GHSA-665X-PPC4-685W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-21 15:20 – Updated: 2026-04-21 15:20Cross-user wishlist item import via shared wishlist code, leading to private option disclosure and file-disclosure variant
Summary
The shared wishlist add-to-cart endpoint authorizes access with a public sharing_code, but loads the acted-on wishlist item by a separate global wishlist_item_id and never verifies that the item belongs to the shared wishlist referenced by that code.
This lets an attacker use:
- a valid shared wishlist code for wishlist A
- a wishlist item ID belonging to victim wishlist B
to import victim item B into the attacker's cart through the shared wishlist flow for wishlist A.
Because the victim item's stored buyRequest is reused during cart import, the victim's private custom-option data is copied into the attacker's quote. If the product uses a file custom option, this can be elevated to cross-user file disclosure because the imported file metadata is preserved and the download endpoint is not ownership-bound.
Vulnerability Type
- Broken object-level authorization / IDOR
- Cross-user data disclosure
- Cross-user file disclosure variant
Root Cause
In app/code/core/Mage/Wishlist/controllers/SharedController.php, the shared flow does:
$item = Mage::getModel('wishlist/item')->load($itemId);
$wishlist = Mage::getModel('wishlist/wishlist')->loadByCode($code);
...
$item->addToCart($cart);
Relevant lines:
SharedController.php:86loads the wishlist item by global IDSharedController.php:87loads the wishlist by shared codeSharedController.php:99imports the item into cart
There is no check that:
$item->getWishlistId() == $wishlist->getId()
The safe owner flow in app/code/core/Mage/Wishlist/controllers/IndexController.php:521-528 does preserve this binding by deriving the wishlist from item->getWishlistId().
The imported item keeps its original buyRequest because app/code/core/Mage/Wishlist/Model/Item.php:370-372 passes that stored request directly into:
$cart->addProduct($product, $buyRequest);
Security Impact
Baseline impact
An attacker can import another user's private wishlist item into the attacker's own cart, using an unrelated shared wishlist code.
This is a clear cross-user authorization bypass. The victim item's private configuration is copied into the attacker's quote, including custom-option values such as personalized text.
Stronger variant: cross-user file disclosure
If the victim item contains a custom option of type file, the imported quote item preserves file metadata such as:
quote_pathorder_pathsecret_key
The file option renderer in app/code/core/Mage/Catalog/Model/Product/Option/Type/File.php:547-552 generates a download URL from:
- the imported
sales/quote_item_optionID - the preserved
secret_key
The downloader in app/code/core/Mage/Sales/controllers/DownloadController.php:150-185:
- loads quote item option by global ID
- verifies only product option type and
secret_key - reads the file from
order_pathorquote_path
It does not verify ownership of the quote item, order, or original wishlist item. This creates a cross-user file disclosure path once victim file metadata has been imported.
Steps To Reproduce
Lab data
- shared wishlist A:
wishlist_id = 1customer_id = 2sharing_code = 6376bb8c37a09c2de3664bd8cdc16412- victim wishlist B:
wishlist_id = 2customer_id = 3- victim item:
wishlist_item_id = 1wishlist_id = 2product_id = 2- victim private text option marker:
VICTIM-MARKER-49040822
Reproduction
Send:
GET /wishlist/shared/cart/?code=6376bb8c37a09c2de3664bd8cdc16412&item=1
Where:
codebelongs to shared wishlist Aitem=1belongs to victim wishlist B
Expected result
The request should be rejected because the item does not belong to the shared wishlist referenced by the sharing_code.
Actual result
The application imports victim item 1 into the attacker's quote anyway.
Verified Evidence
Baseline variant
Previously verified at quote/option level in lab:
option_1 = VICTIM-MARKER-49040822
This shows that the attacker's cart received victim-private custom-option data from another user's wishlist item.
