GHSA-4H52-Q6MH-W82H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-17 15:30 – Updated: 2025-12-10 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
skmsg: pass gfp argument to alloc_sk_msg()
syzbot found that alloc_sk_msg() could be called from a non sleepable context. sk_psock_verdict_recv() uses rcu_read_lock() protection.
We need the callers to pass a gfp_t argument to avoid issues.
syzbot report was:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/sched/mm.h:274 in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 3613, name: syz-executor414 preempt_count: 0, expected: 0 RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 0 PID: 3613 Comm: syz-executor414 Not tainted 6.0.0-syzkaller-09589-g55be6084c8e0 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/22/2022 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1e3/0x2cb lib/dump_stack.c:106 __might_resched+0x538/0x6a0 kernel/sched/core.c:9877 might_alloc include/linux/sched/mm.h:274 [inline] slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:700 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3162 [inline] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3256 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x59/0x310 mm/slub.c:3287 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:600 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:733 [inline] alloc_sk_msg net/core/skmsg.c:507 [inline] sk_psock_skb_ingress_self+0x5c/0x330 net/core/skmsg.c:600 sk_psock_verdict_apply+0x395/0x440 net/core/skmsg.c:1014 sk_psock_verdict_recv+0x34d/0x560 net/core/skmsg.c:1201 tcp_read_skb+0x4a1/0x790 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1770 tcp_rcv_established+0x129d/0x1a10 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5971 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x479/0xac0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1681 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1109 [inline] __release_sock+0x1d8/0x4c0 net/core/sock.c:2906 release_sock+0x5d/0x1c0 net/core/sock.c:3462 tcp_sendmsg+0x36/0x40 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1483 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x46d/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2117 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2129 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2125 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xda/0xf0 net/socket.c:2125 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-50363"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-17T15:15:35Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nskmsg: pass gfp argument to alloc_sk_msg()\n\nsyzbot found that alloc_sk_msg() could be called from a\nnon sleepable context. sk_psock_verdict_recv() uses\nrcu_read_lock() protection.\n\nWe need the callers to pass a gfp_t argument to avoid issues.\n\nsyzbot report was:\n\nBUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/sched/mm.h:274\nin_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 3613, name: syz-executor414\npreempt_count: 0, expected: 0\nRCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0\nINFO: lockdep is turned off.\nCPU: 0 PID: 3613 Comm: syz-executor414 Not tainted 6.0.0-syzkaller-09589-g55be6084c8e0 #0\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/22/2022\nCall Trace:\n\u003cTASK\u003e\n__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]\ndump_stack_lvl+0x1e3/0x2cb lib/dump_stack.c:106\n__might_resched+0x538/0x6a0 kernel/sched/core.c:9877\nmight_alloc include/linux/sched/mm.h:274 [inline]\nslab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:700 [inline]\nslab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3162 [inline]\nslab_alloc mm/slub.c:3256 [inline]\nkmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x59/0x310 mm/slub.c:3287\nkmalloc include/linux/slab.h:600 [inline]\nkzalloc include/linux/slab.h:733 [inline]\nalloc_sk_msg net/core/skmsg.c:507 [inline]\nsk_psock_skb_ingress_self+0x5c/0x330 net/core/skmsg.c:600\nsk_psock_verdict_apply+0x395/0x440 net/core/skmsg.c:1014\nsk_psock_verdict_recv+0x34d/0x560 net/core/skmsg.c:1201\ntcp_read_skb+0x4a1/0x790 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1770\ntcp_rcv_established+0x129d/0x1a10 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5971\ntcp_v4_do_rcv+0x479/0xac0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1681\nsk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1109 [inline]\n__release_sock+0x1d8/0x4c0 net/core/sock.c:2906\nrelease_sock+0x5d/0x1c0 net/core/sock.c:3462\ntcp_sendmsg+0x36/0x40 net/ipv4/tcp.c:1483\nsock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]\nsock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline]\n__sys_sendto+0x46d/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2117\n__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2129 [inline]\n__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2125 [inline]\n__x64_sys_sendto+0xda/0xf0 net/socket.c:2125\ndo_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]\ndo_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80\nentry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd",
"id": "GHSA-4h52-q6mh-w82h",
"modified": "2025-12-10T21:31:29Z",
"published": "2025-09-17T15:30:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-50363"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2d1f274b95c6e4ba6a813b3b8e7a1a38d54a0a08"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/693ddd6ffc05b228ea1638f9d757c5d3541f9446"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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