GHSA-56V6-2FHR-WXGQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 20:37 – Updated: 2026-09-22 20:37Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
It has two related instances that share the same root cause: a user-controlled model field is assigned verbatim to a form field's help_text, which is rendered with Django's |safe filter (render_field.html), bypassing auto-escaping.
In both cases the script executes in the browser of any user who opens an affected create or edit form, including administrators and superusers. Because the payload runs in the victim's authenticated session, it can lead to actions performed as the victim, session/token theft, and further privilege escalation. Exploitation requires the victim to open an affected form.
Relationship description
A user who holds the add/change permission for Relationships (extras.add_relationship / extras.change_relationship) can set a Relationship's description to an HTML/JavaScript payload. That description is used as the help text of the relationship's form field and is rendered on the create/edit page of every object type the relationship applies to.
Module Family name
A user who holds the add/change permission for Module Families (dcim.add_modulefamily / dcim.change_modulefamily) can put a payload in a Module Family name, which is interpolated into the module_family field's help text on the Module "Install module" form for any module bay assigned to that family.
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
Fixes are available in Nautobot v2.4.37+ & v3.1.8+
Note: The underlying weakness exists in earlier EOL versions of Nautobot (v1.x). Users on those older EOL versions are highly encouraged to upgrade to a supported version.
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
There is no configuration-only fix. To remediate without upgrading:
- Restrict the
extras.add_relationship/extras.change_relationshipanddcim.add_modulefamily/dcim.change_modulefamilypermissions to fully trusted administrators only. - Audit existing Relationship description values and Module Family name values for embedded HTML /
<script>content and remove any payloads.
Note that limiting who can open create/edit forms does not fully mitigate the issue, since the payload targets any user (including admins) who opens an affected form.
Credit
Credit for this discovery goes to Habibullo Izzatilloyev.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nautobot"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.37"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nautobot"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-83801"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T20:37:30Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nIt has two related instances that share the same root cause: a user-controlled model field is assigned verbatim to a form field\u0027s `help_text`, which is rendered with Django\u0027s `|safe` filter (`render_field.html`), bypassing auto-escaping.\n\nIn both cases the script executes in the browser of any user who opens an affected create or edit form, **including administrators and superusers**. Because the payload runs in the victim\u0027s authenticated session, it can lead to actions performed as the victim, session/token theft, and further privilege escalation. Exploitation requires the victim to open an affected form.\n\n#### Relationship description\n\nA user who holds the add/change permission for Relationships (`extras.add_relationship` / `extras.change_relationship`) can set a Relationship\u0027s **description** to an HTML/JavaScript payload. That description is used as the help text of the relationship\u0027s form field and is rendered on the create/edit page of every object type the relationship applies to.\n\n#### Module Family name\n\nA user who holds the add/change permission for Module Families (`dcim.add_modulefamily` / `dcim.change_modulefamily`) can put a payload in a Module Family **name**, which is interpolated into the `module_family` field\u0027s help text on the Module \"Install module\" form for any module bay assigned to that family.\n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\nFixes are available in Nautobot v2.4.37+ \u0026 v3.1.8+\n\n\u003e Note: The underlying weakness exists in earlier EOL versions of Nautobot (v1.x). Users on those older EOL versions are highly encouraged to upgrade to a supported version.\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\nThere is no configuration-only fix. To remediate without upgrading:\n\n- Restrict the `extras.add_relationship` / `extras.change_relationship` and `dcim.add_modulefamily` / `dcim.change_modulefamily` permissions to fully trusted administrators only.\n- Audit existing Relationship **description** values and Module Family **name** values for embedded HTML / `\u003cscript\u003e` content and remove any payloads.\n\nNote that limiting who can open create/edit forms does not fully mitigate the issue, since the payload targets any user (including admins) who opens an affected form.\n\n### Credit\n\nCredit for this discovery goes to Habibullo Izzatilloyev.",
"id": "GHSA-56v6-2fhr-wxgq",
"modified": "2026-09-22T20:37:30Z",
"published": "2026-09-22T20:37:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/security/advisories/GHSA-56v6-2fhr-wxgq"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/commit/e6ff20d50e0759135c6d278e7b2ceec56ed9b3c8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/commit/f8a62466f3ebc42759a6373e7c79b0cad5751c2f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/releases/tag/v2.4.37"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/releases/tag/v3.1.8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Nautobot: Stored cross-site scripting (XSS) in object create/edit form help text"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.