GHSA-553V-F69R-656J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 21:39 – Updated: 2026-03-03 21:39
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw unpaired device identity can bypass operator pairing and self-assign operator scopes with shared auth
Details

Summary

A client using shared gateway auth could attach an unpaired device identity and request elevated operator scopes (including operator.admin) before pairing approval, enabling privilege escalation.

Impact

Attackers with valid shared gateway auth could self-assign higher operator scopes by presenting a self-signed, unpaired device identity.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected: >= 2026.2.22 <= 2026.2.24
  • Latest published npm at triage time: 2026.2.24
  • Planned patched release: 2026.2.25

Remediation

Require pairing for operator device-identity sessions authenticated with shared token/password auth (except existing control-ui trusted-proxy/control-ui bypass policy paths).

Fix Commit(s)

  • 8d1481cb4a9d31bd617e52dc8c392c35689d9dea

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the release (>= 2026.2.25). Advisory published with npm release 2026.2.25.

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.2.24"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.2.22"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.25"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T21:39:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA client using shared gateway auth could attach an unpaired device identity and request elevated operator scopes (including `operator.admin`) before pairing approval, enabling privilege escalation.\n\n### Impact\nAttackers with valid shared gateway auth could self-assign higher operator scopes by presenting a self-signed, unpaired device identity.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003e= 2026.2.22 \u003c= 2026.2.24`\n- Latest published npm at triage time: `2026.2.24`\n- Planned patched release: `2026.2.25`\n\n### Remediation\nRequire pairing for operator device-identity sessions authenticated with shared token/password auth (except existing control-ui trusted-proxy/control-ui bypass policy paths).\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `8d1481cb4a9d31bd617e52dc8c392c35689d9dea`\n\n### Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the release (`\u003e= 2026.2.25`). Advisory published with npm release `2026.2.25`.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-553v-f69r-656j",
  "modified": "2026-03-03T21:39:10Z",
  "published": "2026-03-03T21:39:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-553v-f69r-656j"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/8d1481cb4a9d31bd617e52dc8c392c35689d9dea"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw unpaired device identity can bypass operator pairing and self-assign operator scopes with shared auth"
}



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Nomenclature

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