GHSA-5RQ4-664W-9X2C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-25 22:34 – Updated: 2026-02-25 22:34
VLAI?
Summary
Basic FTP has Path Traversal Vulnerability in its downloadToDir() method
Details

The basic-ftp library contains a path traversal vulnerability in the downloadToDir() method. A malicious FTP server can send directory listings with filenames containing path traversal sequences (../) that cause files to be written outside the intended download directory.

Source-to-Sink Flow

1. SOURCE: FTP server sends LIST response
└─> "-rw-r--r-- 1 user group 1024 Jan 20 12:00 ../../../etc/passwd"

2. PARSER: parseListUnix.ts:100 extracts filename
└─> file.name = "../../../etc/passwd"

3. VALIDATION: parseListUnix.ts:101 checks
└─> if (name === "." || name === "..") ❌ (only filters exact matches)
└─> "../../../etc/passwd" !== "." && !== ".." ✅ PASSES

4. SINK: Client.ts:707 uses filename directly
└─> const localPath = join(localDirPath, file.name)
└─> join("/safe/download", "../../../etc/passwd")
└─> Result: "/safe/download/../../../etc/passwd" → resolves to "/etc/passwd"

5. FILE WRITE: Client.ts:512 opens file
└─> fsOpen(localPath, "w") → writes to /etc/passwd (outside intended directory)

Vulnerable Code

File: src/Client.ts:707

protected async _downloadFromWorkingDir(localDirPath: string): Promise<void> {
await ensureLocalDirectory(localDirPath)
for (const file of await this.list()) {
const localPath = join(localDirPath, file.name) // ⚠️ VULNERABLE
// file.name comes from untrusted FTP server, no sanitization
await this.downloadTo(localPath, file.name)
}
}

Root Cause: - Parser validation (parseListUnix.ts:101) only filters exact . or .. entries - No sanitization of ../ sequences in filenames - path.join() doesn't prevent traversal, fs.open() resolves paths

Impact

A malicious FTP server can: - Write files to arbitrary locations on the client filesystem - Overwrite critical system files (if user has write access) - Potentially achieve remote code execution

Affected Versions

  • Tested: v5.1.0
  • Likely: All versions (code pattern exists since initial implementation)

Mitigation

Workaround: Do not use downloadToDir() with untrusted FTP servers.

Fix: Sanitize filenames before use:

import { basename } from 'path'

// In _downloadFromWorkingDir:
const sanitizedName = basename(file.name) // Strip path components
const localPath = join(localDirPath, sanitizedName)
Severity ?
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "basic-ftp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27699"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-25T22:34:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-25T15:20:53Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The `basic-ftp`\u00a0library contains a path traversal vulnerability in the `downloadToDir()`\u00a0method. A malicious FTP server can send directory listings with filenames containing path traversal sequences (`../`) that cause files to be written outside the intended download directory.\n\n\n## Source-to-Sink Flow\n\n```\n1. SOURCE: FTP server sends LIST response\n\u2514\u2500\u003e \"-rw-r--r-- 1 user group 1024 Jan 20 12:00 ../../../etc/passwd\"\n\n2. PARSER: parseListUnix.ts:100 extracts filename\n\u2514\u2500\u003e file.name = \"../../../etc/passwd\"\n\n3. VALIDATION: parseListUnix.ts:101 checks\n\u2514\u2500\u003e if (name === \".\" || name === \"..\") \u274c (only filters exact matches)\n\u2514\u2500\u003e \"../../../etc/passwd\" !== \".\" \u0026\u0026 !== \"..\" \u2705 PASSES\n\n4. SINK: Client.ts:707 uses filename directly\n\u2514\u2500\u003e const localPath = join(localDirPath, file.name)\n\u2514\u2500\u003e join(\"/safe/download\", \"../../../etc/passwd\")\n\u2514\u2500\u003e Result: \"/safe/download/../../../etc/passwd\" \u2192 resolves to \"/etc/passwd\"\n\n5. FILE WRITE: Client.ts:512 opens file\n\u2514\u2500\u003e fsOpen(localPath, \"w\") \u2192 writes to /etc/passwd (outside intended directory)\n```\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n**File**: `src/Client.ts:707`\n\n```typescript\nprotected async _downloadFromWorkingDir(localDirPath: string): Promise\u003cvoid\u003e\u00a0{\nawait ensureLocalDirectory(localDirPath)\nfor\u00a0(const file of await\u00a0this.list()) {\nconst localPath = join(localDirPath, file.name) // \u26a0\ufe0f VULNERABLE\n// file.name comes from untrusted FTP server, no sanitization\nawait this.downloadTo(localPath, file.name)\n}\n}\n```\n\n**Root Cause**:\n-\u00a0Parser validation (`parseListUnix.ts:101`) only filters exact `.`\u00a0or `..`\u00a0entries\n-\u00a0No sanitization of `../`\u00a0sequences in filenames\n- `path.join()`\u00a0doesn\u0027t prevent traversal, `fs.open()`\u00a0resolves paths\n\n\n# Impact\n\nA malicious FTP server can:\n-\u00a0Write files to arbitrary locations on the client filesystem\n-\u00a0Overwrite critical system files (if user has write access)\n-\u00a0Potentially achieve remote code execution\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- **Tested**: v5.1.0\n- **Likely**: All versions (code pattern exists since initial implementation)\n\n## Mitigation\n\n**Workaround**: Do not use `downloadToDir()`\u00a0with untrusted FTP servers.\n\n**Fix**: Sanitize filenames before use:\n\n```typescript\nimport\u00a0{ basename\u00a0} from \u0027path\u0027\n\n// In _downloadFromWorkingDir:\nconst sanitizedName = basename(file.name) // Strip path components\nconst localPath = join(localDirPath, sanitizedName)\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-5rq4-664w-9x2c",
  "modified": "2026-02-25T22:34:26Z",
  "published": "2026-02-25T22:34:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp/security/advisories/GHSA-5rq4-664w-9x2c"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27699"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp/commit/2a2a0e6514357b9eda07c2f8afbd3f04727a7cd9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/patrickjuchli/basic-ftp/releases/tag/v5.2.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Basic FTP has Path Traversal Vulnerability in its downloadToDir()\u00a0method"
}


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  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.