Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-4W3W-2RP5-G8JM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 20:30 – Updated: 2026-09-08 20:30

Summary

xmldom: Attribute name injection via setAttribute() bypasses requireWellFormed

Details

Summary

Element.setAttribute() in @xmldom/xmldom bypasses attribute name validation by calling the private _createAttribute(name) method, which performs no validation. The public createAttribute() method correctly validates names against an anchored QName pattern, but setAttribute() never uses it. The serializer escapes attribute values but trusts attribute names, allowing an attacker to inject additional attributes (including event handlers) into serialized output. The requireWellFormed: true option did not catch this.

Details

Element.setAttribute(name, value) creates attribute nodes by calling the private _createAttribute(name) method, which performs no validation on the name parameter. In contrast, the public Document.createAttribute(name) method validates the name against the QName production before creating the attribute node.

The result is a two-tier validation system where the most commonly used API (setAttribute) takes the unvalidated path:

doc.createAttribute("bad name") — throws INVALID_CHARACTER_ERR (correct).
el.setAttribute("bad name", "value") — succeeds silently (vulnerable).

The serializer emits attribute names verbatim into the output. Because attribute values ARE escaped (quotes, ampersands, etc.), the injection must occur through the name. An attacker can terminate the current attribute and inject new ones by including quote and space characters in the attribute name.

Root Cause

setAttribute() calls _createAttribute() (private, no validation) instead of createAttribute() (public, validates against QName).
The serializer trusts attribute names and emits them unescaped.
The serializer's requireWellFormed code path did not validate attribute names during serialization.

Proof of Concept

const { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');

const impl = new DOMImplementation();
const serializer = new XMLSerializer();
const doc = impl.createDocument(null, 'root', null);

// The attribute name contains a closing quote, a space, and a new attribute
doc.documentElement.setAttribute('class="safe" onclick', 'alert(1)');

const output = serializer.serializeToString(doc, { requireWellFormed: true });
console.log(output);
// <root class="safe" onclick="alert(1)"/>
//
// The single setAttribute() call produced TWO attributes:
//   1. class="safe"
//   2. onclick="alert(1)"
//
// requireWellFormed: true did NOT prevent the injection.

Demonstrating the validation gap

// Public createAttribute correctly rejects invalid names:
try {
  doc.createAttribute('class="safe" onclick');
} catch (e) {
  console.log('createAttribute rejects:', e.message);
}

// But setAttribute (which uses _createAttribute) accepts the same input:
doc.documentElement.setAttribute('class="safe" onclick', 'alert(1)');
// No error thrown

Impact

Applications that use setAttribute() with any user-controlled portion of the attribute name are vulnerable to attribute injection attacks. This includes:

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): Injecting event handler attributes into HTML output consumed by browsers.
Security attribute override: Overriding security-relevant attributes such as integrity, nonce, sandbox, or Content-Security-Policy meta attributes.
Validation bypass: The public createAttribute() API validates while setAttribute() does not, creating an inconsistent security boundary that developers cannot rely on.
requireWellFormed bypass: Applications that adopted requireWellFormed: true as a mitigation for prior CVEs remained vulnerable.

@xmldom/xmldom can also be used inside browsers, where it mirrors the DOM API. Unlike the browser's setAttribute(), which rejects an invalid attribute name with InvalidCharacterError, xmldom accepts it — developers may assume the same safety and skip validation.

Fix Applied

⚠ Opt-in required. Protection is not automatic. Existing serialization calls remain vulnerable unless { requireWellFormed: true } is explicitly passed. Applications that serialize untrusted DOM content should audit all serializeToString() call sites and add it.

When { requireWellFormed: true } is passed, the serializer now validates each serialized attribute's qualified name against the XML QName production and throws InvalidStateError before emitting it. This covers ordinary attribute names and synthesized xmlns:PREFIX namespace declarations (the namespace-prefix sub-vector).

Fixed under requireWellFormed: true in @xmldom/xmldom 0.9.11 and 0.8.14. Default serialization is unchanged.

