GHSA-5QW8-F2G9-FF29
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 13:52 – Updated: 2026-06-18 13:52PraisonAI recipe serve Typer command bypasses the non-localhost authentication guard
Summary
PraisonAI's installed console entrypoint is Typer-first. In current releases,
the recipe command is registered in the Typer app and
praisonai recipe serve dispatches to the deprecated Typer command in
src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/recipe.py.
That Typer command can start the Recipe HTTP server on a non-localhost interface with no authentication:
praisonai recipe serve --host 0.0.0.0 --admin
It prints a deprecation warning, then launches the server with:
{
"host": "0.0.0.0",
"config": {
"cors_origins": "*",
"enable_admin": true
}
}
Because config.auth is absent, create_app() does not attach the API-key or
JWT middleware. Unauthenticated requests can then reach the recipe API and, when
enabled, /admin/reload.
This is an incomplete hardening / sibling-callsite issue. The legacy feature
handler in src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/recipe.py rejects the same
non-localhost/no-auth combination, and current create_auth_middleware() now
fails closed if API-key/JWT auth is selected without a secret. The installed
Typer command bypasses both expectations by never requiring or setting auth.
Affected product
- Repository:
MervinPraison/PraisonAI - Package:
praisonai - Component:
src/praisonai/praisonai/__main__.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/cli/app.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/recipe.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/recipe.pysrc/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/serve.py
Confirmed affected:
v4.6.58 1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e
v4.6.57 e90d92231853161ad931f3498da57651a9f8b528
v4.6.56 d3c4a2afadfbf3a3e172e460e607ba4efad263a6
v4.6.34 e5928449f73f66cc8af1de61621aa974ab255133
v4.6.33 dfbb8d78ec7e8dc7118bc722ab1b2524bc98ddab
v4.6.10 4b1b17b963cbd0625e41394a30168c95b26429b2
v4.5.128 b4e3a8a84ade44ac3dd9102b792cdb4311a95937
v4.5.112 bfe3d94bad6db92fc2927c2e3c081ae8303e209e
Suggested affected range: praisonai >= 4.5.112, <= 4.6.58.
The lower bound is conservative and based on sampled tags. Maintainers should confirm the exact introduction point before publishing a final range.
Root cause
The installed entrypoint routes registered Typer commands before falling back to the legacy dispatcher:
if first_cmd in _get_typer_commands():
_run_typer(argv)
else:
_run_legacy(argv)
cli/app.py registers commands.recipe as the recipe Typer command:
from .commands.recipe import app as recipe_app
...
app.add_typer(recipe_app, name="recipe", help="Recipe management")
The deprecated Typer recipe serve implementation accepts a remote host,
defaults CORS to *, and only enables authentication when --api-key is
explicitly provided:
host: str = typer.Option("127.0.0.1", "--host", "-h", ...)
api_key: str = typer.Option(None, "--api-key", ...)
cors: str = typer.Option("*", "--cors", ...)
admin: bool = typer.Option(False, "--admin", ...)
...
serve_config = {}
...
if api_key:
serve_config["api_key"] = api_key
serve_config["auth"] = "api-key"
if cors:
serve_config["cors_origins"] = cors
if admin:
serve_config["enable_admin"] = True
...
serve(host=host, port=port, reload=reload, config=serve_config, workers=workers)
There is no equivalent to the hardened non-localhost guard in the legacy feature handler:
if host != "127.0.0.1" and host != "localhost" and auth == "none":
self._print_error("Auth required for non-localhost binding. Use --auth api-key or --auth jwt")
return self.EXIT_POLICY_DENIED
The Recipe server only installs auth middleware when config["auth"] is set:
auth_type = config.get("auth")
if auth_type and auth_type != "none":
auth_middleware = create_auth_middleware(...)
if auth_middleware:
middleware.append(Middleware(auth_middleware))
On current v4.6.58, the selected-auth paths fail closed correctly:
auth=api-keywith no key returns503.auth=api-keywith a key but no request header returns401.
The vulnerable Typer path does not select auth at all.
Local-only PoV
Run from the harness checkout:
uv run \
--with starlette --with httpx --with typer --with rich --with pyyaml \
--with sse-starlette --with click --with python-dotenv \
python submission-bundle/praisonai-prai-cand-016-recipe-serve-typer-auth-bypass/poc/pov_prai_cand_016_recipe_serve_typer_auth_bypass.py \
--repo artifacts/repos/praisonai-v4.6.58 \
--label v4.6.58
The PoV does not bind a socket. It monkey-patches the recipe server launcher,
invokes the real praisonai.__main__.main() entrypoint with
recipe serve --host 0.0.0.0 --admin, captures the launch config, and then
uses Starlette's in-process test client to exercise the resulting app.
