{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.22"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-15",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T21:39:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nOpenClaw shell-env fallback trusted startup environment values and could execute attacker-influenced login-shell startup paths before loading env keys.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003e= 2026.1.5` and `\u003c= 2026.2.21-2`\n- Fixed on `main`: `9363c320d8ffe29290906752fab92621da02c3f7`\n- Planned patched release version (pre-set): `2026.2.22`\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerable chain was in the shell-env fallback path:\n\n1. `src/infra/shell-env.ts`\n- `resolveShell(env)` trusted `env.SHELL` when set.\n- `execLoginShellEnvZero(...)` executed `${SHELL} -l -c \"env -0\"` with inherited runtime env.\n\n2. `src/config/io.ts`\n- Config env values were applied before shell fallback execution.\n\n3. `src/config/env-vars.ts` / env policy coverage\n- `SHELL` handling was hardened, but startup-path selectors (`HOME`, `ZDOTDIR`) still needed explicit blocking in config env ingestion and sanitization for shell fallback execution.\n\nWith env/config influence, this could trigger unintended command execution in shell startup processing on the OpenClaw host process context.\n\n### Fix\nMainline hardening now:\n- blocks `SHELL`, `HOME`, and `ZDOTDIR` during config env ingestion used by runtime fallback,\n- sanitizes shell fallback execution env, pinning `HOME` to the real user home and dropping `ZDOTDIR` + dangerous startup vars,\n- adds regression tests for config env ingestion and shell fallback/path-probe sanitization.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `9363c320d8ffe29290906752fab92621da02c3f7`\n\n### Impact\n- Local code-execution risk in environments where attacker-controlled env/config input can reach shell-env fallback.\n- Under OpenClaw trust assumptions (`SECURITY.md`), this is not a public-remote issue and depends on crossing local trusted-operator boundaries.\n\n### Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is intentionally pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.22`) so once npm release is out, maintainers can publish advisory immediately.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-5h2c-8v84-qpvr",
  "modified": "2026-03-03T21:39:51Z",
  "published": "2026-03-03T21:39:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-5h2c-8v84-qpvr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/9363c320d8ffe29290906752fab92621da02c3f7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw shell-env fallback trusted startup env and could execute attacker-influenced login-shell paths"
}