PoC — fixed path

const { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');

const doc = new DOMImplementation().createDocument(null, 'root', null);
doc.documentElement.setAttribute('class="safe" onclick', 'alert(1)');

// Default (unchanged): verbatim — injection present
console.log(new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc));
// <root class="safe" onclick="alert(1)"/>

// Opt-in guard: throws InvalidStateError before serializing
try {
  new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc, { requireWellFormed: true });
} catch (e) {
  console.log(e.name, e.message);
  // InvalidStateError: The attribute name "class="safe" onclick" is not a valid XML QName
}

Why the default stays verbatim

The W3C DOM Parsing and Serialization spec defines a require well-formed flag whose default value is false. With the flag unset, the serializer emits attribute names verbatim, matching the XMLSerializer behavior of Chrome, Firefox, and Safari. Unconditionally throwing would be a behavioral breaking change with no spec justification; the opt-in requireWellFormed: true flag lets applications that require injection safety enable strict mode without breaking existing code.

Residual limitation

setAttribute(name, value) does not validate name at creation time (unlike the public createAttribute(), which already does). Making setAttribute() reject invalid names unconditionally is a breaking change and is deferred to the next breaking release. When the default serialization path is used (without requireWellFormed: true), attribute names set via setAttribute() are still emitted verbatim; applications that do not pass requireWellFormed: true remain exposed.

Creation-time validation is tracked in a public issue on the next breaking-release milestone (filed at publication — issue link to be added), targeting the next breaking release.