Observed v4.6.58 result:
{
"candidate": "PRAI-CAND-016",
"entrypoint_exit_code": 0,
"typer_recipe_command_registered": true,
"captured_launch": {
"host": "0.0.0.0",
"port": 8765,
"config": {
"cors_origins": "*",
"enable_admin": true
}
},
"bypass": {
"admin_reload": {
"path": "/admin/reload",
"status": 200
},
"openapi": {
"path": "/openapi.json",
"status": 200
}
},
"controls": {
"auth_api_key_no_secret": {
"admin_reload": {
"status": 503
}
},
"auth_api_key_no_header": {
"admin_reload": {
"status": 401
}
}
},
"feature_handler_nonlocalhost_noauth_exit": 4,
"auth_fail_closed_current_control": true,
"ok": true
}
Stored evidence:
evidence/current-v4.6.58.jsonevidence/version-sweep.tsv
Why this is not intended behavior
This is not only a disagreement about whether operators should configure auth.
PraisonAI's current security documentation says recent hardening changed API
servers so anonymous requests return 401 and servers bind to 127.0.0.1 by
default. Recipe server docs say auth: api-key should be used for production,
admin endpoints require auth, and public servers should not run without
authentication.
The implementation also shows the intended boundary:
create_auth_middleware()now returns503if API-key/JWT auth is selected without a secret.RecipeHandler.cmd_serve()refuses non-localhost binding whenauthisnone.- The vulnerable Typer command is marked deprecated and tells users to use the
newer command, but the installed entrypoint still routes
praisonai recipeto that Typer command before the legacy handler can enforce the guard.
The official local HTTP sidecar docs describe the sidecar as communicating over localhost and "no external network required", but the Docker example still uses:
CMD ["praisonai", "recipe", "serve", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "8765"]
That command exposes the Typer path above and does not enable auth, even if
PRAISONAI_API_KEY is present in the environment, because this path only sets
auth when --api-key is passed or a config file sets auth.
Impact
If an operator follows the vulnerable command path on a reachable interface, any network caller that can reach the Recipe HTTP server can access recipe runner endpoints without credentials.
Affected endpoints include:
GET /v1/recipesPOST /v1/recipes/runPOST /v1/recipes/streamPOST /v1/recipes/validate- optional
POST /admin/reloadwhen admin endpoints are enabled
The exact impact depends on configured recipes and deployment context. At a minimum, an attacker can enumerate recipes and trigger recipe validation or execution flows intended for local or authenticated callers. In deployments with powerful recipes, tool-enabled recipes, or admin endpoints, this can cause unauthorized workflow execution, model/API spend, state changes, or recipe registry reload operations.
This report does not claim arbitrary code execution by default.
Suggested fix
Prefer one canonical Recipe server CLI path and enforce the same preflight for every wrapper.
Recommended changes:
- Remove or hard-disable the deprecated Typer
praisonai recipe servecommand, or make it delegate to the hardenedRecipeHandler.cmd_serve()code path. - Add the same non-localhost/no-auth guard to
cli/commands/recipe.py. - Treat
PRAISONAI_API_KEYas a secret only whenauth=api-keyis selected; do not rely on the env var's presence alone unless the command also enables auth explicitly. - Fix the deprecated command's help examples so remote binding always includes auth.
- Consider changing
--corsdefault from*to no CORS or localhost origins. - Add regression tests that invoke the installed
praisonai.__main__.main()entrypoint, not only the legacy feature handler: praisonai recipe serve --host 0.0.0.0fails before launch unless auth is selected and configured;praisonai recipe serve --host 0.0.0.0 --admincannot expose/admin/reloadwithout auth;- selected but misconfigured auth still returns
503; - configured auth with no header returns
401.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.6.58"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.5.112"
},
{
