GHSA-524M-Q5M7-79MM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-13 15:11 – Updated: 2026-01-13 15:11
VLAI?
Summary
Mailpit is vulnerable to Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) allowing unauthenticated access to emails
Details

Summary The Mailpit WebSocket server is configured to accept connections from any origin. This lack of Origin header validation introduces a Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) vulnerability.

An attacker can host a malicious website that, when visited by a developer running Mailpit locally, establishes a WebSocket connection to the victim's Mailpit instance (default ws://localhost:8025). This allows the attacker to intercept sensitive data such as email contents, headers, and server statistics in real-time.

Vulnerable Code The vulnerability exists in server/websockets/client.go where the CheckOrigin function is explicitly set to return true for all requests, bypassing standard Same-Origin Policy (SOP) protections provided by the gorilla/websocket library.

https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/blob/877a9159ceeaf380d5bb0e1d84017b24d2e7b361/server/websockets/client.go#L34-L39

Impact This vulnerability impacts the Confidentiality of the data stored in or processed by Mailpit. Although Mailpit is often used as a local development tool, this vulnerability allows remote exploitation via a web browser.

  • Scenario: A developer has Mailpit running at localhost:8025.
  • Trigger: The developer visits a malicious website (or a compromised legitimate site) in the same browser.
  • Exploitation: The malicious site's JavaScript initiates a WebSocket connection to ws://localhost:8025/api/events. Since the origin check is disabled, the browser allows this cross-origin connection.
  • Data Leak: The attacker receives all broadcasted events, including full email details (subjects, sender/receiver info) and server metrics.

Attack Impact - Real-time notification of new emails - Email metadata (sender, subject, recipients) - Mailbox statistics - All WebSocket broadcast data

Recommended Fix The CheckOrigin function should be removed to allow gorilla/websocket to enforce its default safe behavior (checking that the Origin matches the Host). Alternatively, strict validation logic should be implemented.

Proposed Change (Remove unsafe check):

var upgrader = websocket.Upgrader{
    ReadBufferSize:    1024,
    WriteBufferSize:   1024,
    // CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool { return true }, // REMOVED
    EnableCompression: true,
}

Proof of Concept (PoC): To reproduce this vulnerability:

  • Start Mailpit (default settings).
  • Save the following HTML code as poc.html and serve it from a different origin (e.g., using python http.server on port 8000 or opening it directly as a file).
  • Open the poc_websocket_hijack.html file in your browser.
  • Send a test email to Mailpit or perform any action in the Mailpit UI.
  • Observe that the "malicious" page successfully receives the event data.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/axllent/mailpit"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.2.6"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.28.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/axllent/mailpit"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260110031614"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-22689"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1385"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-13T15:11:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-10T06:15:51Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "**Summary**\nThe Mailpit WebSocket server is configured to accept connections from any origin. This lack of Origin header validation introduces a Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) vulnerability.\n\nAn attacker can host a malicious website that, when visited by a developer running Mailpit locally, establishes a WebSocket connection to the victim\u0027s Mailpit instance (default ws://localhost:8025). This allows the attacker to intercept sensitive data such as email contents, headers, and server statistics in real-time.\n\n**Vulnerable Code**\nThe vulnerability exists in server/websockets/client.go where the CheckOrigin function is explicitly set to return true for all requests, bypassing standard Same-Origin Policy (SOP) protections provided by the gorilla/websocket library.\n\nhttps://github.com/axllent/mailpit/blob/877a9159ceeaf380d5bb0e1d84017b24d2e7b361/server/websockets/client.go#L34-L39\n\n**Impact**\nThis vulnerability impacts the Confidentiality of the data stored in or processed by Mailpit.\nAlthough Mailpit is often used as a local development tool, this vulnerability allows remote exploitation via a web browser.\n\n- **Scenario**: A developer has Mailpit running at localhost:8025.\n- **Trigger**: The developer visits a malicious website (or a compromised legitimate site) in the same browser.\n- **Exploitation**: The malicious site\u0027s JavaScript initiates a WebSocket connection to ws://localhost:8025/api/events. Since the origin check is disabled, the browser allows this cross-origin connection.\n- **Data Leak**: The attacker receives all broadcasted events, including full email details (subjects, sender/receiver info) and server metrics.\n\n**Attack Impact**\n- Real-time notification of new emails\n- Email metadata (sender, subject, recipients)\n- Mailbox statistics\n- All WebSocket broadcast data\n\n**Recommended Fix**\nThe `CheckOrigin` function should be removed to allow gorilla/websocket to enforce its default safe behavior (checking that the Origin matches the Host). Alternatively, strict validation logic should be implemented.\n\n**Proposed Change (Remove unsafe check):**\n\n```go\nvar upgrader = websocket.Upgrader{\n    ReadBufferSize:    1024,\n    WriteBufferSize:   1024,\n    // CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool { return true }, // REMOVED\n    EnableCompression: true,\n}\n```\n\n**Proof of Concept (PoC)**: To reproduce this vulnerability:\n\n- Start Mailpit (default settings).\n- Save the following HTML code as poc.html and serve it from a different origin (e.g., using python http.server on port 8000 or opening it directly as a file).\n- Open the [poc_websocket_hijack.html](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24522726/poc_websocket_hijack.html) file in your browser.\n- Send a test email to Mailpit or perform any action in the Mailpit UI.\n- Observe that the \"malicious\" page successfully receives the event data.",
  "id": "GHSA-524m-q5m7-79mm",
  "modified": "2026-01-13T15:11:42Z",
  "published": "2026-01-13T15:11:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/security/advisories/GHSA-524m-q5m7-79mm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22689"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/commit/6f1f4f34c98989fd873261018fb73830b30aec3f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Mailpit is vulnerable to Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) allowing unauthenticated access to emails"
}


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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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