\u0026gt;alert(document.domain)\u0026lt;/script\u0026gt;\"\u003e\u003c/iframe\u003e\n```\n\nOutput (unchanged \u2014 htmLawed passes it through):\n```html\n\u003ciframe srcdoc=\"\u0026lt;script\u0026gt;alert(document.domain)\u0026lt;/script\u0026gt;\"\u003e\u003c/iframe\u003e\n```\n\nWhen rendered via `{{ content|raw }}` in a template, `srcdoc` executes in an `about:srcdoc` frame with the same origin as the page. **Confirmed via Puppeteer/Chromium headless: `alert(document.domain)` fires.**\n\nValidated on Wallabag (which uses Graby) via Docker: entry created via API with iframe-only content body triggers Readability failure \u2192 falls through to `cleanupXss()` path.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Stored XSS in any application rendering Graby-sanitized content via `|raw`\n- In Wallabag: affects both authenticated views and public share pages (unauthenticated)\n- No CSP headers in default Wallabag config \u2014 no secondary mitigation\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nEither remove `+iframe` from the elements config to keep iframes blocked:\n```php\n\u0027elements\u0027 =\u003e \u0027*-iframe-meta\u0027,\n```\n\nOr explicitly deny the `srcdoc` attribute:\n```php\n\u0027deny_attribute\u0027 =\u003e \u0027style srcdoc\u0027,\n```\n\n## Credit\n\nDiscovered by @tikket1, 2026-03-25. Redirected from wallabag/wallabag advisory by @j0k3r.",
"id": "GHSA-3h6j-9x8m-rg3g",
"modified": "2026-03-31T23:12:36Z",
"published": "2026-03-31T23:12:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/j0k3r/graby/security/advisories/GHSA-3h6j-9x8m-rg3g"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/j0k3r/graby/commit/0295d828822f7a59c5751a8199973a4f965a99b0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/j0k3r/graby"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/j0k3r/graby/releases/tag/2.5.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Graby has stored XSS via iframe srcdoc Attribute in htmLawed Sanitization Config"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.