GHSA-5JHW-W88M-CJF3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-11 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: Prevent post-shutdown use-after-free in unlock_filesystem
Writing a filesystem path to /proc/fs/nfsd/unlock_filesystem runs nfsd4_cancel_copy_by_sb() before nfsd_mutex is held and before the handler confirms that nn->nfsd_serv is set. Once nfsd has shut down, nfs4_state_destroy_net() has freed nn->conf_id_hashtbl but left the pointer intact, so the cancel helper iterates freed slab memory as an array of struct list_head and then dereferences a bogus nfs4_client when it takes clp->async_lock. A local administrator holding CAP_SYS_ADMIN can reach this use-after-free by stopping the server and then writing to unlock_filesystem; KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free read in nfsd4_cancel_copy_by_sb().
nfsd4_revoke_states() walks the same state tables and for that reason already runs only under nfsd_mutex with nn->nfsd_serv confirmed present. Move the async COPY cancel into that protected section so every NFSv4 state-table walker on this path observes a running server. Async copies exist only while the server runs, so gating the cancel on nn->nfsd_serv loses nothing.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89661"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:52Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nNFSD: Prevent post-shutdown use-after-free in unlock_filesystem\n\nWriting a filesystem path to /proc/fs/nfsd/unlock_filesystem runs\nnfsd4_cancel_copy_by_sb() before nfsd_mutex is held and before the\nhandler confirms that nn-\u003enfsd_serv is set. Once nfsd has shut down,\nnfs4_state_destroy_net() has freed nn-\u003econf_id_hashtbl but left the\npointer intact, so the cancel helper iterates freed slab memory as an\narray of struct list_head and then dereferences a bogus nfs4_client\nwhen it takes clp-\u003easync_lock. A local administrator holding\nCAP_SYS_ADMIN can reach this use-after-free by stopping the server and\nthen writing to unlock_filesystem; KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free\nread in nfsd4_cancel_copy_by_sb().\n\nnfsd4_revoke_states() walks the same state tables and for that reason\nalready runs only under nfsd_mutex with nn-\u003enfsd_serv confirmed\npresent. Move the async COPY cancel into that protected section so\nevery NFSv4 state-table walker on this path observes a running server.\nAsync copies exist only while the server runs, so gating the cancel on\nnn-\u003enfsd_serv loses nothing.",
"id": "GHSA-5jhw-w88m-cjf3",
"modified": "2026-09-11T21:31:35Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89661"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c1a755b7212e0835398d4df5e782ea85ccd7476"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/292d915d3ba6fd15eeb88351fa10581683073109"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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