GHSA-4M25-X3HR-48WM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-13 09:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86/amd/pmc: Fix LPS0 and debugfs leaks when STB init fails
amd_pmc_probe() registers the LPS0 s2idle handler with acpi_register_lps0_dev() and creates the driver's debugfs directory before calling amd_stb_s2d_init(), which is the last step in probe that can fail.
When amd_stb_s2d_init() fails (for example the S2D telemetry region cannot be ioremapped on a long-running system, or the SMU rejects the S2D setup) the error path only calls pci_dev_put() and returns. This leaves amd_pmc_s2idle_dev_ops on the global lps0_s2idle_devops_head list and leaks the debugfs directory, while the devm-managed resources backing the handler are torn down.
Reloading the module then walks the corrupted list in acpi_register_lps0_dev() and hits:
list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev, but was NULL. kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:29! acpi_register_lps0_dev+0x44/0x80 amd_pmc_probe+0x224/0x380 [amd_pmc] platform_probe+0x67/0x90
Even without a reload, the stale registration means the next s2idle transition calls into torn-down driver state.
Unwind the debugfs directory and the LPS0 registration on the amd_stb_s2d_init() error path. acpi_unregister_lps0_dev() is safe to call unconditionally here: it is guarded on the same conditions as acpi_register_lps0_dev(), which is exactly what amd_pmc_remove() already relies on.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-81015"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nplatform/x86/amd/pmc: Fix LPS0 and debugfs leaks when STB init fails\n\namd_pmc_probe() registers the LPS0 s2idle handler with\nacpi_register_lps0_dev() and creates the driver\u0027s debugfs directory before\ncalling amd_stb_s2d_init(), which is the last step in probe that can fail.\n\nWhen amd_stb_s2d_init() fails (for example the S2D telemetry region cannot\nbe ioremapped on a long-running system, or the SMU rejects the S2D setup)\nthe error path only calls pci_dev_put() and returns. This leaves\namd_pmc_s2idle_dev_ops on the global lps0_s2idle_devops_head list and leaks\nthe debugfs directory, while the devm-managed resources backing the handler\nare torn down.\n\nReloading the module then walks the corrupted list in\nacpi_register_lps0_dev() and hits:\n\n list_add corruption. next-\u003eprev should be prev, but was NULL.\n kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:29!\n acpi_register_lps0_dev+0x44/0x80\n amd_pmc_probe+0x224/0x380 [amd_pmc]\n platform_probe+0x67/0x90\n\nEven without a reload, the stale registration means the next s2idle\ntransition calls into torn-down driver state.\n\nUnwind the debugfs directory and the LPS0 registration on the\namd_stb_s2d_init() error path. acpi_unregister_lps0_dev() is safe to call\nunconditionally here: it is guarded on the same conditions as\nacpi_register_lps0_dev(), which is exactly what amd_pmc_remove() already\nrelies on.",
"id": "GHSA-4m25-x3hr-48wm",
"modified": "2026-09-13T09:32:11Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81015"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/30e5f4d0cd0be655c800f10ae3e530391aa6c1b5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/76f650a76d6a36a4bee79d94db90a0e935a95477"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc9aa5fe21c3966c80647ed6574b94b863f23c62"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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