GHSA-4CQV-H74H-93J4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 21:49 – Updated: 2026-03-03 21:49
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw has a Discord `allowFrom` slug-collision authorization bypass
Details

OpenClaw supports Discord allowlists using either user IDs or names/tags. Name/tag matching depends on slug normalization, so different user tags can collide to the same slug and unintentionally satisfy a name-based allowlist entry.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.2.21-2
  • Patched versions: >= 2026.2.22

What Changed

  • openclaw security audit now warns on Discord name/tag allowlist entries (DM allowlists, guild/channel users, and pairing-store entries).
  • Runtime authorization now prefers resolved user IDs when a configured name/tag can be resolved, without rewriting config files on disk.
  • Name-based entries remain supported for compatibility.

Recommendations

  • Prefer stable Discord user IDs for security-sensitive allowlists.
  • Run openclaw security audit and address warnings where practical.

Fix Commit(s)

  • f97c45c5b5e0698b6667bb5f6badc0cac7dabd12
  • 747bb581b3f2264495e1fec5a0727d9f2ca1b6f1

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.2.21-2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.22"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T21:49:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "OpenClaw supports Discord allowlists using either user IDs or names/tags. Name/tag matching depends on slug normalization, so different user tags can collide to the same slug and unintentionally satisfy a name-based allowlist entry.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.21-2`\n- Patched versions: \u003e= 2026.2.22\n\n## What Changed\n- `openclaw security audit` now warns on Discord name/tag allowlist entries (DM allowlists, guild/channel `users`, and pairing-store entries).\n- Runtime authorization now prefers resolved user IDs when a configured name/tag can be resolved, without rewriting config files on disk.\n- Name-based entries remain supported for compatibility.\n\n## Recommendations\n- Prefer stable Discord user IDs for security-sensitive allowlists.\n- Run `openclaw security audit` and address warnings where practical.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- f97c45c5b5e0698b6667bb5f6badc0cac7dabd12\n- 747bb581b3f2264495e1fec5a0727d9f2ca1b6f1\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-4cqv-h74h-93j4",
  "modified": "2026-03-03T21:49:41Z",
  "published": "2026-03-03T21:49:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-4cqv-h74h-93j4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/747bb581b3f2264495e1fec5a0727d9f2ca1b6f1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/f97c45c5b5e0698b6667bb5f6badc0cac7dabd12"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw has a Discord `allowFrom` slug-collision authorization bypass"
}



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