ghsa-4cch-wxpw-8p28
Vulnerability from github
Published
2020-12-21 16:28
Modified
2021-11-18 15:25
Summary
Server-Side Forgery Request can be activated unmarshalling with XStream
Details

Impact

The vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to request data from internal resources that are not publicly available only by manipulating the processed input stream.

Patches

If you rely on XStream's default blacklist of the Security Framework, you will have to use at least version 1.4.15.

Workarounds

The reported vulnerability does not exist running Java 15 or higher.

No user is affected, who followed the recommendation to setup XStream's Security Framework with a whitelist! Anyone relying on XStream's default blacklist can immediately switch to a whilelist for the allowed types to avoid the vulnerability.

Users of XStream 1.4.14 or below who still insist to use XStream default blacklist - despite that clear recommendation - can use a workaround depending on their version in use.

Users of XStream 1.4.14 can simply add two lines to XStream's setup code: Java xstream.denyTypes(new String[]{ "jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString" }); xstream.denyTypesByRegExp(new String[]{ ".*\\.ReadAllStream\\$FileStream" });

Users of XStream 1.4.14 to 1.4.13 can simply add three lines to XStream's setup code: Java xstream.denyTypes(new String[]{ "javax.imageio.ImageIO$ContainsFilter", "jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString" }); xstream.denyTypes(new Class[]{ java.lang.ProcessBuilder.class }); xstream.denyTypesByRegExp(new String[]{ ".*\\.ReadAllStream\\$FileStream" }); Users of XStream 1.4.12 to 1.4.7 who want to use XStream with a black list will have to setup such a list from scratch and deny at least the following types: javax.imageio.ImageIO$ContainsFilter, java.beans.EventHandler, java.lang.ProcessBuilder, jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString.class, java.lang.Void and void and deny several types by name pattern. Java xstream.denyTypes(new String[]{ "javax.imageio.ImageIO$ContainsFilter", "jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString" }); xstream.denyTypes(new Class[]{ java.lang.ProcessBuilder.class, "jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString", java.beans.EventHandler.class, java.lang.ProcessBuilder.class, java.lang.Void.class, void.class }); xstream.denyTypesByRegExp(new String[]{ ".*\\$LazyIterator", "javax\\.crypto\\..*", ".*\\.ReadAllStream\\$FileStream" }); Users of XStream 1.4.6 or below can register an own converter to prevent the unmarshalling of the currently know critical types of the Java runtime. It is in fact an updated version of the workaround for CVE-2013-7285: ```Java xstream.registerConverter(new Converter() { public boolean canConvert(Class type) { return type != null && (type == java.beans.EventHandler.class || type == java.lang.ProcessBuilder.class || type.getName().equals("javax.imageio.ImageIO$ContainsFilter") || type.getName().equals("jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString") || type == java.lang.Void.class || void.class || Proxy.isProxy(type)) || type.getName().startsWith("javax.crypto.") || type.getName().endsWith("$LazyIterator") || type.getName().endsWith(".ReadAllStream$FileStream")); }

public Object unmarshal(HierarchicalStreamReader reader, UnmarshallingContext context) { throw new ConversionException("Unsupported type due to security reasons."); }

public void marshal(Object source, HierarchicalStreamWriter writer, MarshallingContext context) { throw new ConversionException("Unsupported type due to security reasons."); } }, XStream.PRIORITY_LOW); ```

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in XStream * Contact us at XStream Google Group

