{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "code.vikunja.io/api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.24.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27819"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-26T15:23:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-25T22:16:27Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nPath Traversal (Zip Slip) and Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability discovered in the Vikunja CLI\u0027s restore functionality.\n\n### Details\n\nThe restoreConfig function in vikunja/pkg/modules/dump/restore.go of the https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/tree/main repository fails to sanitize file paths within the provided ZIP archive. A maliciously crafted ZIP can bypass the intended extraction directory to overwrite arbitrary files on the host system. Additionally, we\u2019ve discovered that a malformed archive triggers a runtime panic, crashing the process immediately after the database has been wiped permanently.\n\nThe application trusts the metadata in the ZIP archive. It uses the Name attribute of the zip.File struct directly in os.OpenFile calls without validation, allowing files to be written outside the intended directory.\n\nThe restoration logic assumes a specific directory structure within the ZIP. When provided with a \"minimalist\" malicious ZIP, the application fails to validate the length of slices derived from the archive contents. Specifically, at line 154, the code attempts to access an index of len(ms)-2 on an insufficiently populated slice, triggering a panic.\n\n### PoC\n\nWhen provided with a ZIP containing a traversal path (e.g., ../../../pwned.txt) and a missing migration structure, the application wipes the existing database and then panics due to unsafe index manipulation at line 154 of restore.go.\n\nReproduction Steps:\n1. Preparation: Generate vikunja_critical_poc.zip.\n2. Execution: Run echo \"Yes, I understand\" | vikunja restore vikunja_critical_poc.zip.\n3. Observation:\na. The application logs INFO: Wiped database.\nb. The application immediately follows with: panic: runtime error: index out of range [-2].\n4. The database is effectively deleted (Wiped), and the restoration process fails to complete, leaving the application in a non-functional state with total data loss for that instance.\n\nReproduction Python Script:\n\n    import zipfile\n\n    VIKUNJA_VERSION = \"v1.1.0\" \n    ZIP_NAME = \"vikunja_critical_poc.zip\"\n\n    def create_poc():\n        with zipfile.ZipFile(ZIP_NAME, \u0027w\u0027) as zipf:\n            # Mandatory version file to pass initial check\n            zipf.writestr(\u0027VERSION\u0027, VIKUNJA_VERSION)\n\n            # Malicious traversal path\n            # This triggers the traversal logic and the index panic simultaneously\n            zipf.writestr(\u0027../../../pwned.txt\u0027, \"Vulnerability Confirmed.\")\n        print(f\"[+] {ZIP_NAME} created.\")\n\n    if __name__ == \"__main__\":\n        create_poc()\n\n\nStack Trace:\ntime=2026-02-21T23:07:22.707Z level=INFO msg=\"Wiped database.\" panic: runtime error: index out of range [-2] goroutine 1 [running]: code.vikunja.io/api/pkg/modules/dump.Restore(...) /go/src/code.vikunja.io/api/pkg/modules/dump/restore.go:154 +0x1085\n\n\nRemediation:\nSanitize Paths: Use filepath.Base() to strip all directory information from ZIP entries before processing.\nImplement Bounds Checking: Ensure slices have sufficient length before performing index arithmetic.\n\nProposed Fix for restore.go:\n\n    // 1. Sanitize the filename\n    filename := filepath.Base(configFile.Name)\n    dstPath := filepath.Join(extractionDir, filename)\n\n    // ...\n\n    // 2. Prevent Index Out of Range Panic (Line 154)\n    if len(ms) \u003c 2 {\n        return fmt.Errorf(\"invalid migration sequence in backup archive\")\n    }\n    lastMigration := ms[len(ms)-2]\n\n### Impact\n\nVulnerability Type: CWE-22 (Path Traversal) / CWE-248 (Uncaught Exception)\nAffected Component: pkg/modules/dump/restore.go\nImpact: Arbitrary File Write and Permanent Data Loss\nStatus: Vikunja has not found an existing CVE for these issues; they appear to be undisclosed Zero-Days.\nSource File: pkg/modules/dump/restore.go\nFunctions: Restore, restoreConfig\nLine Number: 154 (v1.1.0)\nCommand: vikunja restore \u003cpath_to_zip\u003e\n\nAffected Party: Any administrator or automated process utilizing the vikunja restore CLI command.\n1. Specifically, instances where a user may be socially engineered into restoring a backup from an untrusted source are at high risk.\n2. Additionally, because the database is wiped before archive validation, even a failed exploitation attempt results in a complete loss of application data for that instance, impacting all end-users of the affected Vikunja installation.",
  "id": "GHSA-42wg-38gx-85rh",
  "modified": "2026-02-26T15:23:30Z",
  "published": "2026-02-26T15:23:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-42wg-38gx-85rh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27819"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/1b3d8dc59cb5f2b759ab0ad2bc9915b993e3cb73"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vikunja.io/changelog/vikunja-v2.0.0-was-released"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vikunja has Path Traversal in CLI Restore"
}