GHSA-3M5P-2C4R-XXW2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 15:14 – Updated: 2026-09-02 15:14Impact
The fix for CVE-2026-3635 (GHSA-444r-cwp2-x5xf) added a proxyFn(socket.remoteAddress, 0) guard on the X-Forwarded-* reads in request.host, request.protocol, request.hostname, request.ip, and request.ips. That guard closes the IP, CIDR, and custom-function forms of trustProxy correctly because those forms compile to predicates that inspect the connecting address. The hop-count form (trustProxy: <number>) compiles to a predicate that structurally ignores the address argument, so the guard reduces to 0 < tp, always true for any tp >= 1.
Applications configured with trustProxy: <number> (documented as "behind N reverse proxies", trustProxy: 1 being the canonical single-proxy setting) remain vulnerable. An attacker who can reach the Fastify origin directly, bypassing the front-facing proxy, can spoof the request fields exactly as in the unpatched version. Impact class matches the parent CVE-2026-3635: host injection in generated URLs, HTTPS-enforcement bypass, secure-cookie / CSRF-origin bypass, host-based routing and cache poisoning.
Patches
Patched in fastify 5.12.1. The numeric form of trustProxy is now disabled at runtime and removed from the TypeScript type union.
Workarounds
- Migrate to an IP / CIDR / custom-function
trustProxyvalue that validates the connecting address. Custom functions must inspect theaddressargument, not only the hop index. - Ensure the Fastify origin is only reachable through the trusted proxy chain (no direct network path).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "fastify"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.8.3"
},
{
"fixed": "5.12.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-16732"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-348"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-02T15:14:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-18T21:16:34Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nThe fix for [CVE-2026-3635](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-3635) ([GHSA-444r-cwp2-x5xf](https://github.com/fastify/fastify/security/advisories/GHSA-444r-cwp2-x5xf)) added a `proxyFn(socket.remoteAddress, 0)` guard on the `X-Forwarded-*` reads in `request.host`, `request.protocol`, `request.hostname`, `request.ip`, and `request.ips`. That guard closes the IP, CIDR, and custom-function forms of `trustProxy` correctly because those forms compile to predicates that inspect the connecting address. The hop-count form (`trustProxy: \u003cnumber\u003e`) compiles to a predicate that structurally ignores the address argument, so the guard reduces to `0 \u003c tp`, always true for any `tp \u003e= 1`.\n\nApplications configured with `trustProxy: \u003cnumber\u003e` (documented as \"behind N reverse proxies\", `trustProxy: 1` being the canonical single-proxy setting) remain vulnerable. An attacker who can reach the Fastify origin directly, bypassing the front-facing proxy, can spoof the request fields exactly as in the unpatched version. Impact class matches the parent CVE-2026-3635: host injection in generated URLs, HTTPS-enforcement bypass, secure-cookie / CSRF-origin bypass, host-based routing and cache poisoning.\n\n## Patches\n\nPatched in fastify 5.12.1. The numeric form of `trustProxy` is now disabled at runtime and removed from the TypeScript type union.\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- Migrate to an IP / CIDR / custom-function `trustProxy` value that validates the connecting address. Custom functions must inspect the `address` argument, not only the hop index.\n- Ensure the Fastify origin is only reachable through the trusted proxy chain (no direct network path).",
"id": "GHSA-3m5p-2c4r-xxw2",
"modified": "2026-09-02T15:14:06Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T15:14:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fastify/fastify/security/advisories/GHSA-3m5p-2c4r-xxw2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-16732"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fastify/fastify/commit/8acfea7eada05383a7357e3eb21c2628416df280"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cna.openjsf.org/security-advisories.html"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/fastify/fastify"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fastify/fastify/releases/tag/v5.12.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "fastify vulnerable to X-Forwarded-* spoofing under trustProxy hop-count"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.