Show details on source website


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.4.15"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-26258"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-12-21T16:21:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-12-16T01:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThe vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to request data from internal resources that are not publicly available only by manipulating the processed input stream.\n\n### Patches\nIf you rely on XStream\u0027s default blacklist of the [Security Framework](https://x-stream.github.io/security.html#framework), you will have to use at least version 1.4.15.\n\n### Workarounds\nThe reported vulnerability does not exist running Java 15 or higher.\n\nNo user is affected, who followed the recommendation to setup XStream\u0027s Security Framework with a whitelist! Anyone relying on XStream\u0027s default blacklist can immediately switch to a whilelist for the allowed types to avoid the vulnerability.\n\nUsers of XStream 1.4.14 or below who still insist to use XStream default blacklist - despite that clear recommendation - can use a workaround depending on their version in use.\n\nUsers of XStream 1.4.14 can simply add two lines to XStream\u0027s setup code:\n```Java\nxstream.denyTypes(new String[]{ \"jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString\" });\nxstream.denyTypesByRegExp(new String[]{ \".*\\\\.ReadAllStream\\\\$FileStream\" });\n```\n\nUsers of XStream 1.4.14 to 1.4.13 can simply add three lines to XStream\u0027s setup code:\n```Java\nxstream.denyTypes(new String[]{ \"javax.imageio.ImageIO$ContainsFilter\", \"jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString\" });\nxstream.denyTypes(new Class[]{ java.lang.ProcessBuilder.class });\nxstream.denyTypesByRegExp(new String[]{ \".*\\\\.ReadAllStream\\\\$FileStream\" });\n```\nUsers of XStream 1.4.12 to 1.4.7 who want to use XStream with a black list will have to setup such a list from scratch and deny at least the following types: _javax.imageio.ImageIO$ContainsFilter_, _java.beans.EventHandler_, _java.lang.ProcessBuilder_, _jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString.class_, _java.lang.Void_ and _void_ and deny several types by name pattern.\n```Java\nxstream.denyTypes(new String[]{ \"javax.imageio.ImageIO$ContainsFilter\", \"jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString\" });\nxstream.denyTypes(new Class[]{ java.lang.ProcessBuilder.class, \"jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString\", java.beans.EventHandler.class, java.lang.ProcessBuilder.class, java.lang.Void.class, void.class });\nxstream.denyTypesByRegExp(new String[]{ \".*\\\\$LazyIterator\", \"javax\\\\.crypto\\\\..*\", \".*\\\\.ReadAllStream\\\\$FileStream\" });\n```\nUsers of XStream 1.4.6 or below can register an own converter to prevent the unmarshalling of the currently know critical types of the Java runtime. It is in fact an updated version of the workaround for CVE-2013-7285:\n```Java\nxstream.registerConverter(new Converter() {\n  public boolean canConvert(Class type) {\n    return type != null \u0026\u0026 (type == java.beans.EventHandler.class || type == java.lang.ProcessBuilder.class\n        || type.getName().equals(\"javax.imageio.ImageIO$ContainsFilter\") || type.getName().equals(\"jdk.nashorn.internal.objects.NativeString\")\n        || type == java.lang.Void.class || void.class || Proxy.isProxy(type))\n        || type.getName().startsWith(\"javax.crypto.\") || type.getName().endsWith(\"$LazyIterator\") || type.getName().endsWith(\".ReadAllStream$FileStream\"));\n  }\n\n  public Object unmarshal(HierarchicalStreamReader reader, UnmarshallingContext context) {\n    throw new ConversionException(\"Unsupported type due to security reasons.\");\n  }\n\n  public void marshal(Object source, HierarchicalStreamWriter writer, MarshallingContext context) {\n    throw new ConversionException(\"Unsupported type due to security reasons.\");\n  }\n}, XStream.PRIORITY_LOW);\n```\n \n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [XStream](https://github.com/x-stream/xstream/issues)\n* Contact us at [XStream Google Group](https://groups.google.com/group/xstream-user)",
  "id": "GHSA-4cch-wxpw-8p28",
  "modified": "2021-11-18T15:25:25Z",
  "published": "2020-12-21T16:28:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/x-stream/xstream/security/advisories/GHSA-4cch-wxpw-8p28"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-26258"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/x-stream/xstream"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r97993e3d78e1f5389b7b172ba9f308440830ce5f051ee62714a0aa34@%3Ccommits.struts.apache.org%3E"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2020/12/msg00042.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/22KVR6B5IZP3BGQ3HPWIO2FWWCKT3DHP"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/PVPHZA7VW2RRSDCOIPP2W6O5ND254TU7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/QGXIU3YDPG6OGTDHMBLAFN7BPBERXREB"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20210409-0005"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2021/dsa-4828"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://x-stream.github.io/CVE-2020-26258.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Server-Side Forgery Request can be activated unmarshalling with XStream"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading...

Loading...

Loading...

Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or seen somewhere by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability is confirmed from an analyst perspective.
  • Exploited: This vulnerability was exploited and seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Patched: This vulnerability was successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not exploited: This vulnerability was not exploited or seen by the user reporting the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expresses doubt about the veracity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: This vulnerability was not successfully patched by the user reporting the sighting.