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GHSA-5PQ6-VGCP-VV3F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ACPI: PCI: Clear driver_data on all paths that free the acpi_pci_root

acpi_pci_root_add() assigns the freshly allocated root to device->driver_data before dmar_device_add() and pci_acpi_scan_root(). Both failure paths reach the end: label where root is kfree()'d, but only the pci_acpi_scan_root() path clears driver_data first.

When dmar_device_add() fails during a hot-add, root is freed while device->driver_data still points at it. The ACPI core does not clear driver_data on attach failure, so a later acpi_pci_find_root() call may dereference this dangling pointer.

acpi_pci_root_remove() has the same problem: it frees root without clearing device->driver_data, leaving a dangling pointer behind after the root bridge is removed.

Move the NULL assignment to the shared end: label so every error path in acpi_pci_root_add() clears driver_data before freeing root, and clear it in acpi_pci_root_remove() as well, so the object is never left reachable through driver_data after being freed.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-92521"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:55Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nACPI: PCI: Clear driver_data on all paths that free the acpi_pci_root\n\nacpi_pci_root_add() assigns the freshly allocated root to\ndevice-\u003edriver_data before dmar_device_add() and pci_acpi_scan_root().\nBoth failure paths reach the end: label where root is kfree()\u0027d, but\nonly the pci_acpi_scan_root() path clears driver_data first.\n\nWhen dmar_device_add() fails during a hot-add, root is freed while\ndevice-\u003edriver_data still points at it.  The ACPI core does not clear\ndriver_data on attach failure, so a later acpi_pci_find_root() call may\ndereference this dangling pointer.\n\nacpi_pci_root_remove() has the same problem: it frees root without\nclearing device-\u003edriver_data, leaving a dangling pointer behind after\nthe root bridge is removed.\n\nMove the NULL assignment to the shared end: label so every error path in\nacpi_pci_root_add() clears driver_data before freeing root, and clear it\nin acpi_pci_root_remove() as well, so the object is never left reachable\nthrough driver_data after being freed.",
  "id": "GHSA-5pq6-vgcp-vv3f",
  "modified": "2026-09-17T18:32:07Z",
  "published": "2026-09-17T18:32:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92521"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/321bb0eb1486a0d575f02e24e3f4170e408c2f51"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3c1e8a14f9d06c1ed6f3e4bd2d283a62079109e2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3eee4c21931dc048ce63b86809f04e4e6f0dcad5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6aaf6dbf54fdfae096f3f90a79e9614e46579280"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e11ac626f9f9fc3a2ed27dfa44ccbe5fb762217"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70cf773cca30a10b4964c24520a71279c974b899"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8a742141f7ab84975aa758b775567ef4740ef0cf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a285fa3780c768dcc51c76768707d099a2cc611d"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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