GHSA-543C-R37X-R759
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-14 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: cros_usbpd-charger: bound the EC-reported port count
cros_usbpd_charger_probe() reads two port counts from the EC and uses one of them, num_charger_ports, as the loop bound when populating a fixed-size array:
struct port_data *ports[EC_USB_PD_MAX_PORTS]; /* 8 entries */
...
for (i = 0; i < charger->num_charger_ports; i++)
charger->ports[charger->num_registered_psy++] = port;
Both num_usbpd_ports (from EC_CMD_USB_PD_PORTS) and num_charger_ports (from EC_CMD_CHARGE_PORT_COUNT) are u8 values reported by the EC. The only validation is a sanity check that compares the two EC-reported values against each other:
if (num_charger_ports < num_usbpd_ports ||
num_charger_ports > num_usbpd_ports + 1)
return -EPROTO;
It never checks either count against EC_USB_PD_MAX_PORTS, the size of the ports[] array. A malfunctioning, malicious or compromised EC that reports num_usbpd_ports == num_charger_ports == N for any N > 8 (for example both 255) passes this check, and the loop then writes N pointers into the 8-entry ports[] array embedded in the devm_kzalloc()'d charger_data, overflowing it by up to 255 - 8 = 247 entries (~1976 bytes): a slab out-of-bounds write.
Reject a port count larger than the ports[] array can hold.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89471"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:28Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\npower: supply: cros_usbpd-charger: bound the EC-reported port count\n\ncros_usbpd_charger_probe() reads two port counts from the EC and uses\none of them, num_charger_ports, as the loop bound when populating a\nfixed-size array:\n\n\tstruct port_data *ports[EC_USB_PD_MAX_PORTS];\t/* 8 entries */\n\t...\n\tfor (i = 0; i \u003c charger-\u003enum_charger_ports; i++)\n\t\tcharger-\u003eports[charger-\u003enum_registered_psy++] = port;\n\nBoth num_usbpd_ports (from EC_CMD_USB_PD_PORTS) and num_charger_ports\n(from EC_CMD_CHARGE_PORT_COUNT) are u8 values reported by the EC. The\nonly validation is a sanity check that compares the two EC-reported\nvalues against each other:\n\n\tif (num_charger_ports \u003c num_usbpd_ports ||\n\t num_charger_ports \u003e num_usbpd_ports + 1)\n\t\treturn -EPROTO;\n\nIt never checks either count against EC_USB_PD_MAX_PORTS, the size of\nthe ports[] array. A malfunctioning, malicious or compromised EC that\nreports num_usbpd_ports == num_charger_ports == N for any N \u003e 8 (for\nexample both 255) passes this check, and the loop then writes N pointers\ninto the 8-entry ports[] array embedded in the devm_kzalloc()\u0027d\ncharger_data, overflowing it by up to 255 - 8 = 247 entries (~1976\nbytes): a slab out-of-bounds write.\n\nReject a port count larger than the ports[] array can hold.",
"id": "GHSA-543c-r37x-r759",
"modified": "2026-09-14T15:32:25Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89471"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b5096f6804161b61451b1cec0e38678630be849"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2746d502b12b343384fb747bdef9cbcfbd7444a2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d1e01443b221081258ff34ea0cdd0431e4ff62e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/48355ce49359740f52e94d3623f6fc557ce341f0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/78be8b7403ff7638162438b664a07d19da76059e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a1905375dfc0b9612bbee52fc066e3a70c0d671d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c46c9f447415ca802afab51dea1eafc08ddff1c6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd29d08ee487f3bf50f2575aaa74f78a74b09b21"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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