Severity

8.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.9.10"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@xmldom/xmldom"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.9.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.13"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@xmldom/xmldom"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "xmldom"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.6.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-83605"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-91"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T20:30:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-01T15:17:38Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`Element.setAttribute()` in `@xmldom/xmldom` bypasses attribute name validation by calling the private `_createAttribute(name)` method, which performs no validation. The public `createAttribute()` method correctly validates names against an anchored `QName` pattern, but `setAttribute()` never uses it. The serializer escapes attribute *values* but trusts attribute *names*, allowing an attacker to inject additional attributes (including event handlers) into serialized output. The `requireWellFormed: true` option did not catch this.\n\n## Details\n\n`Element.setAttribute(name, value)` creates attribute nodes by calling the private `_createAttribute(name)` method, which performs no validation on the `name` parameter. In contrast, the public `Document.createAttribute(name)` method validates the name against the `QName` production before creating the attribute node.\n\nThe result is a two-tier validation system where the most commonly used API (`setAttribute`) takes the unvalidated path:\n\n- `doc.createAttribute(\"bad name\")` \u2014 throws `INVALID_CHARACTER_ERR` (correct).\n- `el.setAttribute(\"bad name\", \"value\")` \u2014 succeeds silently (vulnerable).\n\nThe serializer emits attribute names verbatim into the output. Because attribute values ARE escaped (quotes, ampersands, etc.), the injection must occur through the name. An attacker can terminate the current attribute and inject new ones by including quote and space characters in the attribute name.\n\n### Root Cause\n\n1. `setAttribute()` calls `_createAttribute()` (private, no validation) instead of `createAttribute()` (public, validates against `QName`).\n2. The serializer trusts attribute names and emits them unescaped.\n3. The serializer\u0027s `requireWellFormed` code path did not validate attribute names during serialization.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```js\nconst { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer } = require(\u0027@xmldom/xmldom\u0027);\n\nconst impl = new DOMImplementation();\nconst serializer = new XMLSerializer();\nconst doc = impl.createDocument(null, \u0027root\u0027, null);\n\n// The attribute name contains a closing quote, a space, and a new attribute\ndoc.documentElement.setAttribute(\u0027class=\"safe\" onclick\u0027, \u0027alert(1)\u0027);\n\nconst output = serializer.serializeToString(doc, { requireWellFormed: true });\nconsole.log(output);\n// \u003croot class=\"safe\" onclick=\"alert(1)\"/\u003e\n//\n// The single setAttribute() call produced TWO attributes:\n//   1. class=\"safe\"\n//   2. onclick=\"alert(1)\"\n//\n// requireWellFormed: true did NOT prevent the injection.\n```\n\n### Demonstrating the validation gap\n\n```js\n// Public createAttribute correctly rejects invalid names:\ntry {\n  doc.createAttribute(\u0027class=\"safe\" onclick\u0027);\n} catch (e) {\n  console.log(\u0027createAttribute rejects:\u0027, e.message);\n}\n\n// But setAttribute (which uses _createAttribute) accepts the same input:\ndoc.documentElement.setAttribute(\u0027class=\"safe\" onclick\u0027, \u0027alert(1)\u0027);\n// No error thrown\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications that use `setAttribute()` with any user-controlled portion of the attribute name are vulnerable to attribute injection attacks. This includes:\n\n- **Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)**: Injecting event handler attributes into HTML output consumed by browsers.\n- **Security attribute override**: Overriding security-relevant attributes such as `integrity`, `nonce`, `sandbox`, or `Content-Security-Policy` meta attributes.\n- **Validation bypass**: The public `createAttribute()` API validates while `setAttribute()` does not, creating an inconsistent security boundary that developers cannot rely on.\n- **requireWellFormed bypass**: Applications that adopted `requireWellFormed: true` as a mitigation for prior CVEs remained vulnerable.\n\n`@xmldom/xmldom` can also be used inside browsers, where it mirrors the DOM API. Unlike the browser\u0027s `setAttribute()`, which rejects an invalid attribute name with `InvalidCharacterError`, xmldom accepts it \u2014 developers may assume the same safety and skip validation.\n\n## Fix Applied\n\n\u003e **\u26a0 Opt-in required.** Protection is not automatic. Existing serialization calls remain\n\u003e vulnerable unless `{ requireWellFormed: true }` is explicitly passed. Applications that\n\u003e serialize untrusted DOM content should audit all `serializeToString()` call sites and add it.\n\nWhen `{ requireWellFormed: true }` is passed, the serializer now validates each serialized attribute\u0027s qualified name against the XML `QName` production and throws `InvalidStateError` before emitting it. This covers ordinary attribute names **and** synthesized `xmlns:PREFIX` namespace declarations (the namespace-prefix sub-vector).\n\nFixed under `requireWellFormed: true` in `@xmldom/xmldom` **0.9.11** and **0.8.14**. Default serialization is unchanged.\n\n### PoC \u2014 fixed path\n\n```js\nconst { DOMImplementation, XMLSerializer } = require(\u0027@xmldom/xmldom\u0027);\n\nconst doc = new DOMImplementation().createDocument(null, \u0027root\u0027, null);\ndoc.documentElement.setAttribute(\u0027class=\"safe\" onclick\u0027, \u0027alert(1)\u0027);\n\n// Default (unchanged): verbatim \u2014 injection present\nconsole.log(new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc));\n// \u003croot class=\"safe\" onclick=\"alert(1)\"/\u003e\n\n// Opt-in guard: throws InvalidStateError before serializing\ntry {\n  new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(doc, { requireWellFormed: true });\n} catch (e) {\n  console.log(e.name, e.message);\n  // InvalidStateError: The attribute name \"class=\"safe\" onclick\" is not a valid XML QName\n}\n```\n\n### Why the default stays verbatim\n\nThe W3C DOM Parsing and Serialization spec defines a `require well-formed` flag whose **default value is `false`**. With the flag unset, the serializer emits attribute names verbatim, matching the `XMLSerializer` behavior of Chrome, Firefox, and Safari. Unconditionally throwing would be a behavioral breaking change with no spec justification; the opt-in `requireWellFormed: true` flag lets applications that require injection safety enable strict mode without breaking existing code.\n\n### Residual limitation\n\n`setAttribute(name, value)` does not validate `name` at creation time (unlike the public `createAttribute()`, which already does). Making `setAttribute()` reject invalid names unconditionally is a breaking change and is deferred to the next breaking release. When the default serialization path is used (without `requireWellFormed: true`), attribute names set via `setAttribute()` are still emitted verbatim; applications that do not pass `requireWellFormed: true` remain exposed.\n\nCreation-time validation is tracked in a public issue on the next breaking-release milestone (filed at publication \u2014 issue link to be added), targeting the next breaking release.",
  "id": "GHSA-4w3w-2rp5-g8jm",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T20:30:51Z",
  "published": "2026-09-08T20:30:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/security/advisories/GHSA-4w3w-2rp5-g8jm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-83605"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1043"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1050"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/cba1321218b069182695813fa7565653708e172e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/d8212e632507eaf1d9f609657dd4c56abeb12d44"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.8.14"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.9.11"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "xmldom: Attribute name injection via setAttribute() bypasses requireWellFormed"
}

