GHSA-4CQV-H74H-93J4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 21:49 – Updated: 2026-03-03 21:49
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw has a Discord `allowFrom` slug-collision authorization bypass
Details
OpenClaw supports Discord allowlists using either user IDs or names/tags. Name/tag matching depends on slug normalization, so different user tags can collide to the same slug and unintentionally satisfy a name-based allowlist entry.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
<= 2026.2.21-2 - Patched versions: >= 2026.2.22
What Changed
openclaw security auditnow warns on Discord name/tag allowlist entries (DM allowlists, guild/channelusers, and pairing-store entries).- Runtime authorization now prefers resolved user IDs when a configured name/tag can be resolved, without rewriting config files on disk.
- Name-based entries remain supported for compatibility.
Recommendations
- Prefer stable Discord user IDs for security-sensitive allowlists.
- Run
openclaw security auditand address warnings where practical.
Fix Commit(s)
- f97c45c5b5e0698b6667bb5f6badc0cac7dabd12
- 747bb581b3f2264495e1fec5a0727d9f2ca1b6f1
OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
Severity
6.5 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.2.21-2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.22"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T21:49:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "OpenClaw supports Discord allowlists using either user IDs or names/tags. Name/tag matching depends on slug normalization, so different user tags can collide to the same slug and unintentionally satisfy a name-based allowlist entry.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.21-2`\n- Patched versions: \u003e= 2026.2.22\n\n## What Changed\n- `openclaw security audit` now warns on Discord name/tag allowlist entries (DM allowlists, guild/channel `users`, and pairing-store entries).\n- Runtime authorization now prefers resolved user IDs when a configured name/tag can be resolved, without rewriting config files on disk.\n- Name-based entries remain supported for compatibility.\n\n## Recommendations\n- Prefer stable Discord user IDs for security-sensitive allowlists.\n- Run `openclaw security audit` and address warnings where practical.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- f97c45c5b5e0698b6667bb5f6badc0cac7dabd12\n- 747bb581b3f2264495e1fec5a0727d9f2ca1b6f1\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-4cqv-h74h-93j4",
"modified": "2026-03-03T21:49:41Z",
"published": "2026-03-03T21:49:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-4cqv-h74h-93j4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/747bb581b3f2264495e1fec5a0727d9f2ca1b6f1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/f97c45c5b5e0698b6667bb5f6badc0cac7dabd12"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw has a Discord `allowFrom` slug-collision authorization bypass"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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