GHSA-4W53-6JVP-GG52
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-14 22:31 – Updated: 2024-05-15 14:10Summary
The way the proxy protocol listener is implemented in sshpiper can allow an attacker to forge their connecting address.
Details
This commit added the proxy protocol listener as the only listener in sshpiper, with no option to toggle this functionality off. This means that any connection that sshpiper is directly (or in some cases indirectly) exposed to can use proxy protocol to forge its source address.
PoC
You can use a configuration like this in HAProxy:
listen w-send-proxy
mode tcp
log global
option tcplog
bind *:27654
tcp-request connection set-src ipv4(1.1.1.1)
server app1 ssh-piper-hostname:22 send-proxy
When connecting through HAProxy, sshpiper will log connections as originating from 1.1.1.1. The proxy protocol data is designed to survive multiple load balancers or proxies and pass through to sshpiper at the end, so it should only be enabled trusted environments. This should be behind a configuration option or startup flag to prevent abuse when public connections can be made to sshpiper.
This is also backed up by the specification for proxy protocol:
The receiver MUST be configured to only receive the protocol described in this specification and MUST not try to guess whether the protocol header is present or not. This means that the protocol explicitly prevents port sharing between public and private access. Otherwise it would open a major security breach by allowing untrusted parties to spoof their connection addresses. The receiver SHOULD ensure proper access filtering so that only trusted proxies are allowed to use this protocol.
Impact
Any users of sshpiper who need logs from it for whitelisting/rate limiting/security investigations could have them become much less useful if an attacker is sending a spoofed source address.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/tg123/sshpiper"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.50"
},
{
"fixed": "1.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-35175"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-05-14T22:31:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-14T22:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe way the proxy protocol listener is implemented in sshpiper can allow an attacker to forge their connecting address.\n\n### Details\n\n[This commit](https://github.com/tg123/sshpiper/commit/2ddd69876a1e1119059debc59fe869cb4e754430) added the proxy protocol listener as the only listener in sshpiper, with no option to toggle this functionality off. This means that any connection that sshpiper is directly (or in some cases indirectly) exposed to can use proxy protocol to forge its source address.\n\n### PoC\n\nYou can use a configuration like this in HAProxy:\n\n```\nlisten w-send-proxy\n mode tcp\n log global\n option tcplog\n bind *:27654\n tcp-request connection set-src ipv4(1.1.1.1)\n server app1 ssh-piper-hostname:22 send-proxy\n```\n\nWhen connecting through HAProxy, sshpiper will log connections as originating from `1.1.1.1`. The proxy protocol data is designed to survive multiple load balancers or proxies and pass through to sshpiper at the end, so it should only be enabled trusted environments. This should be behind a configuration option or startup flag to prevent abuse when public connections can be made to sshpiper.\n\nThis is also backed up by [the specification for proxy protocol](https://www.haproxy.org/download/1.8/doc/proxy-protocol.txt):\n\n\u003e The receiver MUST be configured to only receive the protocol described in this\nspecification and MUST not try to guess whether the protocol header is present\nor not. This means that the protocol explicitly prevents port sharing between\npublic and private access. Otherwise it would open a major security breach by\nallowing untrusted parties to spoof their connection addresses. The receiver\nSHOULD ensure proper access filtering so that only trusted proxies are allowed\nto use this protocol.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny users of sshpiper who need logs from it for whitelisting/rate limiting/security investigations could have them become much less useful if an attacker is sending a spoofed source address.",
"id": "GHSA-4w53-6jvp-gg52",
"modified": "2024-05-15T14:10:45Z",
"published": "2024-05-14T22:31:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tg123/sshpiper/security/advisories/GHSA-4w53-6jvp-gg52"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-35175"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tg123/sshpiper/commit/2ddd69876a1e1119059debc59fe869cb4e754430"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tg123/sshpiper/commit/70fb830dca26bea7ced772ce5d834a3e88ae7f53"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/tg123/sshpiper"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "sshpiper\u0027s enabling of proxy protocol without proper feature flagging allows faking source address"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.