File-disclosure variant
Previously verified in lab after importing a victim file-option payload:
/sales/download/downloadCustomOption/id/9/key/86fca9b61c0b891b52fb/
This URL was generated from imported quote item option data containing the victim file metadata and secret key.
Why This Is A Valid Bug
This is not a timing issue and does not depend on non-default security settings.
The bug is a direct authorization failure:
- authorization is based on wishlist A's share code
- the acted-on object is item B from another wishlist
- there is no item-to-wishlist binding check
- victim-controlled item state is then copied into attacker-controlled cart state
That is a broken object-level authorization issue with clear cross-user impact.
Remediation
In SharedController::cartAction(), reject any request where the loaded item does not belong to the wishlist loaded from the share code:
$item = Mage::getModel('wishlist/item')->load($itemId);
$wishlist = Mage::getModel('wishlist/wishlist')->loadByCode($code);
if (!$item->getId() || !$wishlist->getId() || (int) $item->getWishlistId() !== (int) $wishlist->getId()) {
return $this->_forward('noRoute');
}
Defense in depth:
- bind
sales/download/downloadCustomOptionto the current quote/order owner instead of trusting onlyid + secret_key
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "openmage/magento-lts"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "20.17.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40098"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-21T15:20:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-20T17:16:34Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "# Cross-user wishlist item import via shared wishlist code, leading to private option disclosure and file-disclosure variant\n\n## Summary\n\nThe shared wishlist add-to-cart endpoint authorizes access with a public `sharing_code`, but loads the acted-on wishlist item by a separate global `wishlist_item_id` and never verifies that the item belongs to the shared wishlist referenced by that code.\n\nThis lets an attacker use:\n\n- a valid shared wishlist code for wishlist A\n- a wishlist item ID belonging to victim wishlist B\n\nto import victim item B into the attacker\u0027s cart through the shared wishlist flow for wishlist A.\n\nBecause the victim item\u0027s stored `buyRequest` is reused during cart import, the victim\u0027s private custom-option data is copied into the attacker\u0027s quote. If the product uses a file custom option, this can be elevated to cross-user file disclosure because the imported file metadata is preserved and the download endpoint is not ownership-bound.\n\n## Vulnerability Type\n\n- Broken object-level authorization / IDOR\n- Cross-user data disclosure\n- Cross-user file disclosure variant\n\n## Root Cause\n\nIn `app/code/core/Mage/Wishlist/controllers/SharedController.php`, the shared flow does:\n\n```php\n$item = Mage::getModel(\u0027wishlist/item\u0027)-\u003eload($itemId);\n$wishlist = Mage::getModel(\u0027wishlist/wishlist\u0027)-\u003eloadByCode($code);\n...\n$item-\u003eaddToCart($cart);\n```\n\nRelevant lines:\n\n- `SharedController.php:86` loads the wishlist item by global ID\n- `SharedController.php:87` loads the wishlist by shared code\n- `SharedController.php:99` imports the item into cart\n\nThere is no check that:\n\n```php\n$item-\u003egetWishlistId() == $wishlist-\u003egetId()\n```\n\nThe safe owner flow in `app/code/core/Mage/Wishlist/controllers/IndexController.php:521-528` does preserve this binding by deriving the wishlist from `item-\u003egetWishlistId()`.\n\nThe imported item keeps its original `buyRequest` because `app/code/core/Mage/Wishlist/Model/Item.php:370-372` passes that stored request directly into:\n\n```php\n$cart-\u003eaddProduct($product, $buyRequest);\n```\n\n## Security Impact\n\n### Baseline impact\n\nAn attacker can import another user\u0027s private wishlist item into the attacker\u0027s own cart, using an unrelated shared wishlist code.\n\nThis is a clear cross-user authorization bypass. The victim item\u0027s private configuration is copied into the attacker\u0027s quote, including custom-option values such as personalized text.