GHSA-59G6-V3VG-F7WC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-02 20:27 – Updated: 2026-03-06 21:56
VLAI
Summary
CocoIndex Doris target connector didn't verify table name when constructing ALTER TABLE statements
Details

Impact

The Doris target connector didn't verify the configured table name before creating some SQL statements (ALTER TABLE). So, in the application code, if the table name is provided by an untrusted upstream, it expose vulnerability to SQL injection when target schema change.

Patches

Yes, it's fixed in cocoindex 0.3.34: we start to validate table names passed to Doris target at entry point and error out immediately if it's not a valid identifier.

Workarounds

Users should make sure table names used to configure CocoIndex targets are valid, regardless of this fix. Which means

  • The table name comes from a trusted source (e.g. for most cases it's just a fixed string literal).
  • Even if it comes from an untrusted source (e.g. provided by end user), it should be validated before using it to configure the Doris target for CocoIndex.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "cocoindex"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.3.34"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-28438"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-02T20:27:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-06T07:15:58Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThe Doris target connector didn\u0027t verify the configured table name before creating some SQL statements (`ALTER TABLE`). So, in the application code, if the table name is provided by an untrusted upstream, it expose vulnerability to SQL injection when target schema change.\n\n### Patches\nYes, it\u0027s fixed in cocoindex 0.3.34: we start to validate table names passed to Doris target at entry point and error out immediately if it\u0027s not a valid identifier.\n\n### Workarounds\nUsers should make sure table names used to configure CocoIndex targets are valid, regardless of this fix. Which means\n\n- The table name comes from a trusted source (e.g. for most cases it\u0027s just a fixed string literal).\n- Even if it comes from an untrusted source (e.g. provided by end user), it should be validated before using it to configure the Doris target for CocoIndex.",
  "id": "GHSA-59g6-v3vg-f7wc",
  "modified": "2026-03-06T21:56:32Z",
  "published": "2026-03-02T20:27:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cocoindex-io/cocoindex/security/advisories/GHSA-59g6-v3vg-f7wc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28438"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cocoindex-io/cocoindex/commit/ba2fc4a89e22d35572c64bd2990737c7913b0729"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cocoindex-io/cocoindex"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CocoIndex Doris target connector didn\u0027t verify table name when constructing ALTER TABLE statements"
}


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