"fixed": "4.6.59"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-306",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:52:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# PraisonAI `recipe serve` Typer command bypasses the non-localhost authentication guard\n\n## Summary\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s installed console entrypoint is Typer-first. In current releases,\nthe `recipe` command is registered in the Typer app and\n`praisonai recipe serve` dispatches to the deprecated Typer command in\n`src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/recipe.py`.\n\nThat Typer command can start the Recipe HTTP server on a non-localhost\ninterface with no authentication:\n\n```text\npraisonai recipe serve --host 0.0.0.0 --admin\n```\n\nIt prints a deprecation warning, then launches the server with:\n\n```json\n{\n \"host\": \"0.0.0.0\",\n \"config\": {\n \"cors_origins\": \"*\",\n \"enable_admin\": true\n }\n}\n```\n\nBecause `config.auth` is absent, `create_app()` does not attach the API-key or\nJWT middleware. Unauthenticated requests can then reach the recipe API and, when\nenabled, `/admin/reload`.\n\nThis is an incomplete hardening / sibling-callsite issue. The legacy feature\nhandler in `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/recipe.py` rejects the same\nnon-localhost/no-auth combination, and current `create_auth_middleware()` now\nfails closed if API-key/JWT auth is selected without a secret. The installed\nTyper command bypasses both expectations by never requiring or setting `auth`.\n\n## Affected product\n\n- Repository: `MervinPraison/PraisonAI`\n- Package: `praisonai`\n- Component:\n - `src/praisonai/praisonai/__main__.py`\n - `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/app.py`\n - `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/commands/recipe.py`\n - `src/praisonai/praisonai/cli/features/recipe.py`\n - `src/praisonai/praisonai/recipe/serve.py`\n\nConfirmed affected:\n\n```text\nv4.6.58 1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e\nv4.6.57 e90d92231853161ad931f3498da57651a9f8b528\nv4.6.56 d3c4a2afadfbf3a3e172e460e607ba4efad263a6\nv4.6.34 e5928449f73f66cc8af1de61621aa974ab255133\nv4.6.33 dfbb8d78ec7e8dc7118bc722ab1b2524bc98ddab\nv4.6.10 4b1b17b963cbd0625e41394a30168c95b26429b2\nv4.5.128 b4e3a8a84ade44ac3dd9102b792cdb4311a95937\nv4.5.112 bfe3d94bad6db92fc2927c2e3c081ae8303e209e\n```\n\nSuggested affected range: `praisonai \u003e= 4.5.112, \u003c= 4.6.58`.\n\nThe lower bound is conservative and based on sampled tags. Maintainers should\nconfirm the exact introduction point before publishing a final range.\n\n## Root cause\n\nThe installed entrypoint routes registered Typer commands before falling back\nto the legacy dispatcher:\n\n```python\nif first_cmd in _get_typer_commands():\n _run_typer(argv)\nelse:\n _run_legacy(argv)\n```\n\n`cli/app.py` registers `commands.recipe` as the `recipe` Typer command:\n\n```python\nfrom .commands.recipe import app as recipe_app\n...\napp.add_typer(recipe_app, name=\"recipe\", help=\"Recipe management\")\n```\n\nThe deprecated Typer `recipe serve` implementation accepts a remote host,\ndefaults CORS to `*`, and only enables authentication when `--api-key` is\nexplicitly provided:\n\n```python\nhost: str = typer.Option(\"127.0.0.1\", \"--host\", \"-h\", ...)\napi_key: str = typer.Option(None, \"--api-key\", ...)\ncors: str = typer.Option(\"*\", \"--cors\", ...)\nadmin: bool = typer.Option(False, \"--admin\", ...)\n...\nserve_config = {}\n...\nif api_key:\n serve_config[\"api_key\"] = api_key\n serve_config[\"auth\"] = \"api-key\"\nif cors:\n serve_config[\"cors_origins\"] = cors\nif admin:\n serve_config[\"enable_admin\"] = True\n...\nserve(host=host, port=port, reload=reload, config=serve_config, workers=workers)\n```\n\nThere is no equivalent to the hardened non-localhost guard in the legacy\nfeature handler:\n\n```python\nif host != \"127.0.0.1\" and host != \"localhost\" and auth == \"none\":\n self._print_error(\"Auth required for non-localhost binding. Use --auth api-key or --auth jwt\")\n return self.EXIT_POLICY_DENIED\n```\n\nThe Recipe server only installs auth middleware when `config[\"auth\"]` is set:\n\n```python\nauth_type = config.get(\"auth\")\nif auth_type and auth_type != \"none\":\n auth_middleware = create_auth_middleware(...)\n if auth_middleware:\n middleware.append(Middleware(auth_middleware))\n```\n\nOn current `v4.6.58`, the selected-auth paths fail closed correctly:\n\n- `auth=api-key` with no key returns `503`.\n- `auth=api-key` with a key but no request header returns `401`.\n\nThe vulnerable Typer path does not select auth at all.\n\n## Local-only PoV\n\nRun from the harness checkout:\n\n```bash\nuv run \\\n --with starlette --with httpx --with typer --with rich --with pyyaml \\\n --with sse-starlette --with click --with python-dotenv \\\n python submission-bundle/praisonai-prai-cand-016-recipe-serve-typer-auth-bypass/poc/pov_prai_cand_016_recipe_serve_typer_auth_bypass.py \\\n --repo artifacts/repos/praisonai-v4.6.58 \\\n --label v4.6.58\n```\n\nThe PoV does not bind a socket. It monkey-patches the recipe server launcher,\ninvokes the real `praisonai.__main__.main()` entrypoint with\n`recipe serve --host 0.0.0.0 --admin`, captures the launch config, and then\nuses Starlette\u0027s in-process test client to exercise the resulting app.