\n\n### Stronger variant: cross-user file disclosure\n\nIf the victim item contains a custom option of type `file`, the imported quote item preserves file metadata such as:\n\n- `quote_path`\n- `order_path`\n- `secret_key`\n\nThe file option renderer in `app/code/core/Mage/Catalog/Model/Product/Option/Type/File.php:547-552` generates a download URL from:\n\n- the imported `sales/quote_item_option` ID\n- the preserved `secret_key`\n\nThe downloader in `app/code/core/Mage/Sales/controllers/DownloadController.php:150-185`:\n\n- loads quote item option by global ID\n- verifies only product option type and `secret_key`\n- reads the file from `order_path` or `quote_path`\n\nIt does not verify ownership of the quote item, order, or original wishlist item. This creates a cross-user file disclosure path once victim file metadata has been imported.\n\n## Steps To Reproduce\n\n### Lab data\n\n- shared wishlist A:\n - `wishlist_id = 1`\n - `customer_id = 2`\n - `sharing_code = 6376bb8c37a09c2de3664bd8cdc16412`\n- victim wishlist B:\n - `wishlist_id = 2`\n - `customer_id = 3`\n- victim item:\n - `wishlist_item_id = 1`\n - `wishlist_id = 2`\n - `product_id = 2`\n- victim private text option marker:\n - `VICTIM-MARKER-49040822`\n\n### Reproduction\n\nSend:\n\n```http\nGET /wishlist/shared/cart/?code=6376bb8c37a09c2de3664bd8cdc16412\u0026item=1\n```\n\nWhere:\n\n- `code` belongs to shared wishlist A\n- `item=1` belongs to victim wishlist B\n\n### Expected result\n\nThe request should be rejected because the item does not belong to the shared wishlist referenced by the `sharing_code`.\n\n### Actual result\n\nThe application imports victim item `1` into the attacker\u0027s quote anyway.\n\n## Verified Evidence\n\n### Baseline variant\n\nPreviously verified at quote/option level in lab:\n\n```text\noption_1 = VICTIM-MARKER-49040822\n```\n\nThis shows that the attacker\u0027s cart received victim-private custom-option data from another user\u0027s wishlist item.\n\n### File-disclosure variant\n\nPreviously verified in lab after importing a victim file-option payload:\n\n```text\n/sales/download/downloadCustomOption/id/9/key/86fca9b61c0b891b52fb/\n```\n\nThis URL was generated from imported quote item option data containing the victim file metadata and secret key.\n\n## Why This Is A Valid Bug\n\nThis is not a timing issue and does not depend on non-default security settings.\n\nThe bug is a direct authorization failure:\n\n- authorization is based on wishlist A\u0027s share code\n- the acted-on object is item B from another wishlist\n- there is no item-to-wishlist binding check\n- victim-controlled item state is then copied into attacker-controlled cart state\n\nThat is a broken object-level authorization issue with clear cross-user impact.\n\n## Remediation\n\nIn `SharedController::cartAction()`, reject any request where the loaded item does not belong to the wishlist loaded from the share code:\n\n```php\n$item = Mage::getModel(\u0027wishlist/item\u0027)-\u003eload($itemId);\n$wishlist = Mage::getModel(\u0027wishlist/wishlist\u0027)-\u003eloadByCode($code);\n\nif (!$item-\u003egetId() || !$wishlist-\u003egetId() || (int) $item-\u003egetWishlistId() !== (int) $wishlist-\u003egetId()) {\n return $this-\u003e_forward(\u0027noRoute\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nDefense in depth:\n\n- bind `sales/download/downloadCustomOption` to the current quote/order owner instead of trusting only `id + secret_key`",
"id": "GHSA-665x-ppc4-685w",
"modified": "2026-04-21T15:20:41Z",
"published": "2026-04-21T15:20:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenMage/magento-lts/security/advisories/GHSA-665x-ppc4-685w"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40098"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenMage/magento-lts/pull/5446"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenMage/magento-lts"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OpenMage/magento-lts/releases/tag/v20.17.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenMage LTS: Cross-user wishlist import leads to private option \u0026 file disclosure"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.