GHSA-426F-JH2P-2383
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 06:32 – Updated: 2026-08-17 06:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: mxl862xx: fix use-after-free of DSA ports in crc_err_work
Upon an MDIO CRC error mxl862xx_crc_err_work_fn() walks the DSA ports and closes the CPU port conduits:
dsa_switch_for_each_cpu_port(dp, priv->ds)
dev_close(dp->conduit);
mxl862xx_remove() unregisters the switch before cancelling this work:
set_bit(MXL862XX_FLAG_WORK_STOPPED, &priv->flags);
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&priv->stats_work);
dsa_unregister_switch(ds);
mxl862xx_host_shutdown(priv);
dsa_unregister_switch() frees the dsa_port objects. If a CRC error schedules the work during teardown it can run after the ports have been freed and dereference freed memory.
Guard the port walk with MXL862XX_FLAG_WORK_STOPPED, which is already set before dsa_unregister_switch(). DSA tears the ports down under rtnl_lock(), so checking the flag under rtnl_lock() means the work either runs before teardown and sees valid ports, or runs afterwards, observes the flag and skips the walk. This mirrors the host_flood_work handler, which skips torn-down ports under rtnl_lock().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-72411"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T06:22:14Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: dsa: mxl862xx: fix use-after-free of DSA ports in crc_err_work\n\nUpon an MDIO CRC error mxl862xx_crc_err_work_fn() walks the DSA ports\nand closes the CPU port conduits:\n\n\tdsa_switch_for_each_cpu_port(dp, priv-\u003eds)\n\t\tdev_close(dp-\u003econduit);\n\nmxl862xx_remove() unregisters the switch before cancelling this work:\n\n\tset_bit(MXL862XX_FLAG_WORK_STOPPED, \u0026priv-\u003eflags);\n\tcancel_delayed_work_sync(\u0026priv-\u003estats_work);\n\tdsa_unregister_switch(ds);\n\tmxl862xx_host_shutdown(priv);\n\ndsa_unregister_switch() frees the dsa_port objects. If a CRC error\nschedules the work during teardown it can run after the ports have been\nfreed and dereference freed memory.\n\nGuard the port walk with MXL862XX_FLAG_WORK_STOPPED, which is already set\nbefore dsa_unregister_switch(). DSA tears the ports down under\nrtnl_lock(), so checking the flag under rtnl_lock() means the work either\nruns before teardown and sees valid ports, or runs afterwards, observes\nthe flag and skips the walk. This mirrors the host_flood_work handler,\nwhich skips torn-down ports under rtnl_lock().",
"id": "GHSA-426f-jh2p-2383",
"modified": "2026-08-17T06:33:28Z",
"published": "2026-08-15T06:32:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72411"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bcb3b8314611ed9cb4ff4bff484ef9b154fd1b83"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf52622fbc274eb4ca9a2066b258da2ae3dc7406"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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