GHSA-4JRJ-Q762-XJH5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-09-25 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: mdb: Fix use-after-free in vxlan_mdb_remote_src_del()
vxlan_mdb_is_valid_source(), which validates MDBE_ATTR_SOURCE and every MDBE_ATTR_SRC_LIST member, accepts the all-zeros address.
A source list is only accepted on a (, G) entry, whose source is the all-zeros address, and for each member of the list an (S, G) entry is derived from it by substituting the source. Entries are keyed by a plain memcmp() of struct vxlan_mdb_entry_key, so if MDBE_ATTR_SOURCE is present and holds the all-zeros address and the source list holds it as well, the derived (S, G) key is byte-identical to the (, G) key and resolves to the same entry. Omitting MDBE_ATTR_SOURCE is not equivalent, as the key is then left with a zero address family.
vxlan_mdb_remote_src_del() removes the forwarding entry of a source before freeing the source entry:
vxlan_mdb_remote_src_fwd_del(vxlan, group, remote, &ent->addr);
vxlan_mdb_remote_src_entry_del(ent);
With the keys aliased, the first call deletes the remote of the entry that owns 'ent' instead of a separate (S, G) entry, and frees 'ent'. The second call then runs on the freed entry, and its hlist_del() reads ->pprev and ->next out of it and writes through them.
Adding the (*, G) entry with NLM_F_REPLACE and no source list marks the all-zeros source for deletion and reaches this from the sweep at the end of vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_replace().
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __vxlan_mdb_add+0x1cd/0xd70 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888102852500 by task poc/84 __vxlan_mdb_add+0x1cd/0xd70 vxlan_mdb_add+0xc0/0x140 rtnl_mdb_add+0x157/0x2a0 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x207/0x5a0 Allocated by task 84: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x153/0x360 vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_add+0x2eb/0x440 __vxlan_mdb_add+0x803/0xd70 Freed by task 84: kfree+0x14c/0x3b0 vxlan_mdb_remote_del+0x129/0x1a0 __vxlan_mdb_del+0x4f/0xe0 vxlan_mdb_remote_src_fwd_del.isra.0+0x162/0x1b0 __vxlan_mdb_add+0x1c5/0xd70
The MDB operations are netns-scoped, so an unprivileged user can perform them in a new user and network namespace.
Reject the all-zeros address in vxlan_mdb_is_valid_source(), which covers both call sites. A (*, G) entry is expressed by omitting the source, so nothing legitimate is refused.
Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee baul.lee@xbow.com
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-98122"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:43Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvxlan: mdb: Fix use-after-free in vxlan_mdb_remote_src_del()\n\nvxlan_mdb_is_valid_source(), which validates MDBE_ATTR_SOURCE and every\nMDBE_ATTR_SRC_LIST member, accepts the all-zeros address.\n\nA source list is only accepted on a (*, G) entry, whose source is the\nall-zeros address, and for each member of the list an (S, G) entry is\nderived from it by substituting the source. Entries are keyed by a plain\nmemcmp() of struct vxlan_mdb_entry_key, so if MDBE_ATTR_SOURCE is present\nand holds the all-zeros address and the source list holds it as well, the\nderived (S, G) key is byte-identical to the (*, G) key and resolves to the\nsame entry. Omitting MDBE_ATTR_SOURCE is not equivalent, as the key is\nthen left with a zero address family.\n\nvxlan_mdb_remote_src_del() removes the forwarding entry of a source before\nfreeing the source entry:\n\n\tvxlan_mdb_remote_src_fwd_del(vxlan, group, remote, \u0026ent-\u003eaddr);\n\tvxlan_mdb_remote_src_entry_del(ent);\n\nWith the keys aliased, the first call deletes the remote of the entry that\nowns \u0027ent\u0027 instead of a separate (S, G) entry, and frees \u0027ent\u0027. The second\ncall then runs on the freed entry, and its hlist_del() reads -\u003epprev and\n-\u003enext out of it and writes through them.\n\nAdding the (*, G) entry with NLM_F_REPLACE and no source list marks the\nall-zeros source for deletion and reaches this from the sweep at the end\nof vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_replace().\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __vxlan_mdb_add+0x1cd/0xd70\n Read of size 8 at addr ffff888102852500 by task poc/84\n __vxlan_mdb_add+0x1cd/0xd70\n vxlan_mdb_add+0xc0/0x140\n rtnl_mdb_add+0x157/0x2a0\n rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x207/0x5a0\n Allocated by task 84:\n __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x153/0x360\n vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_add+0x2eb/0x440\n __vxlan_mdb_add+0x803/0xd70\n Freed by task 84:\n kfree+0x14c/0x3b0\n vxlan_mdb_remote_del+0x129/0x1a0\n __vxlan_mdb_del+0x4f/0xe0\n vxlan_mdb_remote_src_fwd_del.isra.0+0x162/0x1b0\n __vxlan_mdb_add+0x1c5/0xd70\n\nThe MDB operations are netns-scoped, so an unprivileged user can perform\nthem in a new user and network namespace.\n\nReject the all-zeros address in vxlan_mdb_is_valid_source(), which covers\nboth call sites. A (*, G) entry is expressed by omitting the source, so\nnothing legitimate is refused.\n\nDiscovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee \u003cbaul.lee@xbow.com\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-4jrj-q762-xjh5",
"modified": "2026-09-25T15:31:45Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T12:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98122"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4aa61c88b4e292e10abdfd791334b8272108d68a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71203a41d6fa2fa0ea2f3a7541987958bd3694fd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/74e2a56c82209b0335b53e25f19f9b0590e2483d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e12c903fd13c6261b98ca18d8f70ac26e739e2f8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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