GHSA-5HQ8-QHWW-JM7Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-15 20:01 – Updated: 2026-09-15 20:01
VLAI
Summary
libp2p-quic: Remote panic via certificate expiry race during QUIC handshake
Details

Summary

libp2p-quic can panic on an inbound QUIC handshake if a malicious peer presents a valid, short lived libp2p TLS certificate and delays the final TLS 1.3 handshake fragment until the certificate expires.

This is remotely reachable by a network peer and can crash applications exposing a libp2p QUIC listener.

Details

During the TLS handshake, libp2p-tls parses and validates the peer certificate. After Quinn reports handshake completion, libp2p-quic re-parses the same certificate in the post-handshake upgrade path and assumes this cannot fail:

https://github.com/libp2p/rust-libp2p/blob/969b707bf1177ebebd1febc285c3fd22793b95c5/transports/quic/src/connection/connecting.rs#L65-L66

However, libp2p_tls::certificate::parse() re-runs certificate verification on every call, including a wall-clock validity check. A certificate that was valid during the first handshake time parse can expire before the second post-handshake parse, causing the expect(...) to panic.

PoC

A malicious peer can trigger this by: 1. Opening a QUIC connection to a libp2p QUIC listener. 2. Presenting a valid libp2p TLS certificate with a very short lifetime. 3. Allowing the initial handshake-time certificate validation to succeed. 4. Withholding the final client handshake fragment packet until after the certificate expires, but before the QUIC handshake timeout elapses. 5. The listener completes the handshake and hits the post-handshake certificate re-parse, which panics.

Impact

Remote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing an affected libp2p-quic listener can be crashed by a network peer that performs a valid-looking QUIC/TLS handshake with attacker-controlled timing. No malformed packets are required.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "libp2p-quic"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.13.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-61544"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-15T20:01:17Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`libp2p-quic` can panic on an inbound QUIC handshake if a malicious peer presents a valid, short lived libp2p TLS certificate and delays the final TLS 1.3 handshake fragment until the certificate expires.\n\nThis is remotely reachable by a network peer and can crash applications exposing a libp2p QUIC listener.\n\n### Details\nDuring the TLS handshake, `libp2p-tls` parses and validates the peer certificate. After Quinn reports handshake completion, `libp2p-quic` re-parses the same certificate in the post-handshake upgrade path and assumes this cannot fail:\n\nhttps://github.com/libp2p/rust-libp2p/blob/969b707bf1177ebebd1febc285c3fd22793b95c5/transports/quic/src/connection/connecting.rs#L65-L66\n\nHowever, `libp2p_tls::certificate::parse()` re-runs certificate verification on every call, including a wall-clock validity check. A certificate that was valid during the first handshake time parse can expire before the second post-handshake parse, causing the `expect(...)` to panic.\n\n\n### PoC\nA malicious peer can trigger this by:\n1. Opening a QUIC connection to a libp2p QUIC listener.\n2. Presenting a valid libp2p TLS certificate with a very short lifetime.\n3. Allowing the initial handshake-time certificate validation to succeed.\n4. Withholding the final client handshake fragment packet until after the certificate expires, but before the QUIC handshake timeout elapses.\n5. The listener completes the handshake and hits the post-handshake certificate re-parse, which panics.\n\n### Impact\nRemote unauthenticated denial of service. Any application exposing an affected `libp2p-quic` listener can be crashed by a network peer that performs a valid-looking QUIC/TLS handshake with attacker-controlled timing. No malformed packets are required.",
  "id": "GHSA-5hq8-qhww-jm7q",
  "modified": "2026-09-15T20:01:17Z",
  "published": "2026-09-15T20:01:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/rust-libp2p/security/advisories/GHSA-5hq8-qhww-jm7q"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/rust-libp2p/pull/6525"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/rust-libp2p/commit/212f3774af048e2cecfb2e6b1e08477685e52b22"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/rust-libp2p/commit/e8f35e12c2418b04df6e9cdf036005e8aee3c7a2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/rust-libp2p"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "libp2p-quic: Remote panic via certificate expiry race during QUIC handshake"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.


Loading…