CVE-2026-83605 (GCVE-0-2026-83605)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-01 14:18 – Updated: 2026-09-03 17:35

Title

xmldom: Attribute name injection via setAttribute() bypasses requireWellFormed

Summary

xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. Prior to @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.14 and 0.9.11, and in xmldom version 0.6.0 and earlier, Element.setAttribute() calls the private _createAttribute(name) path without validating the attribute name, while Document.createAttribute(name) validates against QName. XMLSerializer.serializeToString() emits attribute names verbatim, and requireWellFormed: true did not validate them, so a crafted name can terminate the intended attribute and inject additional attributes, including event handlers, into browser-consumed output; synthesized xmlns:PREFIX declarations expose the same unchecked-name boundary. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.14 and 0.9.11; no fixed version is available for xmldom.

Severity

8.7 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-09-03 17:35 UTC

CWE

CWE-91 - XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection)

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

7 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/security/advisor…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1043	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/pull/1050	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/cba132121…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/d8212e632…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.8.14	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.9.11	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

2 products

Vendor	Product	Version
xmldom	xmldom	Affected: <= 0.6.0
@xmldom	xmldom	Affected: >= 0.7.0, < 0.8.14 Affected: >= 0.9.0, < 0.9.11

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JSON

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{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-83605",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-09-03T17:35:48.291463Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-09-03T17:35:55.385Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
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        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/security/advisories/GHSA-4w3w-2rp5-g8jm"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "xmldom",
          "vendor": "xmldom",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c= 0.6.0"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "product": "xmldom",
          "vendor": "@xmldom",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 0.7.0, \u003c 0.8.14"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
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      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. Prior to @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.14 and 0.9.11, and in xmldom version 0.6.0 and earlier, Element.setAttribute() calls the private _createAttribute(name) path without validating the attribute name, while Document.createAttribute(name) validates against QName. XMLSerializer.serializeToString() emits attribute names verbatim, and requireWellFormed: true did not validate them, so a crafted name can terminate the intended attribute and inject additional attributes, including event handlers, into browser-consumed output; synthesized xmlns:PREFIX declarations expose the same unchecked-name boundary. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.14 and 0.9.11; no fixed version is available for xmldom."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 8.7,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-91",
              "description": "CWE-91: XML Injection (aka Blind XPath Injection)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
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      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-01T14:18:20.752Z",
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          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/cba1321218b069182695813fa7565653708e172e"
        },
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          "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/commit/d8212e632507eaf1d9f609657dd4c56abeb12d44"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.8.14",
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          "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.8.14"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.9.11",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/releases/tag/0.9.11"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-4w3w-2rp5-g8jm",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "xmldom: Attribute name injection via setAttribute() bypasses requireWellFormed"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-83605",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-01T14:18:20.752Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-31T20:36:25.743Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-03T17:35:55.385Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.

Action not permitted

GHSA-4W3W-2RP5-G8JM

Summary

Details

Root Cause

Proof of Concept

Demonstrating the validation gap

Impact

Fix Applied

PoC — fixed path

Why the default stays verbatim

Residual limitation

CVE-2026-83605 (GCVE-0-2026-83605)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature