GHSA-5M3W-7WWR-WQM2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-09-25 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv6: Fix UDP length overflow with PMTU discover and big MTU
This commit bounds cork->base.fragsize to IP6_MAX_MTU for UDP sockets to avoid a possible overflow of UDP length that triggers a WARN in udp_set_len_short when setsockopt IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER is set to IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO or IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE, and a large packet is sent over a netdev with an unusually large MTU.
Steps to reproduce (included in the new selftest):
- Set device MTU bigger than IP6_MAX_MTU. cork->base.fragsize will be set to that MTU in ip6_setup_cork.
- Set IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER to IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE or IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO. It lets maxnonfragsize be set to device MTU (cork->fragsize) in __ip6_append_data, rather than to IP6_MAX_MTU.
- Send 65528 bytes of payload (+8 bytes of UDP header, +40 bytes of IPv6 header). Device MTU allows it (it's only one byte bigger than IP6_MAX_MTU, and the device MTU is bigger than that).
- The UDP length in the built packet is 65536, which overflows the 16-bit length field and triggers the WARN in udp_set_len_short.
To avoid breaking sending UDP jumbograms over raw IPv6 sockets, limit the change to UDP sockets only.
The original overflow bug with IPv6 and IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO seems to predate git history (verified reproduction on 2.6.21), was fixed later, and then reappeared in commit 427faee167bc ("net: ipv6: introduce ip6_dst_mtu_maybe_forward"), which is chosen as the Fixes tag here. The overflow with IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE reproduces since its introduction in commit 628a5c561890 ("[INET]: Add IP(V6)_PMTUDISC_RPOBE").
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-97984"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:26Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: ipv6: Fix UDP length overflow with PMTU discover and big MTU\n\nThis commit bounds cork-\u003ebase.fragsize to IP6_MAX_MTU for UDP sockets to\navoid a possible overflow of UDP length that triggers a WARN in\nudp_set_len_short when setsockopt IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER is set to\nIPV6_PMTUDISC_DO or IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE, and a large packet is sent over\na netdev with an unusually large MTU.\n\nSteps to reproduce (included in the new selftest):\n\n1. Set device MTU bigger than IP6_MAX_MTU. cork-\u003ebase.fragsize will be\n set to that MTU in ip6_setup_cork.\n2. Set IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER to IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE or IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO. It\n lets maxnonfragsize be set to device MTU (cork-\u003efragsize) in\n __ip6_append_data, rather than to IP6_MAX_MTU.\n3. Send 65528 bytes of payload (+8 bytes of UDP header, +40 bytes of\n IPv6 header). Device MTU allows it (it\u0027s only one byte bigger than\n IP6_MAX_MTU, and the device MTU is bigger than that).\n4. The UDP length in the built packet is 65536, which overflows the\n 16-bit length field and triggers the WARN in udp_set_len_short.\n\nTo avoid breaking sending UDP jumbograms over raw IPv6 sockets, limit\nthe change to UDP sockets only.\n\nThe original overflow bug with IPv6 and IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO seems to\npredate git history (verified reproduction on 2.6.21), was fixed later,\nand then reappeared in commit 427faee167bc (\"net: ipv6: introduce\nip6_dst_mtu_maybe_forward\"), which is chosen as the Fixes tag here. The\noverflow with IPV6_PMTUDISC_PROBE reproduces since its introduction in\ncommit 628a5c561890 (\"[INET]: Add IP(V6)_PMTUDISC_RPOBE\").",
"id": "GHSA-5m3w-7wwr-wqm2",
"modified": "2026-09-25T12:31:31Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T12:31:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97984"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ae10b6be49b425827659b23bcce498f80eb7182"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d56a00ec91f2885c64ea5b8cea18cb746b91bbb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce66352d3eb21825410af8b91db7cc4bb8e22c98"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e01b7c176d9af2b7c22bb3fe12cf9a7904f99fdc"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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