GHSA-4G38-8HM5-638J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-09-16 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: wacom: validate report length in wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_irq
wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_irq() receives the wire report length in len
but never consults it before parsing. After the report-id gate it
unconditionally calls wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_pen() and then, selected by
features.type, a fixed chain of sub-parsers, none of which receive
len:
wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_pen(wacom);
if (type == INTUOSP2_BT || type == INTUOSP2S_BT) {
wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_touch(wacom);
wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_pad(wacom);
wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_battery(wacom);
} else {
wacom_intuos_gen3_bt_pad(wacom);
wacom_intuos_gen3_bt_battery(wacom);
}
Each sub-parser dereferences wacom->data at fixed offsets. The furthest byte touched on each branch is:
INTUOSP2_BT / INTUOSP2S_BT: wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_pad() reads data[285] (the touchring byte), so the report must be at least 286 bytes; INTUOSHT3_BT ("gen3"): wacom_intuos_gen3_bt_battery() reads data[45], so the report must be at least 46 bytes.
features.type is selected from the VID/PID id_table entry and wacom_setup_device_quirks() force-registers the pen/pad/touch inputs for that type independent of the report descriptor, so a malicious or malfunctioning paired/spoofed Bluetooth peripheral can advertise that VID/PID and send an undersized report that still satisfies the data[0] == 0x80/0x81 gate. The driver then reads past the received report and forwards the bytes to userspace via evdev (MSC_SERIAL / ABS_MISC / ABS_WHEEL on the pen and pad input nodes), an out-of-bounds read with a concrete userspace read-back channel, and a true out-of-bounds read on transports whose backing buffer is sized to the (small) report descriptor rather than a fixed-size staging buffer.
This is the same class of bug commit 2f1763f62909 ("HID: wacom: fix out-of-bounds read in wacom_intuos_bt_irq") already hardened in the sibling wacom_intuos_bt_irq(), which guards each report id against its minimum length before parsing.
Guard wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_irq() the same way: before parsing, reject reports shorter than the furthest offset the selected branch actually dereferences, warn, and bail out. Because the whole pen/touch/pad/ battery chain runs unconditionally per branch, a single up-front check against the maximum offset (286 bytes for INTUOSP2_BT/INTUOSP2S_BT, 46 bytes for the gen3 branch) bounds every sub-parser. Returning 0 on a short report also skips those calls for the same malformed report, which is the safe, conservative behavior.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89999"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:17:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: wacom: validate report length in wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_irq\n\nwacom_intuos_pro2_bt_irq() receives the wire report length in `len`\nbut never consults it before parsing. After the report-id gate it\nunconditionally calls wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_pen() and then, selected by\nfeatures.type, a fixed chain of sub-parsers, none of which receive\n`len`:\n\n\twacom_intuos_pro2_bt_pen(wacom);\n\tif (type == INTUOSP2_BT || type == INTUOSP2S_BT) {\n\t\twacom_intuos_pro2_bt_touch(wacom);\n\t\twacom_intuos_pro2_bt_pad(wacom);\n\t\twacom_intuos_pro2_bt_battery(wacom);\n\t} else {\n\t\twacom_intuos_gen3_bt_pad(wacom);\n\t\twacom_intuos_gen3_bt_battery(wacom);\n\t}\n\nEach sub-parser dereferences wacom-\u003edata at fixed offsets. The furthest\nbyte touched on each branch is:\n\n INTUOSP2_BT / INTUOSP2S_BT: wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_pad() reads data[285]\n\t(the touchring byte), so the report must be at least 286 bytes;\n INTUOSHT3_BT (\"gen3\"): wacom_intuos_gen3_bt_battery() reads data[45],\n\tso the report must be at least 46 bytes.\n\nfeatures.type is selected from the VID/PID id_table entry and\nwacom_setup_device_quirks() force-registers the pen/pad/touch inputs\nfor that type independent of the report descriptor, so a malicious or\nmalfunctioning paired/spoofed Bluetooth peripheral can advertise that\nVID/PID and send an undersized report that still satisfies the\ndata[0] == 0x80/0x81 gate. The driver then reads past the received\nreport and forwards the bytes to userspace via evdev (MSC_SERIAL /\nABS_MISC / ABS_WHEEL on the pen and pad input nodes), an out-of-bounds\nread with a concrete userspace read-back channel, and a true\nout-of-bounds read on transports whose backing buffer is sized to the\n(small) report descriptor rather than a fixed-size staging buffer.\n\nThis is the same class of bug commit 2f1763f62909 (\"HID: wacom: fix\nout-of-bounds read in wacom_intuos_bt_irq\") already hardened in the\nsibling wacom_intuos_bt_irq(), which guards each report id against its\nminimum length before parsing.\n\nGuard wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_irq() the same way: before parsing, reject\nreports shorter than the furthest offset the selected branch actually\ndereferences, warn, and bail out. Because the whole pen/touch/pad/\nbattery chain runs unconditionally per branch, a single up-front check\nagainst the maximum offset (286 bytes for INTUOSP2_BT/INTUOSP2S_BT,\n46 bytes for the gen3 branch) bounds every sub-parser. Returning 0 on\na short report also skips those calls for the same malformed report,\nwhich is the safe, conservative behavior.",
"id": "GHSA-4g38-8hm5-638j",
"modified": "2026-09-16T15:31:06Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T12:30:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89999"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0cdc6cb242dd8d2731956fdf3390de094482a4b2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/114af803e409a68e52516810ecd24df4d8ce0c68"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1bfc0547b81d5861443420d19b5ed2fd533cd17f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/74ec08f7b81c2726578039ca6dea0fec136c38ea"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84781a1f3c5dc6650480be9329e6e8528939eaa0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96dd0af7597aba2d80cc97e2f66e8b72d30ba125"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8e04f3f894ccb52cfcd7e60125a9f35da4a616d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2844f3fcd058113acbe0aa110ab13ef28b98d9f"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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