\n\nObserved `v4.6.58` result:\n\n```json\n{\n \"candidate\": \"PRAI-CAND-016\",\n \"entrypoint_exit_code\": 0,\n \"typer_recipe_command_registered\": true,\n \"captured_launch\": {\n \"host\": \"0.0.0.0\",\n \"port\": 8765,\n \"config\": {\n \"cors_origins\": \"*\",\n \"enable_admin\": true\n }\n },\n \"bypass\": {\n \"admin_reload\": {\n \"path\": \"/admin/reload\",\n \"status\": 200\n },\n \"openapi\": {\n \"path\": \"/openapi.json\",\n \"status\": 200\n }\n },\n \"controls\": {\n \"auth_api_key_no_secret\": {\n \"admin_reload\": {\n \"status\": 503\n }\n },\n \"auth_api_key_no_header\": {\n \"admin_reload\": {\n \"status\": 401\n }\n }\n },\n \"feature_handler_nonlocalhost_noauth_exit\": 4,\n \"auth_fail_closed_current_control\": true,\n \"ok\": true\n}\n```\n\nStored evidence:\n\n- `evidence/current-v4.6.58.json`\n- `evidence/version-sweep.tsv`\n\n## Why this is not intended behavior\n\nThis is not only a disagreement about whether operators should configure auth.\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s current security documentation says recent hardening changed API\nservers so anonymous requests return `401` and servers bind to `127.0.0.1` by\ndefault. Recipe server docs say `auth: api-key` should be used for production,\nadmin endpoints require auth, and public servers should not run without\nauthentication.\n\nThe implementation also shows the intended boundary:\n\n- `create_auth_middleware()` now returns `503` if API-key/JWT auth is selected\n without a secret.\n- `RecipeHandler.cmd_serve()` refuses non-localhost binding when `auth` is\n `none`.\n- The vulnerable Typer command is marked deprecated and tells users to use the\n newer command, but the installed entrypoint still routes `praisonai recipe`\n to that Typer command before the legacy handler can enforce the guard.\n\nThe official local HTTP sidecar docs describe the sidecar as communicating over\nlocalhost and \"no external network required\", but the Docker example still uses:\n\n```text\nCMD [\"praisonai\", \"recipe\", \"serve\", \"--host\", \"0.0.0.0\", \"--port\", \"8765\"]\n```\n\nThat command exposes the Typer path above and does not enable auth, even if\n`PRAISONAI_API_KEY` is present in the environment, because this path only sets\n`auth` when `--api-key` is passed or a config file sets `auth`.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf an operator follows the vulnerable command path on a reachable interface,\nany network caller that can reach the Recipe HTTP server can access recipe\nrunner endpoints without credentials.\n\nAffected endpoints include:\n\n- `GET /v1/recipes`\n- `POST /v1/recipes/run`\n- `POST /v1/recipes/stream`\n- `POST /v1/recipes/validate`\n- optional `POST /admin/reload` when admin endpoints are enabled\n\nThe exact impact depends on configured recipes and deployment context. At a\nminimum, an attacker can enumerate recipes and trigger recipe validation or\nexecution flows intended for local or authenticated callers. In deployments\nwith powerful recipes, tool-enabled recipes, or admin endpoints, this can cause\nunauthorized workflow execution, model/API spend, state changes, or recipe\nregistry reload operations.\n\nThis report does not claim arbitrary code execution by default.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nPrefer one canonical Recipe server CLI path and enforce the same preflight for\nevery wrapper.\n\nRecommended changes:\n\n1. Remove or hard-disable the deprecated Typer `praisonai recipe serve` command,\n or make it delegate to the hardened `RecipeHandler.cmd_serve()` code path.\n2. Add the same non-localhost/no-auth guard to `cli/commands/recipe.py`.\n3. Treat `PRAISONAI_API_KEY` as a secret only when `auth=api-key` is selected;\n do not rely on the env var\u0027s presence alone unless the command also enables\n auth explicitly.\n4. Fix the deprecated command\u0027s help examples so remote binding always includes\n auth.\n5. Consider changing `--cors` default from `*` to no CORS or localhost origins.\n6. Add regression tests that invoke the installed `praisonai.__main__.main()`\n entrypoint, not only the legacy feature handler:\n - `praisonai recipe serve --host 0.0.0.0` fails before launch unless auth is\n selected and configured;\n - `praisonai recipe serve --host 0.0.0.0 --admin` cannot expose\n `/admin/reload` without auth;\n - selected but misconfigured auth still returns `503`;\n - configured auth with no header returns `401`.",
"id": "GHSA-5qw8-f2g9-ff29",
"modified": "2026-06-18T13:52:44Z",
"published": "2026-06-18T13:52:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-5qw8-f2g9-ff29"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI recipe serve Typer command bypasses the non-localhost authentication guard"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.