GHSA-4PH4-Q9R5-6WM6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:20 – Updated: 2022-06-23 18:02When configured to enable default typing, Jackson contained a deserialization vulnerability that could lead to arbitrary code execution. Jackson fixed this vulnerability by blacklisting known "deserialization gadgets". Spring Batch configures Jackson with global default typing enabled which means that through the previous exploit, arbitrary code could be executed if all of the following is true: * Spring Batch's Jackson support is being leveraged to serialize a job's ExecutionContext. * A malicious user gains write access to the data store used by the JobRepository (where the data to be deserialized is stored). In order to protect against this type of attack, Jackson prevents a set of untrusted gadget classes from being deserialized. Spring Batch should be proactive against blocking unknown "deserialization gadgets" when enabling default typing.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.2.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.springframework.batch:spring-batch-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-5411"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-06-23T18:02:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-06-11T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "When configured to enable default typing, Jackson contained a deserialization vulnerability that could lead to arbitrary code execution. Jackson fixed this vulnerability by blacklisting known \"deserialization gadgets\". Spring Batch configures Jackson with global default typing enabled which means that through the previous exploit, arbitrary code could be executed if all of the following is true: * Spring Batch\u0027s Jackson support is being leveraged to serialize a job\u0027s ExecutionContext. * A malicious user gains write access to the data store used by the JobRepository (where the data to be deserialized is stored). In order to protect against this type of attack, Jackson prevents a set of untrusted gadget classes from being deserialized. Spring Batch should be proactive against blocking unknown \"deserialization gadgets\" when enabling default typing.",
"id": "GHSA-4ph4-q9r5-6wm6",
"modified": "2022-06-23T18:02:43Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:20:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-5411"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-batch"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tanzu.vmware.com/security/cve-2020-5411"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Deserialization of Untrusted Data in Spring Batch"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.